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The purpose of this dissertation is to apply the concepts developed by the literature 
of asymmetric information and the principal-agent framew?rk to three separate issues related 
to financial markets. TIle first issue relates to the prolonged negative real growth, financial 
disintermediation, inflation and low real interest rates observed in eight former Soviet Union 
countries after the political collapse of the Soviet Union. TIle second issue relates to the 
individual behaviour of members in group credit contracts. The third and final issue relates 
to the mutual development of pension funds and stock markets. Data relative to the 
development of pension funds and stock markets in the transition countries of Eastern 
Europe are reported although the issue is far from being country specific. 
In the first chapter I develop a model of credit rationing with ex ante asymmetric 
information it fa Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) with risk neutral borrowers and Bertrand 
cOlnpetitor banks. The relationship between financial development and economic growth is 
assumed to belong to the Goldsmith (1969), McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) hypothesis. 
According to these authors, there is a positive relationship between economic growth on one 
side and increasing investment volumes and ef11ciency in the allocation of funds on the other 
side. TIle model developed in tlus chapter provides a possible explanation for the sustained 
negative real growth, lugh inllation and financial disintermediation observed in eight former 
Soviet Union countries for several years atter the collapse of the Soviet Union. Contrary to 
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), who consider heterogeneous borrowers and where the focus is on 
adverse selection, the model developed in the first chapter focuses on the moral hazard 
problem with identical risk neutral borrowers with a uruque stochastic project, whose 
probability of success can be increased by producing effort. Similarly to Stiglitz and Weiss 
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(1981), a pooling equilibrium with type II credit rationing is obtained where a less than 
socially desirable level of investments is produced. In Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) such a 
result derives from the fact that the marginal type in the pool of applicants chooses the safest 
project and any increase in the loan interest rate will cause the marginal type to drop out and 
hence, an increase in the average riskiness of the mix of applicants. In my model an increase 
in the loan interest rate reduces the borrower~' payoff in the good state and hence, it lowers 
the optimal etIort produced by borrowers. Notice that the under-investment result is directly 
in contrast to De Meza and Webb (1987). TIle reason for such a contrasting ditIerence 
between the Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) and the De Meza and Webb's (1987) frameworks 
relates to the fact that in the latter framework, the marginal type in the pool of applicants is 
instead, the riskiest type and any increase in the equilibrium loan interest rate increases the 
quality of the mix of applicants rather than reducing it; thus engendering a more than socially 
desirable level of investments. Clearly, my analysis falls in the former rather than in the 
latter framework. 
In the second chapter I develop a model of credit rationing with ex ante asymmetric 
information which describes the behaviour of individual borrowers within credit group 
contracts. Rural households in marginal areas of developing countries are often said to be 
too poor to be profitable to formal lenders (Otero 1995, Hossain 1988, Von Pischke 1991). 
The principal reasons being that, due to the lack of seizeable collateral, formal lenders tind 
the screening problem extremely costly relative to the small loan size that poor borrowers 
usually request. Group lending programmes have been introduced in various countries at an 
increasing rate thanks also to subsidised credit, but have moved beyond being profitable and 
often failed to properly target poor borrowers (Devereux and Fishe 1993, Khandker et al. 
1995). The Grameen Bank experiment in Bangladesh has probably been the most successful 
of such programmes and due to its success, almost all group lending programmes in other 
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developing countries have been designed upon tIlis model. The model developed focuses 
specifically on the issues of social sanctions and optimal group size. I introduce a social 
sanction function in the borrowers' utility function tI1fough whlch non-monetary disutility is 
imposed when borrowers deviate from tIle social norm. Peers engage in monitoring as 
individual actions atlect tIle group payoff and an optimal group size can be found for any set 
of parameters. 
In chapter tl1fee I analyse the issue of pension reform and pension funds development 
with particular reference to the transition economies of Eastern Europe. The model 
developed focuses on the mutual positive interactions between tIle development of pension 
funds and stock markets. It is claimed that the development of both these institutions is 
conditional to tIle production of publicly available information on the part of firms and 
tIlerefore, that the development of pension funds is beneticial to stock market efficiency and 
to the creation of elIective schemes of corporate governance. 
The issue of pension reform is constantly debated in Eastern Europe because of the 
fiscal unsustainability of public pay as you go (P A YG) schemes and because the economic 
transition trom the central plan has eroded the real value of pension benefits due to the 
almost total absence of indexation of contributions and benel1ts. A pension reform is likely 
to transform the structure of the l1nancial sector by promoting the creation of new l1nancial 
and non-financial agents, and by altering the relative importance of agents already active in 
the market. TItis is likely to have a profound impact on the existing patterns of allocation of 
funds, corporate governance and therefore, on the issue of tirm restructuring. In tllis 
framework, pension funds are likely to play an important role. More than any other 
institutional investors, they are likely to inl1uence the development of the stock market whlch 
in turn enables pension funds to develop even further as a more efficient stock market allows 
pension funds to allocate funds more efficiently. 
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The model developed in the third chapter is divided into two parts: in a first part I 
model the interaction between firms and stock market, and in a second part I model the 
interaction between pension funds and stock market. Firms in transition economies are 
affected by serious problems of corporate governance and this is one of the reasons for their 
exclusion from long term finance. In the model, a continuum of tirms with different 
probability of survival seeks long term equity !lnance in order to increase the set of available 
projects and hence, increase future net revenues. The information about the different 
survival probability is private to tirms and can be disclosed through signalling. The stock 
market is the natural means through which equity tinance is provided and, for different sets 
of parameters, a fully or partially separating equilibria are obtained. Because of the 
monopolistic nature of the stock market in the activity of processing tirms' information, a 
less than socially desirable number of firms is likely to be listed on the stock exchange. In 
the second part of the model, among the different types of institutional investors, pension 
funds are seen as the major provider of long term funding to the stock market. In a 
framework of bilateral monopoly with el1icient bargaining, I show ho'w increasing 
bargaining power of pension funds can yield to a larger number of l1rms being listed on the 
stock exchange and a larger volume of information being produced by tirms; therefore, to an 
increased etliciency in the economy. 
There is a unique framework that links together the three models presented in this 
dissertation. TIus is related to the presence of ex ante asymmetric information in a principal-
agent type of models. The focus is always on possible institutional responses in the financial 
markets of developing/transitional economies, aimed at reducing or eliminating the market 
failure and hence increase efficiency. TIle overall importance of my analysis is related to the 
general institutional approach to financial development. Development is not just about 
getting the right economic and technical inputs through macroeconomic stabilisation policies 
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(TIle World Bank), it is also (among other things) about identifying which aspects of 
government actions need improving to overcome market failures. In tIus dissertation I 
address three specific issues related to market failures in financial markets whose 
identification and understanding definitely help the design of effective policies for financial 
development. Credit rationing alleviation in transition economies soon after the collapse of 
the Soviet Union is the topic of the first chapter. Credit rationing alleviation in rural credit 
markets is the topic of the second chapter. Pension reform, pension funds and stock market 
development in the transition econonties is the topic of the Hurd chapter. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Credit Rationing, Inflation and Financial 
Collapse in the FSU Countries 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Within the literature on economic growth, two sets of models can be identified for 
their different approach to endogenous growth. In a first set, there are models l for which 
along the steady state per capita output is constant; in order to achieye tIllS, a decreasing 
marginal productivity of capital is assumed. In a second set, there are those models2 where 
the marginal productivity of capital does not decrease and per capita real output is tIlerefore 
free to increase. I choose tIllS latter approach as the main theoretical framework for the 
following analysis. The reason for tlus choice will become clear in the next sections but a 
first intuition can be anticipated: only if the level of capital and/or its marginal productivity 
are allowed to increase along tIle steady state, can one really tIunk of a causality relationship 
between financial development and economic growth. 
TIllS chapter is structured in the following way. In section 2, I summarise the main 
results of the recent literature on financial development and economic growth. In section 
2.1, I analyse ditTerent indicators of financial development that have been used in tIle 
literature. 
In section 3, I relate the results of tIle literature to the findings in eight countries of 
the former Soviet Union: namely Armenia, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, Li tIluani a, 
Moldova, Ukraine. TIle main result of the section is that soon after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, these countries experienced numerous years of both political and economic 
instability. What is specifically analysed in tlus section is the behaviour of macroeconomic 
variables such as GDP, inl1ation, interest rates and deposits with the attempt to relate this to 
tIle hypothesis of monetary overhang. TIle hypothesis of monetary overhang describes the 
1 See Solow (1956) and Blanchard and Fisher (1989). 
2 See Lucas (1988) and Romer (1986). 
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passage from planned to market economies as a process involving a forced accumulation of 
monetary holdings that needs re-balancing through an increase in prices and interest rates. 
The process is of a monetary nature and it should be completed in the short run. 
Nevertheless, some countries had not managed to stabilise their economies before 1994. In 
the period 1991 - 1994, their economic instability was characterised, among other things, by 
negative real growth, high inflation, low real interest rates, financial disintermediation and 
rigidities on the labour market. Although the causes of the negative growth cannot be 
attributed to financial disintermediation only, the aim of tIlis analysis is to investigate the 
contribution of the financial development in the FSU countries to their growth in the period 
1991 - 1994 and therefore, only aspects relevant to the financial sector will be underlined. 
In section 4 I develop a model of credit rationing focusing on the relationsllip 
between financial development and growth. The rational bellind the model is that credit 
expansion can have a positive contribution to growth only if there are no losses of efticiency 
in the use of credit. The model gives a possible explanation to the delayed economic 
recovery of some FSU countries by assuming imperfect information on the part of the banks 
about borrowers. It also explains why some countries did not experienced a positive growth 
despite increased levels of financial deepening. The assumption, here, is that the legal and 
property rights systems of these countries were (and largely are still) not strong enough to 
guarantee a more efficient use of the new credit. As a matter of fact, I show that a credit 
expansion not accompanied by an improvement in the property right system yields to a less 
efficient use of credit and speculate that tIlis is likely to have happened. 
Conclusions follow in section 5. 
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2. FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 
Goldsmith (1969), McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) can be seen as the original 
contributors to the literature on financial development and economic growth. In their work 
they all suggest a positive relationship between output and financial development but the 
channels through which tIllS is achieved are ditJerent. On the one hand, Goldsmith (1969) 
suggests that financial development is responsible for higher rates of capital accumulation. 
According to tIllS line of thought, the development of the financial sector would allow 
economic agents to increase their savings. Increasing loanable funds, in turn, would increase 
investments and, through the production function, output. On the other hand, McKinnon 
(1973) and Shaw (1973) concentrate on the role of the financial sector on capital allocation. 
The development of the financial sector would allow a more efficient allocation of resources 
by increasing the "quality" of investments. In tIllS framework, output would increase again 
through the production function, but the focus is on increased efficiency in funds allocation 
rather than on increasing investment levels. 
Since these first contributions, the debate in the theoretical literature has focused on 
the analysis of possible channels linking financial development to economic growth and their 
relative importance. 
On a micro level Stiglitz and Weiss' (1981) paper focuses, among other tIlings, on 
the relationship between financial development and volume of investment. Stiglitz and 
Weiss (1981) present a model where credit is rationed due to imperfect information on the 
part of the banks about borrowers' project types. Risk neutral borrowers can choose among 
projects WitIl different riskiness and projects ditfer by a mean preserving spread.3 In such a 
framework, banks cannot screen borrowers and tIle resulting equilibrium is a pooling 
3 See Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970). 
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equilibrium with the marginal borrower choosing the safest project. If interest rate is 
increased, the marginal borrower drops out from the nux of applicants and consequently, the 
average riskiness of the projects 11nanced increases. Banks, therefore, ration borrowers more 
than what is socially desirable, engendering a lower than socially desirable level of 
investments. 
De Meza and Webb (1987) present a model of credit rationing where instead, the 
marginal borrower in the pooling equilibrium is the one with the riskier project. If interest 
rate is increased, the marginal borrower drops out from the nlix of applicants and the average 
riskiness of the projects nnanced decreases. In their model the level of investment generated 
because of the market failure is more than socially desirable. TIus proves that the 
relationsrup between credit expansion and level of investment is ambiguous when explained 
in a framework of asymmetric information. 
On a macro level, Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) show that the main role of 
financial institution is to process information and to channel loanable funds towards 
investment with lugher return. Hence, on the one hand, the activity of financial institutions 
stimulates growth but at the same time it benefits from econonlies of scale. TIle process of 
growth allows a lugher participation in the l1nancial sector reducing costs per loan. 
In Bencivenga and Snlith's (1991) paper, agents face stochastic consumption needs. 
They have the choice between investing in a liquid asset with a low expected return or in an 
illiquid asset with a lugh expected return. The aut1lors demonstrate that in the absence of 
financial institutions, investors tend to choose investments that can be readily liquidate whlle 
the presence of 11nancial institutions decreases the costs associated with liquidity needs and 
it makes possible for savings to be channelled towards investment with lugher expected 
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return. Because of tIlis improvement in the "quality" of investments, growth is achieved 
even if the volume of savings decreases. 
Roubini and Sala i Martin (1992) analyse the etIect of tax evasion on financial 
development. They present an interesting model where l1nancial development is avoided by 
the government in order to broaden the base of inl1ation tax. They suggest that tinancial 
development is avoided in those countries where revenues from tax on income are low 
because of tax evasion. 
Jappelli and Pagano (1992), somehow in the line with Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) and 
De Meza and Webb (1987), analyse the effect on savings of the relaxation of credit 
constraints. They show that when credit is rationed because future income is uncertain, 
agents tend to increase savings to l1nance consumption. TIlis implies an ambiguous 
relationsllip between a relaxation of the constraint on consumer credit and the level of 
savings. 
In summary, financial development alTects growth in a dual way. On the One hand, it 
may increases the Inarginal productivity of capital (but, at least on a theoretical ground, De 
Meza and Webb's 1987 results prove the possibility of the opposite outcome) by channelling 
loanable funds more efficiently. On the other hand it may increase the volume of savings 
(but the experience with the l1nancial liberalisation in Latin America shows the contrary) 
that would result in a larger volume of investments. 
The position adopted in the following analysis is that savings mobilisation and 
higher marginal productivity of capital alone are necessary but not sufl1cient conditions for 
econonlic growth. That is, savings mobilisation has to be accompanied by non decreasing 
productivity of investment (or vice versa) fortJlis to have a positive etTect on growth. 
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2.1 Alternative measures of financial development 
After having identified what is most likely to be the relationship between financial 
deepening and economic growth, it is necessary to isolate an appropriate indicator suitable 
for measuring the level of financial development.4 
A first best situation would be the analysis of two different and independent 
indicators: one for savings and/or investment mobilisation and one for capital productivity. 
On the one hand, savings and/or investment can be easily measured by looking at the 
ratio of deposits and/or domestic credit over GDP. For a given size of the economy, such an 
indicator would measure the ability of the financial system to raise funds and channel them 
towards their logical use, Le. investments. 
On the other hand, capital productivity is more ditlicult a variable to measure, 
especially in developing countries. Intuitively it would be best measured by the rate of 
return on enterprise investment. Although this would represent the most appropri~te 
indicator, it turns out not to be a feasible one with the data available for most of the FSU 
countries. The reason is that accounting systems used by the enterprises are too often 
inaccurate and biased. Since the direct observation of investment returns is made impossible 
by the inaccuracy of the data, it is necessary to rely on an indirect indicator of capital 
productivity. 
The McKinnon-Shaw hypothesis suggests that real interest rates on loans act as a 
proxy for the productivity of investments. The higher the interest rate, the more efficient is 
assumed to be the investment.s Nevertheless, positive real interest rates may be high because 
4 See King and Levine (1992) for a thorough analysis of various indicators, De Gregorio and Guidotti (1992) for a 
comparison between indicators based on monetary aggregates and interest rates. 
5 Agents would choose investments with a higher expected return to compensate the higher interest rate cost<;. 
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of risk premia rate caused by a weak financial sector, poor regulatory environment or legal 
framework. For tIlis reason, a better indicator could be the opportunity cost of holding 
money measured by the interest rate differential between deposits and loans. But if this 
spread makes perfectly sense when real interest rates are positive, its interpretation is more 
ambiguous when interest rates are negative. With negative real interest rates on deposits, for 
instance, agents are better off sllifting wealth into the future by trading goods instead of 
leaving their money into bank deposits. At the same time, if real lending rates are negative 
agents are always better off by borrowing instead of keeping their money. TIlis means that 
when both real interest rates (deposits and loans) are negative, the relevant spread is not the 
one between deposit and loan real interest rates, but it is the spread between zero (which is 
what the activity of "investing" in goods would yield) and real rate on loans.6 TIlis is of 
course equal to the modulus of the real interest rate on loans. 
In the FSU economies deposit and loan real interest rates were sometime positive 
and sometime negative in the period 1991-1994. Furthermore, it is known that for some 
countries, households preferred to use goods as a way of sllifting wealth in time but very 
little data is available to measure such an activity. For these reasons I chose not to use an 
indicator (direct or indirect) for capital productivity separately from one for financial 
deepening, but to rely on a summary indicator for the two phenomena. 
The value of domestic credit granted to the private sector as a percentage of GDP 
seems to be the best choice. Given the size of the economy, it tells us to what extent the 
financial sector contributes to growth by granting credit. It also gives an approximate 
measure of efficiency in the use of such credit if we a()sume that the private sector always 
uses credit in a more ef11cient way than tile government. 
6 In such a ca<;e, real interest rates on loans represent the benefit from borrowing with respect to the second best 
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3. FINDINGS IN THE FSU ECONOMIES 
The following sections analyse the data collected in the eight countries surveyed. 
The behaviour of macroeconomic variables in the year after the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union is explained here in terms of the "monetary overhang" phenomenon, wlule I will 
present a theoretical model of credit rationing to explain the behaviour of the same variables 
in the subsequent years. 
Tahle 1 M2 as % of GOP. 
Dec.-91 Dec.-92 
Armenia 73.68 40.12 
Belarus 35.10 
Estonia 125.16 27.90 
Georgia 62.01 43.60 
Latvia 25.00 
Lithuania 
Moldova 74.95 40.38 
Ukraine 59.06 31.40 
Source: IMF 
Before the political collapse, the financial sector of the Soviet Union Was 
characterised by forced private saving and government dissaving. On the one hand, excess 
demand on the good market and fixed prices, meant that the private sector was forced to save 
the excess money balance. On the other hand the government did not cover all public 
expenditure irom taxation and the financial sector intermediated to make private savings 
available to cover the excess. Table 1 reports a measure of tlus forced accumulation. It 
shows the lugh level of monetisation reached in the FSU economies by the end of 1991 
expressed by the ratio of M2 over GDP. 7 
action that agents can take. I.e. shifting wealth into future by storing it into goods. 
7 M2 was chosen as indicator for monetisation since M 1 is not available for all countries. In particular, the 
continuous change of legal tender, resulted in inconsistent "money outside banks" series. 
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Hence, before the dissolution of the Soviet Union, there was a direct link between 
financial deepening and 11scal deficit. In 1989 household savings deposits were 36.2 percent 
of the GNP while a comparable figure in the US was 33.7 percent (Conway, 1995). 
Nevertheless, this measure of financial deepening does not suggest a desire for saving on the 
part of the private sector but it represents an inefficient government fiscal policy together 
with a forced accumulation of purchasing power that was to be redeemed for future 
production. 
TIlls excess growth did not lead to substantial inflation because of the extensive 
system of price controls and the inflationary pressure was simply postponed until later price 
liberalisation. The regime of repressed inflation, prior the dissolution of the Soviet Union, 
determined the accumulation of nominal money balances, and the consequent excess demand 
on the good market. TIllS, could only be eliminated by setting the economy on a different 
path with hlgher nominal interest rates and prices. Higher nominal interest rates would clear 
the financial_market wIllIe higher prices would clear the good market. 
As a matter of fact, the adjustment took place only through prices because nominal 
interest rates remained arti11cially low. In particular, it is argued in section 4 that problems 
of imperfect information on the part of banks, due to a chaotic regulation system and an 
inel1icient legal system, induced banks to ration credit by keeping interest rates low. When 
prices started to be liberalised in the new republics, monthly inflation in the eight countries 
surveyed reached on average the level of 80 percent in January 1992. 
The situation in the new republics soon after the dissolution of the Soviet Union can 
be summarised in the following points: 
1. Decreasing real GOP. 
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2. High inflation. 
3. Low real interest rates on deposits and loans. 
4. . Drastically reduced levels of l1nancial deepening with agents shifting to alternative 
means to transfer wealth into the future such as f?reign currency and good~. 
The theory of monetary overhang suggests that -the adjustment should have taken 
place in the short run with prices and interest rates jumping to a higher level. What the data 
collected, is that such an adjustment did not take place at all, and if it took place, it took 
place in a much longer period than what suggested by the theory. 
In particular, the different economies surveyed, can be separated into two different 
groups. In the first group there are the Baltic States that managed to stabilise their 
economies since 1993. In the last two years, these countries experienced low inflation, 
positive real interest rates, increasing levels of l1nancial deepening and positive real growth 
in 1994. In the second group, all the other countries are far behind in the process of 
stabilisation and for most of them, the data seem not to suggest any sign of recovery . 
. 3.1 Real GDP 
A characteristic of former socialist economies is the strong decrease in real GDP that 
took place soon after the break down of the Soviet Union. Only few economies started 
recovering during 1994. Figure 1 shows how, in all the countries surveyed, real GDP 
decreased considerably between 1990 and 1993. Only in 1994, did real GDP increase in 
Armenia, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.s 
8 The data on 1994 change in real GDP come from IMF and local authorities estimates for most of the non Baltic 
States. The reliability of the data is very low because of inconsistency of methodologies and coverage across 
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Latvia experienced an acute contraction in the period 1991-93, estimated at about 46 
percent. The most important factors that affected the economy in those years inqlude: 
1. a tenns of trade deterioration. 
2. a continuing decline in trade with the FSU countries. 
3. political disputes. 
4. the collapse in payments mechanisms. 
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In particular, terms of trade deterioration occurred mainly in 1992. In addition to 
raw material shortages, terms of trade in Latvia sharply deteriorated as price liberalisation 
proceeded in other parts of the FSU. Meanwhile, a severe drought in mid 1992 caused 
countries. This is definitely lrue in Armenia more than elsewhere, 'hence, the national account figures should be 
treated with great caution. This may imply that the 0.6 percent growth in Armenia needs revising at a later date. 
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agricultural output to collapse. FSU demand for Latvian industrial goods also slowed due to 
the severe problems associated with adjustment and the breakdown of the trade and 
payments system within the region. As a result, in the tirst half of 1992 industrial output 
declined by 34 percent. Basically the same factors affected the other FSU economies but the 
Latvian fall in real GDP is somewhat more acute because the structural shocks listed before, 
occurred in Latvia at an earlier stage. TIns same reason ·is also expected to lead to a more 
rapid recovery. 
In 1991, Lithuanian per capita GDP was estimated to be 46 percent Ingher than in 
Russia9• However, in the following years, Lithuania experienced the strongest decline in real 
GDP among the Baltic States. Between 1991 and 1993, real GDP fell cumulatively by nearly 
57 percent whlle a 0.5 percent recovery was estimated in 1994. Terms of trade deterioration, 
continuing decline in trade with FSU, unreliable availability of oil from Russia and 
macroeconomic statistics more unreliable than in the other Baltic States account for tins fall. 
In Belarus, real GDP decreased by 21 percent cumulatively, between 1991 and 1993. 
In 1994 tIlere was a further drop of 21 percent. TIns continuous fall in real GDP is mainly 
due to terms of trade deterioration caused by tile fall in tile demand for Belorussian 
commodities in the FSU countries and the price increase of energylO and raw material 
imports. 
In Georgia, the fall in real GDP was even sharper. Between tile same years, real 
GDP decreased by 74 percent. A further fall of 36 percent occurred in 1994. Georgia shows 
the worst pattern of all countries surveyed. Its economic performance was adversely affected 
by civil conflicts. Together with the disruption in trade and payments arrangements with 
9 World Economic Outlook 1993. 
10 During 1990-93, imports of crude oil decreased by two third and import'i of electricity decreased by one third. 
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FSU countries as well as the deterioration in the terms of trade associated with higher energy 
import costs, they account for the total collapse of the economy. 
In Moldova, real GDP decreased by 45 percent between 1991 and 1993. In top of 
the trade disruption among FSU countries and terms of trade deterioration, local events such 
as the severe drought experienced in 1992 and the intense connict over the status of the 
Transnistria region accounted for such a deCline. Considering that agriculture represents a 
comparative advantage and that it accounted for about 42 percent of the NMP in 1993, the 
1992 drought largely explains the more than average decrease in 1992 real GDP. The 
cessation of hostilities, and the subsequent resumption of economic relations between 
Transnistria and the rest of Moldova, contributed to a partial recovery, especially in the 
industrial sector, in 1993. 
The last country surveyed was Ukraine. In tIus country, real GDP decreased by 37 
percent between 1991 and 1993. A further decrease of 17 percent occurred in 1994. TIus 
decline resulted from severe weakening demand, cutbacks in energy imports in 1993, 
tightening of monetary policy and administrative controls over the economy . 
. 3.2 Employment, wages and prices 
Despite the fall in real output, unemployment remained relatively low in almost all 
countries. 
Figure 2 shows how, at the end of 1993, unemployment never exceeded 10 percent 
of the labour force for any country except Armenia where it was 26.1 percent. 
Unemployment was calculated as residual in the labour force. l1 Official unemployment, 
11 The method used is likely not to take into consideration the falling participation rates in the economy or the 
forced unpaid leaves that workers were "offered" as alternative to unemployment. For Ukraine, unemployment is 
given a'i a percentage of the working age population. The latter comprises labour force and student'i. 
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hardly exceeds 1 percent for many countries and such a calculation represent a proxy also for 
hidden unemployment, forced unpaid leave or underemployment. The low levels of 
unemployment are a clear sign of rigidity in the labour market. Even for Armenia, the 
decline in employment has been markedly smaller than the measured decline in outpu.t, 
reflecting in part a tacit policy of maintaining emploYlllent by state enterprises 'as part of 
social policy. 
19m Labour force. 
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Figure 2 1993 Labour force. (1) active population. 
3.3 Wages, 
Information on wages is very poor and it is often available only for the public sector. 
Given its relative big size, especially in the early years of transition, I used tins information 
as a proxy for wages in the whole economy. Clearly, the quality of such an approximation, 
worsens with the progress of the privatisation process in each country and the following 
figures should be considered only as approximate. 
20 
Again, the Baltic States stand in a separate group showing relatively constant real 
wages at least in 1994. Between the tirst quarter of 1991 and the fourth quarter of 1993, real 
wages fell by 33 and 42 per cent in Estonia and Lithuania respectively. At the end of the 
same period, real wages in Latvia were back at 1991 levels. After the end of 1993, all three 
countries experienced relatively constant real wages. The reason for almost constant real 
wages in Latvia since 1991 is due to the fact that price liberalisation started in this country at 
the end of 1989 when real wages were already artiticially low. 
For the years 1992 and 1993, real wages in Armenia fell by 60 and 46 percent 
respectively, while in Ukraine by 23 and 61 percent. Belarus experienced an increase of 12 
percent in 1993 after a decrease of 14 percent in 1992. Moldova and Georgia represent an 
exception in tlus framework because real wages remained relatively constant throughout 
1992 and 1993, although there was a substantial variability witlun each year. Prior to 1993, 
wages in Moldova were determined on the basis of social policy and political objectives and 
were relatively stable. Afterwards, increases in nominal wages merely offset the increase in 
inflation. 
Given the relative stability of nominal wages and employment, it is safe to assume 
that, nominal costs sustained by the enterprises for their working capital, remained relatively 
constant since the break down of the Soviet Union. 
3.4 Prices 
Also as far as prices are concerned, we can divide the eight countries into two 
groups. The Baltic States have substantially succeeded in stabilising their inflation, whlle 
for all other countries the inflation is still not under control. Figure 3, Figure 4 and Figure 5 
allow an immediate comparison among the eight countries. It is worth noticing the similar 
inflation pattern in the Baltic States, almost identical for Estonia and Latvia. These last two 
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countries liberalised prices during more or less the same period and by the end of 1992, both 
governments had essentially completed the process of price liberalisation. Individual factors 
account for the success obtained in controlling inflation. A currency board was established 
in Estonia in June 1992, with a continued avoidance of net domestic financing of gener~l 
government. 
In Latvia, the progress in reducing inl1ation was due to the tightening of monetary 
policy that accompanied the introduction of the Latvian rouble in May 1992. Nevertheless, 
inflation accelerated by the end of 1993. Domestic absorption increased as a result of the 
increase in wages in budgetary organisations and average pensions increased by nearly 50 
percent in November 1993. 
Lithuania seems to have delayed inflation stabilisation due to a less tight monetary 
policy during the whole 1993. Nevertheless, inflation in tins country has been very much 
comparable to that of the other two Baltic States afterwards. As a matter of fact, common 
sources of inflation exist in the Baltic States since the beginning of 1994. Namely, exchange 
rate, upturns in domestic absorption and supply rigidities in the non-tradable sector. For 
instance, the real appreciation of tile Russian rouble in tile second half of 1993 (120 percent 
against tile kroon and 100 percent against the lat) drove up prices of goods imported goods 
from Russia whlch is still one of the Baltic States' largest trading partners. As Figure 4 
shows, tllis had an immediate impact on the inflation of Latvia and LitIluania and with a gap 
for Estonia. 
For the other countries, the situation is considerably different. Although tile process 
of price liberalisation took place later tIlan in the Baltic States, and prices of key product are 
still regulated, int1ation has been considerably Ingher. In general the lngher inflation of tile 
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non Baltic States can be explained by the common inability of these countries to control the 
money supply. Nevertheless, some specific factors needs underlying . 
.In Armenia, monthly in11ation reached the peak of 437.8 percent in November 1993 
reflecting the uncertainty related to the introduction of the dram, the massive inflow of old 
roubles from other countries of the former Soviet Union and the population's rush to 
substitute goods for cash holdings. 
Georgia faced similar problems during 1993 as a result of indiscriminate price 
liberalisation, highly accommodative financial policies and inflation expectations due to a 
lack of confidence in the economic policies. 
Expectations played also an important role in explaining intlation in Moldova. The 
reduction of subsidies on key food products at the end of 1993, resulted in a sharp increase in 
price pressures. Together with the following expectations of widespread confiscations 
related to the introduction of the leu, tillS induced the population to convert their cash· 
balances and bank deposits into goods or foreign currency. The much lower inflation in 
1994 is attributable to the tight monetary policy that accompanied the introduction of the leu 
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Figure 5 Monthly inflation in Georgia, Armenia and Moldova 
Ukraine is probably the country that still possess a considerable system of 
administered prices. Until December 1993, administered prices added up to more than 30 
percent of the CPI. Such prices were periodically increased producing sharp spikes in the 
recorded monthly intlation in January, June, September and December 1993. Intlation was 
considerably reduced during the first three quarters of 1994 due to the strong monetary 
tightening of late 1993 and to the fact that administered prices were not allowed to adjusted 
until the end of 1994. 
3.5 Interest rates 
The following figures report the monthly weighted real interest rate on time deposits 
and the monthly weighted real interest rate on short term loans for those countries with 
available comparable data. 
Given the fact that nominal interest stayed low because of informational problems, 
the behaviour of real interest rates is mainly determined by the behaviour of inl1ation. As it 
was anticipated by the data on inl1ation, the Baltic'States seelll to be the only countries to 
have succeeded in stabilising their economies. The negative interest rates in the early 1993 
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in Lithuania is easily explained by considering that inf1ation was then as high as four times 
more than in the other two Baltic States. Furthermore, the Central Bank of Lithuania 
adopted a highly restrictive credit policy in 1993 and early 1994. In the absence of a well 
functioning money market, banks had no uses for lent funds. As a result, real interest rates 
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Figure 6 Loan and deposit interest rates in Belarus 
--Deposits 
--Loans 
12 The credit ceilings imposed by the BOL may undermine t~c assumption of credit rationing as a result of 
asymmetric information for Lithuania. Although this should be generally true, in the Lithuanian case it does not 
look like being the case. Figure 9 shows that the abolition of the credit ceilings had no effect on real interest rates. 
This suggest the hypothesis that such c\.!ilings were not binding after all. 
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Figure 7 Loan and deposit interest rates in Estonia 
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Figure 8 Loan and deposit interest rates in Latvia 
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Figure 9 Loan and deposit interest rates in Lithuania 
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Figure 10 Loan and deposit interest rates in Ukraine 
A feature which is in common to the three Baltic States (but of different magnitude) 
is the negative rates during the third quarter of 1993 and the first quarter of 1994. Again the 
inflation acceleration, caused in large part by the appreciation of the Russian rouble at the 
end of 1993, is mostly responsible for such a drop. 
Belarus and Ukraine are clearly far from stabilising their economies. In Belarus, 
monthly real interest rates are highly negative and what is worse, they show a decreasing 
linear trend. In Ukraine, monthly real interest rates were negative throughout 1993 and then 
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positive during 1994. TIus behaviour mirrors the adjustments in the administered prices in 
1993 and the tightening of the monetary policy late in the same year that managed to curb 
inflation until the end of 1994. 
3.6 Savings 
The hlgh level of financial deepening aclueved ir. the Soviet Union was eliminated 
soon after the political collapse. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, fiscal deficits rose 
and private income dropped. TIus, together with the initial lugh inl1ation that resulted in 
negative real interest rates, discouraged private savings in the banking system. Table 2 
shows the considerable decrease of deposits as a percentage of GDP that occurred in all 
surveyed countries during the first years of independence. 
If before the independence, savings were redirected to finance the fiscal deficit, tIus 
was not possible anymore after the independence because of savings shortage and 
uncontrolled -prices. With decreasing income, the only source of incOlne left to ~he 
governments to finance fiscal expenditure was an intlation tax. Since the source of tax 
intlation is given by the monetary holdings denominated in local currency, the natural 
reaction to tile government policy was a prompt switch into assets denominated in foreign 
convertible currency. Table 3 shows tile marked increase in the share of deposits 
denominated in foreign currency in some countries. 
In Estonia, despite the progressive liberalisation of foreign currency transactions, the 
share of foreign currency deposits held with commercial banks, fell from 31 percent at the 
end of 1992 to nearly 8 percent at the end of 1993, suggesting the growing confidence in the 
kroon. During tile same period, time and savings deposits increased by almost 130 percent 
indicating improving confidence in the banking systeln. Nevertheless, thls is not evident 
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when looking at the ratio of deposits over GOP. The ratio decreased by 2 percent in 1994, 
probably as a consequence of the 4 percent increase of real GOP during the same year. 
Tahle 2 Deeosits as % of GDP. 
Dec.-91 Dec.-92 Dec.-93 Dec.-94 
·A;:m·eii·i~········9i:04·········45·.·75·········57:·1·6········"20:6·0···· 
Belarus 30.92 22.22 34.60 
Estonia 62.63 20.60 16.20 14.70 
Georgia 32.69 27.75 18.85 
Latvia 17.70 21.10· 27.63 
Lithuania 33.94 17.36 28.31 
Moldova 67.70 66.29 11.22 
Ukraine 51.31 22.69 6.44 5.83 
Source: IMP 
Table 3 Foreign Currencl: Deposits. 
Dec.-91 Dec.-92 Dec.-93 Dec.-94 
·A;.·~~·~i~··········0:2·1·· .. ·······1·9:23···· .. ··70:08 .. · .. ····7·1·:94··· .. 
Belarus 5.44 44.38 
Estonia 31.0 7.39 16.88 
Georgia 2.80 57.98 
Latvia 49.52 40.54 40.55 
Lithuania 54.06 36.90 42.11 
Moldova 
Ukraine 11.91 36.10 86.04 
Source: IMP 
In Latvia, deposits increased in 1993 and 1993 as a ratio of GOP. Despite the 
appreciation of the lat and the high rates on the lat-denominated deposits in the 11rst three 
quarters of 1993, foreign currency deposits, dropped from nearly 50 percent in the end of 
1992 to 40 percent at the end of 1993 and they remained at that level throughout 1994. 
In Lithuania, deposits increased only in 1994 as a ratio of GOP. Among the Baltic 
States Lithuania is the only state that experienced a decrease of deposits over GOP in until 
1993. The reason for tillS delay is attributable to the restrictive credit policy of the Central 
Bank. As lnentioned in section 3.5, credit ceilings discouraged tI1e banks iTOln attracting 
deposits. 
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With the exception of Belarus in 1994, all the other countries experienced a 
continuous decrease of the ratio deposits over GDP in all the years surveyed. 
3.7 Domestic credit 
The substantial financial disintermediation of the period 1991 - 1993 is also evident 
in the credit market. During those years, the ratio of domtstic credit granted to the economy 
over GDP constantly decreased. In order to have an idea of the magnitude of the 
phenomenon in real terms, it is worth recalling the magnitude of real GDP decrease reported 
in section 3.1. 
IehIe 4 Domestic Credit, GOP %. 
Dec.-91 Dec.-92 Dec.-93 Dec.-94 
··A·im·eii·i~········6i:45·········66·:50·········41·.9g·········24:ci2···· 
Belarus 49.48 27.23 
Estonia 60.59 10.09 10.16 
Georgia 85.09 94.61 29.72 
Latvia 19.54 14.34 17.08 26.21 
Lithuania 23.16 14.66 24.58 
Moldova 64.32 49.95 21.73 
Ukraine 36.64 54.81 13.75 18.22 
Source: IMP 
TahIe 5 P!!!.ate Sector ~ , GOP %. 
__ ~_~D.ec.-91 Dec.-92 Dec.-93 Dec.-94 
Armenia 66.60 45.26 9.68 17.46 
Belarus 44.43 18.25 
Estonia 55.73 11.44 12.71 
Georgia 78.36 72.52 20.54 
Latvia 12.80 13.72 19.21 
Lithuania 11.42 13.87 24.03 
Moldova 6.00 5.22 4.27 
Ukraine 24.42 36.09 12.48 13.47 
Source: IMP 
As it can be seen in Table 4 and Table 5,13 during 1994, and for some countries 
already in 1993, the decreasing trend of financial disintermediation was reverted. TIus is 
13 A close look of the two tables reveals that percentages in Table 5 for Estonia (1992 and 1993) are higher than 
the respective percentages in Table 4-:.This is due to the fact that in the Estonian monetary survey the Credit to 
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particularly true for the domestic credit granted to the private sector. In Estonia, nominal 
credit to the private sector increased by 139 percent iIi 1993 wlule credit to state enterprises 
remained constant. TIus retlected the rapid expansion of the private sector and the 
reluctance of banks to lend to state enterprises, the future of wluch was uncertain in the 
privatisation process that was boosted in 1993.14 In 1992, banks granted almost ~ssentially 
short term credits but by the end of 1993 the maturity' of such loans started increasing 
reflecting the increasing needs of the larger number of enterprises in the private sector to 
finance working capital. 
In Latvia, domestic credit more than doubled in 1993. In that year, domestic credit 
to private sector increased from 11 to more than 18 percent over GOP. TIus increasing trend 
was reinforced in 1994. Although Latvia shows the strongest credit expansion among the 
FSU countries in the last two years, the maturity of the loan portfolios remained short 
throughout 1993 and it started increasing only last year. 
In Lithuania, the Central Bank adopted a lughly restrictive credit policy in 1993 and 
early 1994. Under such a policy, each commercial bank was given a limit on domestic credit 
expansion each quarter. TIus is probably the reason for the decrease of domestic credit over 
GOP in 1993. Nevertheless, as Table 5 shows, the ratio of credit to private sector over GOP 
Government is net and negative. The data for Latvia 1992 and 1993 in both tables refer to January of the 
following year. Furthermore, the Latvian Domestic Credit to the private sector of the same two years includes 
credit to State enterprises. 
14 The total proceeds from privatisation sales mnounted to EEK 3! million in 1991-92. In 1993, the value of sales 
reached more than EEK 300 million, of which EEK 125 million were due to small enterprise privatisation. 
Privatisation of public enterprises has proceeded with varying success, depending on the size of the enterprise and 
the type of business in which they wereinvolved. (IMF, 1994 Estonia survey.) 
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increased from 12.5 to 13.5 percent that year. After the abolition of these ceilings in 1994, 
domestic credit over GOP expanded by 10 percent. 15 
,With the exception of Ukraine, for which domestic credit over GOP increased in 
1994 both in the private and government sector, the data collected show a continuous credit 
contraction for all the other countries. In Armenia although domestic credit to the whole 
economy contracted when measured over GOP, the same ratio relative to the private sector 
shows an increase of nearly 100 percent. 
In the following section I develop a model of credit rationing that explains the 
factual evidence just presented. In particular I will relate the slow recovery of some country 
to wrong government intervention in their financial markets. No claim is made of a unique 
explanation of the patterns observed but only of mere possibility. Unfortunately, the lack of 
data for the period soon after the political collapse of the Soviet Union makes it impossible 
to test the veridicity of the assumptions made here. 
4. THE MODEL 
What follows is a one period model of credit rationing with ex ante asymmetric 
information and with three agents: borrowers, banks and government. Borrowers' type is not 
known to banks and therefore, credit rationing may arise. Such market failure justifies 
government intervention, which tries to expand credit by providing banks with "cheap" 
money. Because of the low levels of income funds cannot be raised through taxes or 
borrowing and seignorage is used instead. Inl1ation has a negative effect on the quality of 
the mix of applicants since it lowers the real return on borrowers' projects and this may 
15 Notice that the relationship between credit ceilings abolition and credit expansion in 1994 is ambiguous. As 
already stated in footnote 12 it is dubious whether the credit ceilings were actually binding, since their abolition 
did not affect interest rates. 
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offset the increase in the supply of loans, which would derive from the government money 
expansion. Even if credit does not decrease, inl1ation may reduce borrowers'incentive to 
produce effort below the minimum level for their participation constraint not to bind and the 
financial system collapses because the demand for credit drops to zero. Alternatively, when 
the government tries to expand credit by increasing the value of the collateral that banks can 
seize in case of project failure/ 6 inllation is not created, the quality of the mix of applicants 
improves and therefore, the credit rationing is relaxed. 
4. 1 Borrowers 
A set of identical risk neutral firms (borrowers) each have wealth w insufficient to 
finance the activity of production (project) which costs I > w in nominal wages. 17 In order to 
run the project, each borrower obtains a fixed size loan I through a credit contract with the 
banks in order to pay wages at the beginning of the period. The credit contract defines the 
nominal size of the loan I, the nominal interest rate r to be paid at the end of the period in 
case of success and the collateral c to be paid in case of failure. The project is stochastic, 
with a binary realisation of X = 0 in the bad state with probability (1 - p) or X = M in the 
good state with probability p. The probability of success p is a function of the effort e that 
borrowers produce in running the project and it is logical to assume that p'(e) > O. Effort is a 
cost for the borrower and it enters his maximisation problem through a cost function gee) 
with g' > 0 and gil> O. Because of a weak legal framework and private property right 
16 The government can, for instance, strengthen legal framework for seizing collateral in bankruptcy states, 
enhance property righl'i et cetera. 
17 I assume that labour is the only input in the firm's productio.n function. Alternatively, the model can be re-
interpreted in tenns of material inputs where short term lending is directed at funding inventories rather than 
wages. Under this interpretation, finns have identical up-front purchases of material inputs. The reference to 
wages is merely indicative. 
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system, in the bad state banks can seize a fraction ~ E [0,1] of the collateral agreed in the 
credit contract. 
In the economy there is inl1ation 1t and although credit contracts are written in 
nominal terms, the parties are interested in the real va~ue of the contract. Nevertheless, 
agents are not perfectly rational and can only anticipate a fraction "I E [0,1) of future 
inflation. In otller words, agents, at the beginning of the transition, have not learned yet that 
they will be living in a high ini1ationary environment. Hence, borrower's real payons at the 
end of the period are (-~c) in case of failure and (m -IR) in case of success. Here 
m = M 1 + 'Y1t is the real value of the project in the good state and R = (1 + r) 1 + 'Y1t is the 
1+1t 1+1t 
real loan interest rate. 
The assumptions made so far need some justification. 
1. Borrowers are risk neutral and there is no reason why the market failure presented in 
tIns model would disappear if some agents were risk averse. The literature on credit 
rationing demonstrates that indirect screening mechanisms such as collateral and 
interest rate may not be surticient to avoid credit rationing even when agents are risk 
averse (Bester 1985, Stglitz and Weiss 1992). Furthermore, risk neutrality allows us 
to show how credit rationing is not attributable to the underprovision of insurance 
schemes to risk averse agents (Mankiw 1986). 
2. The size of the loan is lixed in nonlinal terms. Tllis 11ts the information collected on 
the FSU countries. The rigidities in the labour market reported in section 3.2 allow 
us to assume that the nonlinal cost of labour was basically constant in the period 
1992 - 1994. 
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3. Collateral is here constant in real terms and it seems unreasonable to assume the 
opposite. When inllation reduces the real value of money, borrowers can always 
hedge themselves by buying goods or any other asset whose nominal value increases 
with inflation. 
4. The realisation of the project is negatively alIected by inllation. The non-neutrality 
of money derives from the fact that inl1ation is only partially endogenised. Hence, 
unexpected inl1ation negatively aiTects projects as firms are likely to have sale 
contracts to meet stipulated at the beginning of the period. Also, changes in relative 
prices are unmistakably seen as the effect of real shocks only in a world with no 
inflation. But when inl1ation is positive, agents cannot distinguish between 
monetary and real components in the relative price change. As a result, unexpected 
inflation decreases the average prot1tability of a project since the information 
conveyed in the relative prices is reduced. 
Hence, the borrower's real expected return on the project is given by: 
( 1 ) ~(e) = -~c(l- pee)) + (m -IR)p(e) - gee) 
with m > R > I> w = c> o. 
ke2 By normalising I = 1 and assuming that pee) = e and gee) = - with k> 0, 
2 
borrowers' real expected return ii·om the project can be re-written as: 
(2) ke
2 
~(e) = -~c+(m -R+~c)e--
2 
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Borrowers maximise their real expected return given by ( 2 ) with respect to the 
effort e and subject to e E [0,1]. Assuming an internal solution, this yields ari optimal level 
of effort given by: 
(3) " m-R+~c e=----
k 
In order for e to be not larger than one, it must be the case that (m - R + ~c):::; k. 
Furthermore, nobody would bon'ow if ( 2 ) were negative. Therefore, a participation 
constraint on the real expected return must be taken into consideration, which implies that 
the optimal level of etTort be 0 < ~ 2~C $ e $ 1. It is worth noticing that the optimal level of 
effort cannot be zero. In such a case, borrowers would lose ~c with probability one and 
consequently, they would not bOlTOW. In the presence of collateral, a lower bound for effort 
exists, which is increasing in the level of collateral that banks can seize in the bad state. 
By totally differentiating the first order condition it is possible to determine the sign 
and magnitude of the change in the optimal level of effort for changes in the parameters. 
Thus: 
(4) de c de -=->0; --
d~ k dr 
1 de R m 
---<0' = - (')'-1)<0. 
k(l + 1t) 'd1t k(l + 1t) 
The optimal level of effort is increasing with the seizeable collateral and decreasing 
with nominal loan interest rate and inl1ation. The reason for tillS is that, other tllings being 
equal, any increase in the seizeable collateral (nominal interest rate) will make that bad 
(good) state more costly and borrowers will try to ~ompensate for this by modifying the 
optimal level of effort produced. Whenever effective inl1ation is higher than expected 
inflation the real value of repayment in the good state decreases. At the same time, tile 
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profitability of the project for any level of etTOlt decreases. Since the second effect offsets 
the first effect, borrowers arc better olI by reducing effort when effective inflation is higher 
than expected inflation.I8 
4.2 Banks 
Banks are risk neutral and Bertrand competitors on the loan and deposit markets. I9 
On each loan they grant, banks obtain pc when the project fails and IR when it succeeds. 
TIus means that banks' real expected return is given by: 
(5) per, c) = pcO- pee)) + IRp(e) 
Given the previous normalisation of 1= 1 and the fact that pee) = e, banks' real 
expected return, when the optimal response from borrowers is taken into consideration, can 
be re-written as: 
(6 ) p(r,e) = pc + (R - Pe)e 
Banks know that for any contract offered, borrowers' optimal effort is given by (3 ). 
Therefore, banks solve the maximisation problem recursively by taking into account 
borrowers' behaviour when maximising their real expected return. Banks' maximisation 
problem yields the following iirst order conditions: 
(7) ap = p[O _ e) + R - Pc] > 0 de k 
18 de Notice that when y = 1, - = 0 . 
dn 




Since ( 7 ) is Inonotonically increasing in c there will be no internal solution and 
banks will invariably ask for the maximum level of collateral from borrowers.2o S}nce ( 8 j is 
concave in r, it is possible to l1nd an internal solution for the nominal interest rare: i.e. 
. m l+n m 
1 + r* = ( - + f3c) --. Tlli s corresponds to an equili bri um real interest rate R* = - + f3c 
2 l+yn 2 
wllich is decreasing with inllation and increasing with seizeable collateral. 
At the equilibrium values, bOITower's and banks' real expected return are given by: 
(9) "I 11l2 . ¢ =-f3c+-; 
r* 8k 
Notice that banks are Bertrand competitors, hence the equilibrium real expected 
return on each loan must be equal to the real interest rate on deposits. Thus: 
(10 ) "/ 111
2 
• l+yn P =Ac+-=(l+l*)--=I* 
r* JJ 4k 1 + n 
Tins equation allows us to detennine the change in the equilibrium real rate of 
deposit 1*. 
( 11 ) £1/* £1/* m
2 (Y-l) 
--=c>O; --= <0 
df3 dIT 2k(l + n) 
20 Notice that this justifies the assumption initially made that w = c. 
39 
( 11 ) says that the real interest rate on deposits increases with the seizeable 
collateral and decreases with unexpected inl1ation.21 . 
, From totally differentiating the first order condition of tlus second problem, it is also 
possible to determine the sign and the magnitude of th~ change in the optimal loan rate R* 
for a change in the other parameters. Hence: 
(12 ) dR* --=c>o· dP , dR * = m(y-I) < o. dre 2(1 + re) 
( 12 ) says that the equilibrium real interest rate R* increases with the seizeable 
collateral and decreases with unexpected inl1ation. 
4.2.1 The supply of funds and loans 
Banks face a real supply of funds which is increasing in the deposit real interest rate 
given by: 
(13 ) L(I) = H(I) + FD 
where H(l) is the real supply of funds frOln households with H' > 0, FD is the 
(exogenous) real supply of funds ii"om the government financed through a budget deficit and 
1= (1 + i) 1 + yTt is the real interest rate on deposits. Funds are used by banks as reserves RE 
1+ Tt 
or in order to supply credit S in proportions ex and (1 - ex) respectively; Le. L = RE + S. 
Therefore, if the reserve requirement is binding, the real supply of loans is given by: 
21 Notice the role played by unexpected inflation. Banks know that there will be inflation like all other agents and 
like all other agents know that their forecast will bt! always and systematically lower than efJective inflation. 
Hence, nominal interest rate is higher than what be required if agt!nLo;; wt!re pt!rfectly rational. 
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(14 ) S(p) = (1- a) L(p) 
At the equilibrium real rate of interest R*, demand for credit can be in excess of 
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Figure 11: Credit rationing pooling equilibrium. 
In the first orthant of Figure 11 we have the demand and supply of credit. The 
demand D is infinitely elastic with respect to the real loan rate of interest since borrowers are 
all the same and the total demand in the economy is given by D .. The supply S is concave in 
R because of ( 8). Demand equals supply at the Walrasian real interest rate Rw (not shown in 
the figure). In the second orthant we have bank's real expected return on each loan p. In the 
third orthant we have the supply of funds to the banking sector L(~. The level of credit 
rationing is given by [D - S(plrJ1 . This is a type II credit rationing in the sense that, for the 




The government is assumed not to have an objective function to maximise but it has 
a budget constraint to respect. The real government expenditure g, which is not financed by 
" 
income taxes 't, gives rise to a real budget deli cit FD that needs financing by p~inting high 
powered money. That is: 
(15 ) FD = g -'t = ME 
( 15 ) can only be fully justified if we assume that there is no currency outside banks. 
In such a case, the real supply of funds to the banks L(I) can be interpreted as the real money 
supply and the real value of reserves RE as the real high powered money. 
It is possible to interpret ( 15 ) in a even more interesting way. In fact, the change in 
real high powered money can be re-written as: 
(16 ) 
where REn = aPL(I) is the nominal value of reserves. By substituting the 
expression for the nominal value of reserves into ( 16 ), ( 15 ) can be re-written as: 
(17 ) FD = rcRE 
( 17 ) says that the government liscal delicit has to be financed by a tax inflation and 
the base for this tax is the real money balances RE = aL(I). 
4.4 Credit expansion or contraction? 
Given the market failure stemming ii'om asymmetric information, it is safe to assume 
that the government may intervene in various ways in order to increase efficiency in the 
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credit market. The theoretical literature actually justifies public intervention in the presence 
of imperfect information because of its ambiguous effects on investment (Stiglitz and Weiss 
1981, 1992, De Meza and Webb 1987) and externality-like etIects (Greenwald and Stiglitz 
1986). The model just developed allows us to analyse two alternative intervention policies. 
4.4.1 Exogenous increase in the supply of funds 
The government can exogenously expand the supply of funds to the banking sector 
by printing money and letting banks allocate the extra funds to borrowers. By doing so 
inflation is produced by ( 17) drt = _1_. When inl1ation is produced, both borrowers and 
dFD RE 
banks experience real costs as there is always part of tIus int1ation that is not forecasted. 
From ( 9 ) we obtain: 
(18 ) d~1 * m2 (Y-l) 1 dpl * m2 (Y-1) 1 __ r = <0. _r_= <0 
dFD 4k(1 + rt) RE 'dFD 2k(1 + rt) RE 
"'I d~ d'" 
where __ r* is the change in the equilibrium real return for the borrower and ~ 
dFD dFD 
is the change in the equilibrium real expected return to banks when the government 
exogenously increases the supply of funds. Notice again that there is no change in the 
equilibrium if all inllation produced is endogenised by agents; i.e. y = 1. In tIlis case money 
is neutral. Since both borrowers and banks lose from unexpected inllation, with the latter 
losing more than the former, it is ambiguous whether the ration on credit is going to be 
relaxed or tightened after government intervention. To see tlus, it is necessary to evaluate 
the supply of loans at its maximum by substituting ( 10) into ( 13) and the result into ( 14). 
By doing so, the equilibrium supply of credit can be re-written as: 
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(19 ) Sl = (1-a) H(~c+-) +FD " [ 1112 ] 
r* 4k 
It is straightforward to calculate the change in the equilibrium supply of credit when 
FD increases: 
(20 ) dsL. =~+ iJS iJ/* dli =(l-Ul[l' aH 111 2(,,(-1) 1 ] 
dFD aFD vI * vrr; dFD al * 2k(l + 1t) RE 
The sign of ( 20 ) depends on the elasticity of the households' supply of funds with 
respect to the deposit real rate of interest and by how much inllation is anticipated by agents. 
For a given ,,(, if the supply or funds is sufficiently clastic, credit rationing is likely to 
increase. The increased inflation will lower tile real interest rate on deposits by ( 11 ), 
therefore reducing the households' supply or funds to the banks. 
TIns possibility is shown in Figure 12 where the gap between demand and supply . 
increases. TIle increase in government funds will shift the supply of funds to the left in the 
thlrd orthant. At the same time the higher int1ation will reduce the profitability of borrowers 
and hence, the real expected return to banks. Banks cannot increase the nominal interest rate 
on loans in order to fully compensate the increase in inl1ation because tIns would further 
decrease the level of effort that borrowers produce. Therefore, real interest rates decrease on 
both loans and deposits. In Figure 12 the supply of funds is highly elastic to real interest rate 
changes and the decrease of the deposit rate from 1* to 1'* more than offsets the exogenous 
increase in FD. Consequently, the equilibrium supply of credit diminishes in the tirst orthant 
and the level of credit rationing increases. Of course, if the elasticity of household's supply 
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of funds with respect to the deposit real rate of interest is sut11ciently low, the outcome of 
this policy may be reversed and credit rationing may"actually decrease.22 
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Figure 12: Government providing "cheap" money to banks. 
A second important result dcriving from this analysis should be also taken into 
consideration. TIus result answcrs thc qucstion whether the policy of "cheap" money is in 
the end sustainable. In ordcr to do this it is necessary to further consider borrowers' 
participation constraint. When effcctive inllation is higher than unexpected inflation, we 
know by ( 4 ) that the optimal levcl of cffort e\,.* = ~1~ is lower than what necessary to 
. . b '·1· TI . I tl d·t· t f3c < "I f' 1 ... maXUllise orrwers uti Ity. 11S means t lUt lC con 1 Ion k - e,.* or t le particIpation 
constraint to hold, may fail when inllation is not correctly anticipated. TIlerefore, it must be 
22 The likelihood of such outcome can he increased if governments announce well in advance their policies and 
the inflationary nature of money expansion. In this case. inl1atiol1 would be almost fully anticipated and the 
adverse effect on rationing, that derives rrom the households' supply, would be limited. 
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the case that for high levels of inflation 1t such that it < TC, real expected return from the 
project becomes negative for every horrower and the whole credit market collapses.23 
A first conclusion can be drawn from the previous analysis. A policy aimed at 
expanding credit by providing money to the banking system and relying on the inflation tax, 
may not increase the supply of credit if households' supply of funds is sutliciently elastic to 
the real interest rate on deposits and if agents do not anticipate such policy. Furthermore, 
even if expansion is achieved, this may not be sustainable and it could risk the collapse of the 
whole financial system. 
4.4.2 Increasing seizeahle collateral 
The model suggests a second alternative for the government to expand credit. This 
is strictly related to the idea of maki ng borrowers more profitable to banks and it is suggested 
by the role of collateral in the model. The government could for instance spend its limited 
resources in· improving the legal framework governing bankruptcy procedures or' in 
strengthening the private property rights system. TIus would increase the value of collateral 
that banks can seize in case of project failure. The strategy seems to be less inl1ationary than 
the previous one and it possesses a further strength: by ( 4 ), when banks can seize a hlgher 
fraction of the collateral agreed in the contract. the level of elJort produced by borrowers 
increases. Because of ( 7 ), tlus yields positive profits to banks, wluch start competing for 
borrowers by raising nominal interesl rates. Credit expansion will therefore be achieved 
without lowering the productivity of investments. By recalling that 
sl = (1- a)[H(~C + m? ) + G] from ( 19 ), the change in the supply of credit for a change 
r· 4k 
in J3 is given by: 
23 For a similar result, see Mankiw (1986). 
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(21 ) dsl '""H r* _ (1 ) 0 . 0 --- -a, --c> d~ a[* 
which still depends on the elasticity of the households' supply of funds with respect 
m2 
to the deposit real rate of interest 1* = ~c + 4k' but it is nevertheless unambiguously 
positive. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
The data collected on eight countries of the former Soviet Union (Armenia, Belarus, 
Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova and Ukraine) over the period 1991 - 1994 
suggest that these countries experienced a considerable econOlnic instability from which only 
the Baltic States seem to have recovered at the end of 1994. The economic instability of the 
countries investigated was characterised, among other things, by a sharp decrease in real 
GDP, high inflation, low real interest rates and financial disintermediation. Furthermore, 
rigidities in the labour market implied that nominal wage and employment remained 
relatively constant over the period. 
The initial instability is well explained by the hypothesis of monetary overhang. 
Before the political collapse, the financial sector of the Soviet Union was characterised by 
forced private saving and government dissaving. On the one hand, excess demand on the 
good market and fixed prices, meant thut the private sector was forced to save the excess 
money balances. On the other hand the government did not cover all public expenditure 
from taxation and the financial sector intermediated to make private savings available to 
cover the excess. 
TIus excess growth did not lead to suhstantial int1ation because of the extensive 
system of price controls and the ~?llationary pressure was simply postponed until later price 
47 
liberalisation. The regime of repressed inflation, prior the dissolution of the Soviet Union, 
determined the accumulation of nominal money balances, and the consequent excess demand 
on the good market. 'This, could only be eliminated by setting the economy on a different 
path with higher nominal interest rates and prices. Higher nominal interest rates would clear 
the financial market while higher prices would clear the good market. 
Two issues have been analysed in tIus chapter: 
1. Interest rates relnained very low despite what is suggested by the monetary overhang 
hypothesis. It seems that the adjustment (partially aclueved only in the Baltic States) 
took place only through prices. It has been claimed here that in all countries, interest 
rates stayed low because of the imperfect information that banks have on borrowers. 
When banks cannot perfectly screen borrowers, they offer contracts with collateral 
and interest rate that maximise their expected profits with no consideration about the 
demand level. If tIus is tile case, the equilibriUln interest rate need not to be tile 
Walrasian interest rate and borrowers are rationed. 
2. The economic recovery seems to have taken place only in the Baltic States but in a 
period of time well beyond what the monetary overhang hypothesis suggests. In 
tIlese countries, tile level of financial deepening, measured as the ratio of domestic 
credit to the private sector over GDP, started increasing already in 1993, suggesting 
a relationship between financial deepening and growth. The Baltic States are not the 
only states showing tlus pattern. In 1994 financial deepening increased also in 
Belarus and Ukraine. Nevert1leless these two countries are far from showing 
posi ti ve growth. 
It is claimed in tlus paper that one possible explanation for the different pattern 
followed in the transition between the Baltic States and tile rest of the FSU countries lies in 
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the presence of imperfect information in the credit market, coupled with a weak institutional 
and legal framework, especially as far as the system of property rights is concerned. 
, In such a set up, governments have tried to increase the efficiency of the credit 
market by providing the banking sector with "cheap" l~oney. Because of the low revenues 
from income, the only source for tIns extra funds has been the inflation tax. Nevertheless, by 
producing inflation whlch is not perfectly anticipated, governments reduced the profitability 
of projects for borrowers and as a consequence, the real expected return to banks on each 
loan. As a result, banks kept nominal interest rates on loans low in order to offset the 
negative impact of inflation on bOlTowers' quality. TIns Ineant that lower profits were 
available to pay depositors and nominal interest rates on deposits also remained low. 
Credit ratiorung has been relaxed in those countries with low inflation, with a 
stronger legal framework and better defined institutions. In countries with hlgh inflation, the 
quality of borrowers has been too low to create any substantial demand for credit. The 
situation of the financial market in countries such as Belarus, Ukraine, Georgia and Armerua 
is a situation of virtual collapse with extremely low demand for credit despite the negative 
real interest rates on loans. 
The role of unexpected inflation and collateral in tins model suggests a second 
option available to governments to expand credit. By increasing the value of tile collateral 
tIlat banks can seize in the event of project failure, governments improve tile quality of 
applicants served by banks. TIns policy is unlikely to be as inflationary as the previous one 
and it would result in lngher real interest rates and increasing supply of credit from the 
banking sector. More specifically, governments should first stabilise tIleir economies and 
through tllis, reduce inl1ation and create the conditions for a positive credit demand. Once 
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the demand for credit exists, it can be improved by strengthening the legal framework with 
particular reference to the bankruptcy law and private property right systems. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Credit Rationing, Group Lending and 
Optimal Group Size 
6. INTRODUCTION 
Credit is an important constraint on production in developing countries. Formal 
credit is almost unavailable to the rural poor because their lack of collateral, and the extreme 
unpredictability of the weather, make them "unprofitable" to formal lenders. Informal credit, 
although widely present, is granted by moneylenders at extremely high interest rates which 
. 
limit the set of feasible productive projects available to borrowers. In tIlis context the 
availability of credit at lower costs is considered essential to alleviate poverty and promote 
economic development in developing countries, especially in rural areas. 
Rural households in marginal areas of developing countries are often said to be too 
poor to be prol1table to formal lenders (Otero 1995, Hossain 1988, Von Pischke 1991). The 
principal reasons being that, due to tile lack of seizeable collateral, formal lenders find the 
screening problem extremely costly relative to the small size of tile loan tIlat poor borrowers 
usually request. Group lending programmes have been introduced in various countries at-an 
increasing rate tIlanks also to subsidised credit, but have moved beyond being profitable and 
often failed to properly target poor borrowers (Devereux and Fishe 1993, Khandker et aZ. 
1995). The Grameen Bank experiment in Bangladesh has probably been the most successful 
of such programmes24 and due to its success, almost all group lending programmes in other 
developing countries have been designed upon tIlis mode1.25 
24 Important studies of the Grameen Bank and other successful rural credit programmes are: Hoff et al. 1993, 
Hossain 1988, Huppi and Feder 1990, Khandker et al. 1995, Von Pischke et al. 1983, Wahid 1994, Wenner 
1995, Yaron 1992. 
25 Among the developing countries that have introduced group lending programmes modelled upon the Grameen 
Bank system are: Bolivia, China, Kenya, India, Indonesia, Lesotho, Nepal, Nigeria, Malaysia, The Philippines and 
Tanzania. In the United States, the Grameen Bank system has been replicated in the city of Chicago and rural 
Arkansa'> (Armendariz and Gollier 1996)._ 
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Tllis chapter is structured in the following way. In section 7, drawing on the existing 
literature on group lending, I analyse the group characteristics that are likely to'make a group 
credit contract more efficient that an individual credit contract. The literature has so far 
concentrated on various issues such as the risk sharing properties of the group contracts, their 
informational content, efficiency, welfare properties, monitoring structures and joint 
responsibility of project outcome. Little work has been done on why credit groups tend to be 
small and little weight has been put on the social interactions that seem to me crucial in 
explaining group formation and behaviour. In section 8 I present a model of group lending 
wllich focuses specifically on the issues of social sanctions and optimal group size. The 
contribution to the existing literature consists in the attempt to formally study the 
determinants of group size in group lending contracts. Conclusions follow in section 9. 
7. GROUP CHARACTERISTICS 
In the principal agent framework of credit contracts, specific characteristics of group 
credit have 'been identified, likely to make group credit contracts more efficient than 
individual credit contracts. At the stage of group formation agents are likely to make use of 
superior private information in choosing their peers: self selection is likely to take place then, 
excluding bad types from the contract. Peers are usually jointly responsible for the group 
outcome and tIlis incentive scheme triggers a monitoring activity among group members. 
Mutual monitoring structures can be e111cient in small groups but llierarcllical monitoring 
structures with specialised monitors tend to be preferred in larger groups. Non-monetary 
disutility in the fonll of social sanctions, shame, guilt and stigma play a crucial role in 
imposing discipline on individual behaviour. The nature of the group implies that problems 
such as co-ordination and/or free riding can be extremely detrimental to the success of group 
credit schemes. However, an appropriate incentive scheme based on the characteristics just 
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mentioned, and that has the basic property of transferring risk from the principal to one or 
more (eventually all) agents, is thought to be able to offset the lack of collateral and 
increasing efficiency in rural credit markets. 
7. 1 Self selection 
Credit groups work as self selection mechanisms' and can improve the informational 
content of credit contracts. Co-borrowers are likely to make use of latent information not 
available to formal lenders in their screening process (Wenner 1995), therefore excluding 
high risk type from. the group. Wenner (1995) uses data collected from the FINCA 
(Fundaci6n Integral Campesina) group credit programme in Costa Rica to study the viability 
and cost efTectiveness of group credit as a means to transmit information about borrower 
creditworthiness. FINCA is a non-pront development agency whose objective is to assist 
poor rural communities through the establishment of self-sustaining, locally managed and 
controlled loan funds used to finance either consumption or productive projects. S~all 
groups of farmers and rural women without collateral receive up to US$ 384.00 for a period 
of one year at an interest rate that varies between 15 - 33%. The group distributes the loan in 
equal shares among co-borrowers who are jointly responsible for the loan repayment at the 
end of the period. Wenner argues that credit groups improve information transfer as co-
borrowers make use of latent information not available to formal lenders in their screening 




Yt is a binary variable with value one if individual repayment was delayed or did not 
occur, zero otherwise. 
Xl t is a binary variable with value one if the individual belonged to a group that had a 
written code of regulations, zero otherwise. 
X2t is a binary variable with value one if the individual belonged to a group that screened 
according to reputation, zero otherwise. 
By using the above logit model for 118 individuals Wenner (1995) finds that X2t is 
statistically significant and with the right sign (negative) wllile Xl h although witIi. the right 
sign (negative), is statistically non-significant. The fact that Xlt is non significant suggests 
that self-selection may have occurred at the stage of group formation and that the fact that 
groups have a written code of behaviour is irrelevant once individuals have agreed to it. The 
fact that X2t is significant suggests that groups make use of extra information ("reputation" in 
Wenner's (1995) paper) which is unlikely to be available to formal lenders. 
7.2 Joint liability 
Joint liability is used in almost all group lending programmes. With joint liability 
assigned to all group members, each member of the group is responsible for all individual 
loan repaymefl:ts and can be asked to make up for the missing repayment of defaulting 
members. 
Devereux and Fishe (1993) develop a principal-agent model with risk neutral lenders 
operating in a perfectly competitive credit market and risk neutral borrowers organised in 
groups of (N + 1) members. Each borrower has wealth W wllich is put up as collateral C in 
the group. Investors request a loan of size 1 to finance a project with payotIs X in the good 
state and zero in the bad state. There are y high-risk bOlTowers in the economy and (1 - y) 
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low-risk borrowers. TIlere are two kind of projects available to borrowers: a risky project (1) 
and a safe project (2). The two projects succeed witli probability D1 and D2 respectively with 
D2> D1. Borrowers are jointly liable for each others' repayments and the collateral of 
defaulting members is redistributed among the non-defaulting members of the group. 
TIle lender's problem is to design two loan con~racts which maximise profits and 
provide borrowers with an incentive to self-select by level of risk. The lender decides the 
interest rates R; = (1 + r;) and the amount of collateral required C; for each contract, where 
i = 1,2. Furthermore, the lender borrows funds disbursed as loans at an interest / = (1 + i). 
Since lenders are perfect competitors on the deposit market, the lender's profit 
maximisation problem can be re-written as the maxinusation problem of borrowers' utility 
subject to (among other constraints) a zero profit constraint for the lender. Thus: 
s.t. 
D;R;,=/ 
the payoff function. 
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The first two incentive compatibility constraints guarantee self-selection, the third 
constraint is the participation constraint for the lender and the fourth constraint guarantees 
that borrowers are not asked to put up more collateral than their wealth. Notice that in the 
participation constraint of the lender there is no collateral as the joint liability clause implies 
that loan repayment does not take place only when all members fail. Whenever there are 
a:::; N members defaulting the other (N + '1 - a) members will share among them the 
defaulting members' collateral and indemnify the lender against these defaults. 
The solution to tins problem is markedly ditTerent from the solution (using the same set-up) 
of the problem with only one borrower. In the problem with only one borrower the low-risk 
type receives a contract with high interest rate and zero collateral whlle the hlgh-risk type 
receives a contract with lower interest rate and positive collateral. In the group lending case, 
the group formed by lngh-risk types will be ofTered a contract with both Ingher interest rate 
and collateral. The justitication for tIns is that a high-risk group will share the burden of re-
paying another member's debt more often than members of a low-risk group. Therefore, 
they will require more collateral to offset tins burden.· 
7.3 Small group size 
When group memberslnp increases, the value of joint liability in encouraging members to 
assist each other is reduced. TIns is because the share of collateral from the marginal 
defaulting members assigned to non defaulting members is reduced. Furthermore, the costs 
of monitoring increase with group size and it is unlikely that members would increase 
proportionally the effort in Inonitoring; hence, reducing the overall control on members' 
actions. In order to encourage Inonitoring, some lending programmes have assigned joint 
liability only to a few group leaders. These individuals are likely to be seriously affected by 
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even one default and therefore, will specialise in monitoring in order to prevent such 
occurrence. 
7.4 Monitoring 
Joint responsibility of loan re-payment implies that co-borrowers have the incentive 
to monitor each other (Varian 1990). As is most likely to be the case, it is particularly 
feasible when monitoring costs are lower for peers than for formal lenders' . In general, in a 
principal-agent problem, when the output of one agent is correlated with the actions of other 
agents, the optimal incentive scheme typically involves making the payments to one agent 
depend on the output of the other agents. TIns is clearly shown in Stiglitz (1990). In Ins 
model, risk averse borrowers borrow a loan L to finance a stochastic project that yields YtCL) 
if successful and zero if unsuccessful. The subscript t = r,s indicates that borrowers can 
choose between a safe or a risky technique with the probability of success of the safe 
technique always Ingher than the probability of success of the risky technique: Le. Ps > Pro 
Furthermore, the safe project stochastically dominates the risky project: Le. PsYs > PrYr. 
Borrowers have zero collateral and produce effort when running the project. Their expected 
utility from the project is given by: 
VlL,r) = U[YrCL) - (1 + r)L]pt - v(e(L)) 
where r is the interest rate to be paid on the loan when the project is successful and 
the term v(e(L)) is the disutility of effort e with v' > 0 and v" > O. Effort is not assumed to 
affect the probability of success of the project but it is function of the loan size and e'(L) > O. 
Perfect competitive banks receive the loan repayment (1 + r)L in the good state, zero 
in the bad state and their cost of capital is constant and equal to p because of the assumption 
of perfect competition. Therefore, their zero profit condition is given by: 
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TIlL, r) = (1 + r)Lpt - Lp = 0 
Since the probability of success of the safe technique is higher than the probability 
of success of the risky technique there is a moral hazard problem in the sense that banks 
prefer borrowers to use always the safe technique wInle tIns may not be incentive compatible 
for borrowers. In order to make the choice of tIle safe technique incentive compatible for 
borrowers, banks ration borrowers along their own zero profit locus and so tIlat borrowers 
are inditTerent between choosing tIle safe or tIle risky technique. TIns occurs along the locus 
of Land r such that VsCL,r) = Vr(L,r). 
Stiglitz (1990) shows that if borrowers were allowed to form groups in which 
members monitor each other and report agents' using the risky technique, tIle credit rationing 
that arises in an individual contract can be relaxed. The idea is tIl at monitoring improves the 
informational content wInIe transferring risk ii"om the principal to the agent and therefore, 
allows banks to offer a larger loan with at least the same (if not lower) interest rate. 
The way monitoring is triggered is by oiTering a contract to a group of, say, two 
borrowers where one borrower agrees to cosign the loan and pay qL (with q> 0) to the 
lender in the event that the loan he has cosigned goes into default. Making one of tIle 
borrowers cosign the loan imposes an additional risk tIlat will trigger the activity of 
monitoring, costless by assumption. Furthermore, since borrowers are identicaI,26 tIley 
jointly decide whetIler to undertake tIle safe or the risky technique. In tIns set-up the locus of 
points Land r for wInch the two borrowers are indifferent between the safe and the risky 
technique is given by: 
U[YsCL) - (l + r)L]p2s + U[YlL) - (1.+ r- q)L]psCl - Ps) = 
26 Stiglitz (1990) assumes perfect self sebction at during the stage of group formation. 
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U[Yr(L) - (1 + r)L]p2r + U[Yr(L) - (1 + r - q)L]Pr(1 - Pr) 
Under plausible conditions, Stiglitz (1990) shows that there is a positive relationship 
between the size of the loan L needed to attain a certain level of utility and the magnitude of 
the cosignee's payment rate q. In other words in order to compensate the cosignee for taking 
additional risk, the lender has to provide a larger loan: i.e: credit rationing is relaxed. 
In the next section I will draw on the results just shown in order to construct a model 
of group lending. 
8. A MODEL OF GROUP LENDING: OPTIMAL GROUP SIZE 
The model in this section is divided into two parts. In the first part I consider an 
individual loan contract and prove that rich borrowers with collateral are lnore profitable to 
formal lenders than poor borrowers with less or no collateral. TIus means that in the 
competition for loans, poor borrowers will only be served after all rich borrowers and in a 
world with limited credit, it is likely that poor borrowers are credit constrained. TIus 
provides a justification for the institutional response of group lending and the analysis in the 
second part of the model. 
Among the various issues that characterise credit groups, I want to analyse the 
determinants of the group size. Little formal analysis has been done on the determinants of 
group size and the usual explanation put forward for the instability of large groups is related 
to the free riding problem (Armendariz 1995), or to the reduced control over peers in large 
groups (Devereux and Fishe 1993). These may account for much of the reasons why groups 
tend to be small but it does not seem to be the only reasons. Social factors, such as social 
norms, imitation, conformism et cetera, related to the particular nature of the group should 
be also taken into consideration. Tlus paper is an attempt to formally model the effects of 
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social factors on the size of borrowing groups and such analysis incidentally provides an 
indirect answer to the question of why it has been difficult to replicate·the Grameen 
experiment outside Bangladesh (Thomas 1995). 
The only paper surveyed which considers a gr~up with more than two borrowers is 
the paper by Devereux and Fishe (1993). The authors analyse the effects of the joint liability 
clause in a group lending contract using a group of (N + 1) borrowers. The group size is 
taken as given and the problem for the lender is to ofTer two contracts which enable to 
separate high-risk groups from low-risk groups. Because of self-selection during the stage of 
group formation (or "assortative matching" in Armendariz 1995, Armendariz and Gollier 
1996) the probability of success of each group member are identical. Exactly tillS allows 
Devereux and Fishe to use tI1e binomial distribution to determine the probability of default of 
a :;; N members in the group. 
It would have been interesting to use the same framework and introduce social· 
custOlllS to endogenise the group size but tlllS appears not to be possible. The main reason 
for rejecting the Devereux and Fishe's (1993) framework is that group size is likely to be 
related to the behavioural characteristics of individual borrowers withln the group. TIllS 
suggests that individual borrowers cannot be ex ante homogeneous since a group of perfectly 
identical members does not create the possibility of any sort of social interaction. The fact 
that group members can be heterogeneous does not necessary imply that the self selection 
process that takes place during the stage of group formation is of no value. It only points out 
that the use of private information to select low-risk borrowers cannot possible acllleve the 
selection of perfectly identical individuals.27 In my model there are several differences from 
Devereux and Fishe (1993): 
27 See Armendariz and Gollier 1996 for a modd with heterogeneous borrowers. 
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1. the group size is assumed to be a continuous variable and it is endogenously 
determined. TIus implies that I cannot use the binomial distribution to keep on board 
joint liability.28 As a matter of fact tIus assumption is dropped and tile lender will be 
partially insured against individual defaults in the group by the fact that now the 
lender can seize tile collateral of defaulting members. 
2. Members produce effort in running their own project and therefore, they affect the 
project probability of success. TIus means that the members of a: group can have 
different probabilities of success. In other words, self-selection during the stage of 
group formation matches similar but not necessarily identical individuals. TIus 
hypothesis allows me to analyse the possibility of individual deviations from a group 
norm in terms of eilort. 
3. In Devereux and Fishe (1993) the lender receives a constant full repayment in all 
states of the world except when it receives zero because all members default. In my 
model the lender receives full repayment only when all members succeed and 
members' collateral when everybody in the group defaults. In all intermediate states 
of the world the lender receives decreasing repayments constituted by a combination 
of loan repayments irom successful borrowers and collateral irom unsuccessful 
borrowers. TIus apparent lack of insurance is on:~et by the fact til at borrowers now 
produce effort wluch alTects the probability of success of each individual project; 
thus, tile expected profit to lender will be constant in all states of the world. 
4. TIus introduces another ditlerence wluch is the presence of monitoring. Members 
can deviate from a social norm and tIus produces a disutility to all participants. 
28 Notice that the binomial distribution can be approximated by a continuous distribution. The reason why joint 
liability is ignored in my model is that the members of a group can have different probabilities of success. See 
further. 
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Costly monitoring ensures that deviations can be observed and properly punished. 
Non-monetary disutility in terms of social sanctions is inflicted" on deviating 
members by all non deviating members. Since the imposition of social sanctions is 
assumed to be costless, the threat of punishment is credible. 
B.1 Borrowers 
In this section I will consider the outcome of individual credit contracts. Borrowers 
are risk neutral29 with wealth wand each (individually) obtains a loan L in order to finance 
an investment project represented by a random variable Xt that yields Xt with probability Pt or 
zero with probability (l - Pt). In running the project borrowers can choose between a safe 
and a risky technique; tItis is again indicated by the subscript t = s,r. If the project is 
successful borrowers will pay back the loan plus an interest on the loan LR = L(1 + r) where 
r is the loan nontinal interest rate. If the project is unsuccessful borrowers will lose 
collateral in the amount of c ::::; w. 
When using the safe technique the payoff of the project in the good state is Xs while 
it is x, when the risky technique is used. The payoff of the project in the good state is a 
concave function of the loan size, i.e. x; (L) > 0 and x;'( L) < O. The l1xed costs associated 
with the risky project are larger than for the safe project: i.e. L, > L.r. At the same time, for 
any loan size the return to scale to the risky project are larger than for the safe project: i.e. 
x;(L) > x;(L). With the aid of Figure 13 it is possible to explain the implications of this 
assumption. For any loan size L> r, , the return to the safe project is larger than the return 
to the risky project. Nevertheless, since returns to scale are larger for the risky project, there 
29 Similar results can be obtained with ri;;k averse borrowers. 
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will be a loan size L * such that for L > L * the return to the risky project is larger than the 




Figure 13 Project returns to scale when safe and risky techniques are used. 
Finally, the probability of success of the risky technique is lower than the probability 
of success of the safe technique for any given other parameter and the safe project 
stochastically dominates the risky project for all L. 
In running the project borrowers produce an effort e at a cost given by a convex 
function h(e) and the probability of success of the project is positively correlated with effort, 
i.e. p;(e) > O. Thus, borrowers' expected utility from the project is given by: 
(22 ) EUt(e,R,c, L) = Pt (w+ xt - LR) + (1- Pt)(w- c) - h(et) 
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I will simplify tllis general form by assuming that: Pt = et , h(et) = i e~ with kt > 030 
and by renaming (w + Xt - LR) as Wt. Furthermore, I will assume for the momene1 that 
banks require borrowers to put up all their wealtll as collateral: c = w. Thus, ( 22 ) can be re-
written as: 
(23 ) 
where etWr is the borrowers' expected payoff from the project. 
For any given Land R borrowers maxinlise ( 23 ) with respect to et. Assuming an 
interior solution, the optimal e1Tort function is given by: 
(24 ) " W, e =-
t k
t 
Notice tllat otller tIlings equal an increase in wealth (and therefore, collateral) 
tl · d det 1 o· . increases ·le optimal effort pro uced in equilibrium - = - > ; an Increase In the loan 
dW kt 




. 1'" t'f' "det L 0 negative elect on e 10rt - = --k < . 
. "dR t 
30 Notice that since PI = e" it must follow that kl < (w + XI - LR) so that el E (0,1). Furthennore, it has been said 
. w+xr -LR C f 
that P > P . hence e" > e and therefore, It must be the case that kr > k~ lor any set 0 parameters. 
"r' , r . W+Xs - LR 
31 This will be proved in section 8.2 where banks' technology is dcscribed. 
32 Notice that the effect of loans size on effort is positive for sufficicntly small a loan size: i.e. when the marginal 
return to scale of the project is larger thaii the interest rate charged by lenders. 
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By substituting ( 24 ) into ( 23 ) and by totally differentiating, it is possible to plot 
borrowers' indifference curves in the space (L x R). Their slope is given by: 
(25 ) ~ =_x:_-_R 
dLlEU, L 
Consider now all L such that ( 25 ) is positi ve. Since x; > x; the indifference curves 
when the risky technique is used are steeper than the indHIerence curves when the safe 
technique is used. More formally: 
(26 ) dR/ dR/ - <-
dL EU$ dL EU, 
It must be the case, then, that indifference curves relative to the safe and risky 
techniques intersect in the space (L x R) as depicted in Figure 14. 
The intersection takes place along the aa' switch line the slope of which is given by: 
(27 ) dR/~ _ = e,,(x,: -R~ -e:(x; -R) < 0 
dL EUs=EU, L(es -er ) 
Below the switch line EUr < Eu'r and borrowers will use the safe technique. Vice 
versa, above the switch line EUs < EUr and borrowers will use the risky technique. Along 
aa' borrowers are indifIerent between the safe and risky project and by assumption they will 
use the safe technique. The combined indifference curve for a borrower who can choose 
between a safe and risky project is given by the safe indilTerence curve to the left hand side 
of aa' and by the risky indifference curve to the right hand side of aa '. 
The switch line is negatively sloped under the plausible assumption that, because 
returns to scale are more important for the risky project than for the safe, an increase in the 
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loan size increases the expected utility of the risky project more than for the safe project. 
Thus: 
(28 ) aEUs _ "(' R) "(' R) _ aEU r ---e x - <e x - ---aL S S r r aL 
R 
~----------------------------------------~L 
Figure 14 Risky and safe technique indifference curves. 
TIlls can be seen also by taking any point al?ng aa I in Figure 14 and increase the 
loan size for a given loan interest rate. When L increases utility increases and the risky 
project dominates the safe project because returns to scale are more important for the risky 
than for the safe project. A decrease in R would increa..~e the optimal effort produced and 
make borrowers again indifferent between the two techniques. 
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B.2 Banks 
Banks are risk neutral. In case of a successful project they obtain at the end of the 
period the loan plus the interest on the loan LR = L(l + r). In case of failure of the project 
they obtain the collateral c. Thus, banks' expected retur~ on each project is given.by: 
(29 ) 
Banks are perfect competitors on the deposit market and in equilibrium they have to 
respect the zero profit condition: 
(30 ) er(LR-c)+c= LI 
where 1=(1 + i) is the nominal interest rate on deposits exogenously given because 
of the assumption of perfect competition. 
Throughout the previous section I assumed that c = w. TIus assumption can now be 
proved by noticing that from the assumption of risk neutrality of borrowers, banks' expected 
return is monotonically increasing in the collateral c. Thus, after substituting ( 24 ) into ( 29 
): 
(31 ) dEp, LR - c (1 ") 0 --= + -e > de k
t 
t 
Hence, banks will always ask borrowers to put up all their wealth as collateral. If 
tIns is true, it is possible to re-write ( 29 ) as: 
(32 ) Ep,(e,R,L) =et(LR-w)+w 
When olTering a contract, the bank solves the following maximisation problem: 
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max EUt (e, L,R) = et ~ -~e; {e"L,R) '. 2 
s.t. 




(34 ) et (LR - w) + w = LI PC 
(35 ) IC 
with Wt = (w + Xt - LR). (33) is the incentive compatibility constraint that 
guarantees that borrowers produce the optimal elYort in equilibrium. (34) is the 
participation constraint for the bank that guarantees that banks will respect the zero profit 
condition in equilibrium. (35) is the incentive compatibility constraint for the borrower that 
guarantees his or her choice of the safe project in equilibrium: i.e. t = s. 
Instead of solving formally the maximisation problem I will develop the intuition 
that lies behind 11le resulting equilibrium. 
By substituting ( 33 ) into ( 34 ) and by totally ditTerentiating, it is possible to plot 
the zero profit loci (ZPLt) in the space (L x R) relative to the safe and risky techniques. The 
ZPLt are negatively slop~d33 and their slope is given by: 
(36 ) dRI = 
dL ZPL, 
x' -R 
_t __ (LR - w) + (e
t 
R - I) 
k t <0 
L 
-[x - 2(LR - w)] k t 
t 
x; -R A R /) 
33 Provided xt >2(LR-w) and -k-(LR-w»(et - • t ., 
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For a given loan size, an increase in R has a positive effect on banks' expected return 
for a sufficiently high project payoff, i.e. whenever xt > 2(LR - w). A decrease in the loan 
size is "then necessary to decrease banks' expected return such that ( 34 ) is met again. TIus 
explains why the ZPLt are negatively sloped. 
R 
~--------------------------------------~L 
Figure 15 17le combined zero profit locus when borrowers can choose between risky and 
safe technique. 
Banks have two zero profit loci according to which technique borrowers choose. 
Since the probability of success of the risky technique is lower than the probability of 
success of the safe technique for any given Land R, banks' expected return is hlgher when 
borrowers use the safe technique. In other words the safe zero profit locus ZPLs lies always 
below the risky zero profit locus ZPLr. TIus means that the combined ZPL when borrowers 
can choose between the two projects is given by ZPL,v and by ZPLr to the left hand side and 
to the right hand side of aa'respectively, as depicted in Figure 15. 
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B.3 The equilibrium contract 
Banks cannot specify in the loan contract which technique borrowers should be 
using when running the project and even if tillS were possible, it would not be enforceable. 
Banks would like borrowers to use tile safe technique because tillS makes borrow~rs produ'ce 
a lllgher effort in equilibrium. The only way to force borrowers to choose the safe project is 









/"--- ...... . 
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L* 
Figure 16 The equilibrium contract. 
Contract E in Figure 16 lies on the switch line, where by assumption borrowers use 
tile safe technique, on the combined ZPL, where banks make zero profits, and it maximises 
borrowers' expected utility. Hence, it is an equilibrium contract. Clearly, borrowers are 
rationed at E as, at tile equilibrium interest rate R*, they can move to a hlgher indifference 
curve iftIley were allowed to borrow a loan size l >L* such tIlat x;CL) = R. Nevertheless, 
iftllis happens, banks would make expected losses on each Joan as at L, EUrCl) > EUsCr) 
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and borrowers would choose the risky project. Therefore, banks maximise their expected 
return by rationing borrowers along aa' . 
. In the preceding sections I showed how rationing arises in equilibrium when the 
credit market is characterised by imperfect information on the part of the lenders. .In the next 
section I will show how rich borrowers are always offered a better contract than the one 
offered to poor borrowers. In other words rich borrowers are less rationed than poor 
borrowers in equilibrium. 
8.4 Rich and poor borrowers 
In what follows, a rich borrower difTers from a poor borrower only for its initial 
wealth w. In order to prove that rich borrowers are less rationed than poor borrowers it is 
necessary to consider the effect of wealth on the equilibrium contract. 
Wealth affects the equilibrium contract in two ways. The first efTect is on the switch. 
line. From (' 25 ) we know that wealth does not a1Tect the slope of the indifference curves. 
Nevertheless, the switch line of a rich borrower lies always to the right hand side of the 
switch line of a poor borrower. To see this, let's start at E in Figure 16 and increase wealth. 
At E, EUs = EUr but when wealth increases and it is all put up as collateral both expected 
b aEU~ " " aEUr utilities increase y aw = es > er = a;- Tins means that at E, the safe project 
dominates the risky project for the rich borrower. In other words, E lies to the left hand side 
of the rich borrower's switch line bb'. Figure 17 shows both the poor borrower switch line 
aa' and the rich borrower switch line bb'. 
Another way of proving tIns is to notice th~t for given L, R and technique used, a 
I · h 1'f' lb' ae, 1 0 Tl' rich borrower produces a ug er e ort t lan a poor orrower SInce - = - > . lIS means aw kt 
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that for a given R, a rich borrower can be otIered a larger loan size before he switches 
technique. 
, The second effect of wealth is on the combined ZP L of the bank. Again, a rich 
borrower produces a higher effort than a poor borrowe,r for any given L, R and technique 
used. Tllis means that banks make always a lligher expected return by lending to a rich 
borrower than by lending to a poor borrower for any given L, R and technique used. 
Therefore, the combined ZPLr for a rich borrower must lie below the combined ZPLP for the 




Figure 17 Poor and rich borrowers' equilibrium contracts. 
It follows that a rich borrower will always be offered a contract with a lower loan 
interest rate and a larger loan size as in E': i.e. a rich borrower is less rationed than a poor 
borrower. In the next sections I will show how group borrowing modifies individual's 
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behaviour and how poor borrowers can compensate for their lack of physical wealth by 
borrowing within a group. 
8.5 Group lending 
The literature on peer monitoring has so far concentrated mainly on issues such as 
efficiency and welfare gains (Stiglitz 1990, Arnott and Stiglitz 1991, Armendariz 1995, 
Besley and Coate 1995, Varian 1990) or on risk sharing issues (Udry 1991, 1992). Very 
little attention has been given to the issue of optimal group size. I believe that an indirect 
attempt has been made by those authors (Thomas 1995, Otero 1995, Devereux Fishe 1993, 
Hossain 1988, Wahid 1994) investigating the successes of the Grameen bank and the 
difficulties in reproducing such experiments outside Bangladesh. The general conclusion on 
this issue is that groups have to be small for them to be stable. Nevertheless, few papers 
have addressed the social issue formally.34 
Group borrowing differs substantially irom individual borrowing in the sense that 
individual behaviour in the group will not be necessarily dictated by intrinsic preferences 
only (Bernheim 1994, Kandel and Lazear 1992). The causes of such a modification in 
behaviour may be better understood by looking at a few important characteristics of groups: 
1. It is costly to form a group because its management is inevitably more complex than 
the management of an individual in isolation. Difficulties arise from the early stages 
when an investment project has to be chosen up to the very end when payoffs have to 
be shared among co-borrowers. 
34 Armendariz (1995) excludes the possibility of large groups b~cause of increasing negative effects of the free 
riding problem while Deveruex and Fishe (1993) conclude that large groups are unstable because of the decreased 
effort dedicated to monitoring peers. This is part of the reason but it completely ignores the social aspect of the 
problem. I.e. whether ex ante agents are likely to form a group or not. 
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2. If the group expected payoff has to be shared among co-borrowers, tIlis yields the 
possibility of free riding. 
3. ' Groups with common goals give rise to social norms wllich do not affect agents 
behaviour in isolation. Social norms should be ~ndogenously determined. witllin the 
group. 
4. Individual deviations from the norm affect group utility. When spillovers are 
negative, individuals are punished with non-monetary disutility. When spillovers are 
positive, individuals are rewarded with non-monetary utility. Non-monetary 
disutility is identified with social sanctions or "shame".35 
5. The magnitude of the punishment or reward depends on: 
a) The magnitude of tIle deviation from the social norm. As group disutility is 
directly proportional to the magnitude of agent's deviation from the social 
norm, it is safely to assume that the punishment be directly proportional to 
the magnitude of such a deviation. 
b) The level of monitoring witllin the group: A plausible assumption is that 
monitoring costs increase with the group size as people in rural economies 
are fairly dispersed geograpllically. 
c) The ability of the group to impose the punishment. The ability to impose a 
sanction is directly related to the ability to monitor the behaviour of peer 
borrowers. As the cost of monitoring increase with the group size, the ability 
to sanction is likely to decrease with the group size. 
3S Shame is felt only in a group because the deviating agent is actually observed. I here ignore the possibility of 
"guilt" which would affect individual behaviour inside and outside the group. See Kandel and Lazear (1992). 
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d) The costs for the group involved in imposing the punishment. A plausible 
assumption is that the larger the group the lower the cost that each individual 
borrower in the group will have to bear when he/she imposes the sanction.36 
I will be analysing the individual behaviour of c~edit group members whQ pool their 
initial individual wealth wand each obtain a loan L which will be used to finance n 
independent stochastic projects Xt. In the group there is no joint liability clause and the 
lender is partially insured from individual failures by the fact that the physical collateral of 
unsuccessful members can be seized. Although projects are run separately, the payoff is 
shared among group members.37 In such a set-up, points 1) to 5) above, can be formalised in 
the following expected utility function for borrower i within the group: 
with ei,t E [0,1]; mi,t ~ 0 'i i; n ~ 1. 
36 This depends of course on the structure of monitoring of the group and it is ea'iy to find structures where both 
punishment and monitoring increase with group size. See Armendariz (1995) for an analysis of alternative 
monitoring structures. 
37 Notice that this particular incentive scheme is not one necessarily empirically observed. A joint responsibility 
clause is almost invariably present in group contracts as it plays a crucial role in triggering monitoring within the 
group. In my framework, joint responsibility is absent and monitoring is triggered by the clause of profit sharing. 
As a matter of fact, both joint responsibility and profit sharing make the utility of each peer depend on the action 
of other peers. This interdependence makes peer monitoring necessary so that deviating agents, whose actions 
would negatively affect utility, can be observed and punished. Therefore, because of the identical role played by 
the two clauses of joint responsibility and profit sharing, only profit sharing is here considered. FUlthermore, the 
partiCUlar choice of the incentive scheme makes it easier to model the choice of the optimal group size without 
loss of generality. 
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( 37 ) is basically equal to ( 23 ) with few modifications necessary to take into 
consideration the individual behaviour in a group. 
,On the right hand side of ( 37 ) Uj represents borrower i's share of the group 
n 
expected payoff Le;,t Wr from all projects. There are many ways in which the outcome of 
;=1 
the project can be shared among co-borrowers but the most plausible one in our context is 
that co-borrowers agree on a Nash bargaining solution proportional to the amount of wealth 
deposited by each individual before jointly applying for a loan.38 Since all co-borrowers have 
identical wealth and t~chnology, the Nash bargaining solution is given by u; =.!... 
11 
The function gee) is the punishment function that gives the utility loss in the case of 
deviation from the social norm .. It is plausible to assume the following behaviour of such a 
function: 
Other things equal, the higher borrower i's own effort, the lower the 
punishment or in other words: any lack of effort is punished. The 
"lack of effort" is measured in terms of social norm: if borrower i's 
effort falls short of the social norm he/she receives a punishment 
which is proportional to the deviation. 
38 Devereux and Fishe (1993) suggest that rather than the average expected payoff, each member is usually 
rewarded according to its productivity. This may of course be. the ca"e in a world where co-borrowers have 
different abilities and all participate to the realisation of a single project. Here, co-borrowers are identical and 
they all work on separate and independent project'); furthermore, they have no out')ide option. Hence, a more 
plausible way to share the expected payoff of the projects is proportionally to initial wealth. 
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Other things equal, the higher other borrowers' effort the higher the 
punishment. In other words, an increase in effort on the part of other 
borrowers can be seen as a relative lack of effort produced by the ith 
borrower. TItis assumption can also be interpreted in terms of social 
norm: the ltigher other's effort, the more demanding is the social 
norm each borrower has to comply with if he/she does not want to be 
punished. 
Punishment occurs if there is monitoring. Deviants cannot be 
punished if they are not observed when they deviate from the social 
norm. Hence when there is no monitoring (Le. mj = 0 V j '* i), there 
is no punishment (Le. gee) = 0). The monitoring activity is costly 
and tlus is captured by the fact that mi enters the cost function in (.37 
). Therefore, it is plausible to assume that the higher the level of 
monitoring, the ltigher the punishment in case of deviation from the 
social norm. 
Since the level of monitoring increases the disutility of being caught 
deviating from the social norm, it is plausible to assume that group 
members will otTset an increase in monitoring levels by increasing 
the effort produced and therefore, by decreasing the probability of 
success of the projects. Notice that the monitoring activity does not 
contribute directly to the probability of success of the project. 
Nevertheless, it does indirectly by modifying the etTort produced by 
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each individual. In other words: if additional monitoring is to 
increase the level of effort, there must be a gain to increasing effort 
when monitoring increases. 
Punishment is proportional to, the disutility inflicted' on other 
members in the group. The larger the loan size, the larger the scale 
of the project (remember that x'(L) > 0) and therefore, the larger the 
disutility imposed to all participants in case of individual project 
failure. Therefore, it is safe to assume that the punishment in case of 
deviation be proportional to the loan size. 
g( .. ·,n = 1,,,,) = 0 No guilt is assumed in tlus framework. As previously mentioned, 
punishment occurs only if deviation from the social norm is observed 
(Le. there is a positive level of lllonitoring). Clearly, if the group is 
constituted by a single individual, there is no monitoring and shame 
is not imposed.39 
By taking all tillS into consideration we can give a specific form to the punishment 
function gee) and borrower i's expected utility from the project can be re-written as: 
(38 ) . EU't =.! ~ ei t~ -~(ei t +m't)2 -(s(L)-n)(e -ei t)~ m J, tG I, £.J, 2' I, ,£.J ' 
n i=1 j~i 
39 The issue of social norm does not arise when the group collapses to an individual size. For an individual in 




is the individual share of the group expected payoff L ei,t Wr ; 
11 ~ 
~(e. t + m· t)2 is the individual cost function for producing effort and monitoring; s(L) is the 2 I" I, 
sanction, increasing in the loan size (Le. s'(L) > 0), inflic~ed in case of deviation; (e - ej,t) is 
the deviation (positive or negative) frOln. the social norm e; L mj,t is the level of 
j'i'i 
monitoring that borrower i faces;40 G > 0 is a scale factor. 
When agent i's effort is lower than the social norm e, he/she is punished 
proportionally to such deviation and to the loan size. The punishment takes place only when 
more than one borrower is in the group (n> 1) and when the deviation is observed (mj,t> 0). 
Alternatively, when agent i's efTort is higher than the social norm, he/she is rewarded with 
social status. 
The perception of such punishment or reward is a decreasing function of the group 
size and tIns is captured by the factor (s(L) -11). When groups have a high degree of social 
cohesion, social sanctions can be a powerful incentive device since tIle costs of upsetting 
other Inembers in the group may be high (Besley and Coate, 1991). A plausible assumption 
is that social cohesion is a decreasing function of the size of the group. Therefore, it must be 
the case that the larger the group size the lower is the perception of, or equivalently the 
ability to impose, a given sanction s. 
Notice that tIle social norm e is here arbitrarily chosen. TItis is unlikely of course to 
be the case and we need a way of endogenising it. The easiest way to do tItis is to assume 
that each borrower i decides what level of effort he or she produces by looking at the average 
40 Notice that the level of monitoring faced by a group member can be eac;ily standardised in fonn of probability of 
being observed. 
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effort that the other co-borrowers produce in equilibrium. TIns means that e = _1_~ e· t n-1~ J. 
. J~ 
and (e - ej t) = _1_(~ eJ. t -nej tJ. Notice that if the term (e - e,' t) can be interpreted as 
. n-1 ~. . . 
J=l 
agent i's deviation from the social norm, the term (~e l". - nei") is the shortfall ~n overall 
effort given by borrower i's deviation. 
In tlns new set-up each borrower in the group has to choose how much effort to 
produce and how much mOlntoring to undertake. Tins can be done in two steps: in the 1irst 
step, we can maxImise ( 38 ) with respect to ei,t 'i i = 1, ... ,n keeping all mi.t fixed. Tins 
yields n first order conditions of tlle type: 
(39 ) dEUjt W, ~ ---' =--kt(ej,t +mi,t)+(s-n) LJmj,tG = 0 
dej,t 11 j¢i 
and tllcrefore: 
(40 ) w, (S-I1)r e' t =--mit +--- m·tG 
"11k . k .. J. 
t t J~ 
'i i=l, .. ·,n 
Notice tllat from an individual point of view, there is a negative relationship between 
own effort and own level of monitoring. 
In the second step, each individual effort level can be then substituted into the 
objective function wInch now becomes a function of the monitoring variables only. The 
optimal level of monitoring produced by each co-borrower is tllen given by:41 
41 Notice that since all co-borrowers are. identical, it must be the case that in equilibrium Illi" = m, V i = 1, .. .• n. 
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(41 ) " VV; ( k, ) nlt(L,n,R) =- l---~--
n (s-n)(n-l)G 
, When the group size is neither too large nor too small (s - n)(n - l)G > kt• When 
this condition holds true, both the loan size and wealth affect positively tJ:le level of 
. a In, 0 a /11, 0) . 1 . 
monitonng in the group (Le. aL > and aw >. ' WIllie t le Interest rate affects 
negatively the level of monitoring in the group (i.e. ~~ < 0). When the group size is either 
too large or too small (s - n)(n - l)G < kt and the level of monitoring becomes negative and 
the sign of the above derivatives is reversed. Since a negative level of monitoring makes 
little sense in this framework, it will be assumed that when the group size is either too large 
or too small no monitoring takes place. When mOnitoring is positive, it first increases and 
then decreases with group size. 
Monitoring is a costly activity for members and it does not contribute directly to the' 
success of a project. The e1Tect of a marginal increase in monitoring by one member in the 
group has a double effect. It increases the probability of observing deviation among other 
peers, therefore it imposes discipline on others' elTort and by tlus means, it increases the 
group expected payoff. At the same time, because of the inverse relationslup between own 
elfort an monitoring given in ( 40 ), a marginal increase in monitoring by one member in the 
group lowers the social norm that the other peers take into consideration when assessing the 
level of effort they produce. By tIus means, group expected payo1T is lowered. The 
magnitude of these two contrasting effects is larger in small groups. TIus is simply because 
in smaller groups, both social norm and probability of observing deviation are calculated by 
averaging the effort and the level of monitoring of fewer individuals. Therefore, in small 
groups, although the probability of observing deviation is likely to increase considerably, 
very little monitoring occurs because lugh monitoring would decrea..l;)e the social norm in 
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such a way that group expected payoff is lowered. In large groups, very little monitoring 
occurs as well but for a different reason. When groups are large, the effective social sanction 
that deviating agents perceive (s - n) is small and it has no impact on individual behaviours. 
In this situation it is not worth monitoring as effective punishment would be minimal. This 
last point can be explained also by looking at the incentive of producing increasing effort 
when monitoring increases. TItis is given by the elements otT the diagonal in the Hessian of 
the punishment function g wltich can be related to the "accuracy of detection". When group 
size increases, lim d
2 
g = -(s(L) -n)G = O. TItis means that when the size of the group 
n~sde·dm. J I 
increases, the marginal benefit from increasing monitoring tends to zero as it has to be shared 
among too many members. 
Let's substitute ( 41 ) into ( 40 ) to obtain the optimal level of effort produced by 
each group member. ThuS:42 
(42 ) ,.. W ((s-n)(n-l)G J'" et(L,n,R)=-+ -1 mt I1kl kt 
Monitoring has a positive effect on individual effort only when (s - n)(n - l)G > k t : 
Le. when groups are neither too small nor too large. Incidentally tWs condition is the same 
for the level of monitoring to be strictly positive and in tltis situation, exactly like for the 
individual lending contract analysed in the previous section, the loan size and wealth have a 
det de .. h . t't' t 
Positive effect on effort (Le. - > 0 and -' > 0) WIllIe mterest rate as a negative eec dL dw 
on effort (Le. de, < 0). 
dR 
42 Notice that since all co-borrowers are identical, it must be the case that in equilibrium ej" = e, V i = 1, ... ,n. 
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Banks maximise their profits by solving the problem recursively. They know that for 
any given contract each individual will produce a level of elIort and monitoring given by ( 41 
) and ( 42). Therefore, they offer a contract and choose the optimal group size such that 
borrowers choose the safe technique and such that banks earn zero profits in equilibrium. 
Assuming an internal solution (Le. n E (l,s)), banks' problem for each co-borrower can be 







(L R) - W, (s-n)(n-1)G -lJ ei t , n, - + mi t 
, I1kt kt ' 
l11'it ,n,R)=- 1 (L W, ( 1 J 
, n (s-n)(n-1)G 
EUi,$ ~ EUi,r 
1 n 






where ( 44 ) and ( 45 ) are the incentive compatibility constraints that guarantee that 
borrowers produce the optimal effort and monitoring in equilibrium; ( 46 ) is the incentive 
compatibility constraint for the borrower that guarantees his or her choice of the safe project 
in equilibrium; ( 47 ) is the participation constraint for the bank that guarantees that banks 
earn zero profits in equilibrium. Again: Wt = (w + Xt - LR) is the payolI in the good state 
when the safe (t = s) or risky (t = r) technique is chosen. 
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After the usual substitution of c = W, the maximisation problem here outlined is 
equivalent to the maximisation problem analysed in section 8.2 where the group size was not 
taken into consideration. By substituting ( 44 ) and ( 45 ) into the other equations it is 
possible to "simplify" the problem and reduce the choice variables to L, nand R. 
Nevertheless, the problem is still too complex to be easily solved and not much would be 
added to the intuition about the effect of group size on tile equilibrium contract. Therefore, 
in the next section I will develop such intuition without formalJy solving the problem. 
8.6 Optimal group size 
In section 8.4 I showed how wealth affects the equilibrium contract. The main result 
was that rich borrowers are alTered a better contract. TIus resulted from the fact that rich 
borrowers have a switch line that lies always to the right hand side of the poor borrowers' 
switch line and from the fact that the ZPLr of the bank relative to a rich borrower lies always 
below the ZPI! relative to a poor borrower, as depicted in Figure 17. In turn, the different 
position of the rich borrowers' switch line and ZPLr in the (L x R) space was determined by 
the fact that rich borrowers produce a lugher level of eiTort for any given set of parameters. 
TIus must be the case simply because rich borrowers have a lugher level of collateral at risk. 
Poor borrowers do not have wealth and can only obtain better contract terms if they 
can commit themselves to produce a higher etIort in equilibrium. Such a commitment is not 
credible in an individual contract since in such a contract there is no incentive mechanism 
that would enforce the commitment and therefore, banks ration borrowers. A group with its 
peer pressure can make such commitment credible because monitoring and shame modify 
individual behaviour. Therefore, in order to determine whether borrowers in a group enjoy a 
relaxation of their credit constraint, as a rich borrower enjoys a relaxation of Ius credit 
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constraint compared to the poor borrower, it is sufficient to determine whether the group size 
has the same effect that wealth has on effort. 
It is possible to prove that if the level of shame s is sufficiently high, the individual 
equilibrium effort in a group can be higher than what it would be outside the group. Thus: 
"(L R) = W ((S-I1)(11-1)G et ,11, + 
nkt k t J
" W 1 Int >-k t 
TIns is shown in Figure 18 where individual efIort in a group is shown together with 
the effort that a member in a group would produce if he/she were not monitored. For a given 
set of parameters, individual effort reaches a maximum at 11 *. TIns means that banks are 
better otf by lending to a group of 11 * poor borrowers than by lending to the same poor 
borrowers individually. Social pressure is such that in equilibrium, individual effort is 
higher than what it would be if members borrow individually. It must be the case, then, that 
in equilibrium borrowers in a group will be compensated for the Ingher level of effort ~ith 
more favourable contract terms. In other words they will be jointly offered a contract with a 
lower loan interest rate and a larger loan size. 
For a given set of parameters, effort is first decreasing, then increasing and 
eventually decreasing again with 11. TIle reason for tIllS behaviour is related to the negative 
and positive effects of group size on effort. The negative effect on etfort derives from the 
profit sharing clause in the contract and to the resulting free riding problem. TIllS is captured 
by the first term in ( 42 ) wIllch says that individual co-borrowers receive in equilibrium only 
a share..!. of the group expected payoff ~ e. t~. When the group size increases a smaller n ~ I, 
i=1 
share of the expected payoff is distributed to each member and consequently, tins has tile 
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effect of reducing the optimal level of effort produced.43 The positive effect on effort derives 






Figure 18 Optimal individual's effort function of group size. 
TIus is captured by the second term in ( 42). For extremely small groups (groups of 
size n E (1,n1], for instance), no monitoring occurs and the effort produced in equilibrium is 
simply dictated by the profit sharing characteristics of the contract. When the group size 
increases (groups of size n E [n],n*]) , group members find optimal to produce increasing 
levels of monitoring, as explained before, but at a decreasing rate. Further increases in group 
size (groups of size n E (n* ,n2]) reduce the level of shame that can be imposed to such levels 
that can only be compensated with extremely lugh levels of monitoring. When this occurs, 
43 Effort represents a cost and it is higher the larger the expected payoff. 
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the costs outweigh the benefits of monitoring and members reduce their control on other 
peers until eventually, monitor levels drop to zero (groups of size n ~ n2, for instance). 
, Because of this effect of monitoring on individual behaviour, it follows that 
borrowing groups cannot be either too small or too large. They cannot be too small because 
then, the discipline imposed by monitoring cannot offse! the negative impact on the social 
norm and therefore, group expected payoff would decrease. At the same time, groups cannot 
be too large because too many individuals have problems in co-ordinating their monitoring 
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Figure 19 The effect of shame on the optimal group size. 
n 
Finally it is worth analysing the role of shame in group formation. As stated above, 
the individual effort in a group can be higher than what it would be outside the group only if 
the level of shame is sufficiently high. In this case a' maximum in the effort function can be 
88 
dn* found at n * and we can prove that --> 0 : i.e. the larger the shame that can be impose on dS 
deviating agents, the larger the group size that can be achieved in equilibrium. 
If the level of shame is too low, groups cannot be formed either because a maximum 
in the individual effort function does not exist or because, even if such maximum exists, it is 
lower than the effort produced by an individual borrowing in isolation. Figure 19 shows the 
case when a maximum exists but it is too low for the lender to allow group borrowing. 
The level of shame S depends here on the scale of the loan L. It can also be 
interpreted as the ex ante characteristics of individuals that determine whether groups will be 
formed or not. . Groups will be formed only when individuals are sufficiently able to 
"behave" in a group. If individuals are particularly insensitive to social sanctions (notice that 
s can be easily seen as the individual's perception of shame), groups tend to be unstable and 
unprofitable to lenders; therefore, they will not be allowed. 
9. CONCLUSIONS 
In a credit market where poor borrowers are more rationed than rich borrowers there 
exists some scope for institutional innovation. Formal lenders can otTer a group contract that 
relies on the formation of "social collateral" to improve the risk sharing properties of the 
equilibrium. "Social collateral" is not some physical element that lenders can seize in the 
bad state but it is a product of group interactions. It represents the discipline that monitoring 
has on co-borrowers' effort and such discipline may increase the individual equilibrium level 
of effort so that poor borrowers can obtain more favourable contractual terms from formal 
lenders. 
Group interactions produce contrasting effects on individual optimal effort. Effort 
tends to be lowered because of free riding and profit sharing; furthermore, other things equal, 
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the monitoring activity reduces the amount of effort that each individual can dedicate to the 
project, thus reducing the social norm. Positive effects are related to the social norm that 
groups endogenously develop and to the discipline that derives from monitoring. Deviation 
from the norm are punished with social sanctions by peers when they can be observed and 
this tends to increase the equilibrium level of effort. TIns form of behaviour discipline is the 
"social collateral" that may increase banks' expected return on each loan. 
Banks' expected return on each loan will decrease or increase according to whether 
the negative effect of group lending on effort dominates or not. The negative effect is likely 
to dominate when groups are either too small or too large. When groups are too small the 
discipline imposed by monitoring cannot offset the negative impact on the social norm and 
therefore, the group expected payoff would decrease. When groups are too large the ability 
to impose sanction is too low; thls lowers the discipline and therefore, the expected payoff of 
the group. In any case, the reason why borrowers tend not to form either too small or too 
large groups cannot be explained only by the magnitude of the free riding problem as much 
. . 
of the literature on group lending and peer monitoring seems to underline. There are factors 
of exclusively social nature that affect group formation. TIlese factors can be identified with 
the ability of co-borrowers to monitor each other; with the ability of groups to impose social 
sanctions on deviating partners and with the individual perception of social sanctions. 
TIle individual perception of social sanctions ("s" in the model) seems to playa 
crucial role. It was easy to show that the optimal group size is positively correlated with the 
individual sensitivity to social sanctions and thls observation may provide an indirect answer 
to why difficulties have been encountered in replicating the Grameen Bank success outside 
Bangladesh. Very simply, it is necessary that a minimal strictly positive value of "s" exists 
ex ante for a group to be formed. In other words, the lngher the individual sensitivity to 
social sanctions, the hlgher the likelihood that a group will be formed and the larger will be 
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the optimal group size. If tIlis is true, it must also be the case that group lending programmes 
will be more successful simply among individuals wllich simply have a hlgh ex ante 
predisposition to form groups. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Pension Reform, Pension Funds and Stock 
Market Development in Eastern Europe 
10. INTRODUCTION 
The issue of pension reform is constantly being debated in Eastern Europe due to the 
fiscal unsustainability of public pay as you go (P A YG) schemes and because the economic 
transition from ~he central plan has eroded the real value of pension benefits· due to the 
almost total absence of indexation of contributions and benefits. But a pension reform 
involves issues that go further than the "simple" problem of guaranteeing adequate 
retirement income to pensioners. A pension reform is likely to transform the structure of the 
financial sector by promoting the creation of new financial and non-financial agents, and by 
altering the relative importance of agents already active in the market. This is likely to have 
a profound impact on the existing patterns of allocation of funds, corporate governance and 
therefore, on the issue of firm restructuring. 
In tins framework, pension funds are likely to play an important role. More than any 
other institutional investors, they are likely to influence the development of the stock Inarket 
whlch in turn enables pension funds to develop even further as a more efficient stock market 
allows pension funds to allocate funds more efficiently. 
TIns chapter will focus on these propositions: Sections 11 and 12 analyse the role 
played by public PAYG pension schemes, their fiscal unsustainability, the issues that are 
likely to be addressed by the reforms and the consequences of a pension reforms. Section 13 
analyses how pension funds influence and are influenced by the development of the stock 
markets. Section 14 presents a stylised model of pension funds and stock market interaction, 
focusing on its impact on firms' information disclosure. Section 15 presents factual evidence 
of pension funds and stock market development in the transition economies of Eastern 
Europe and the former Soviet Uillon (FSU). Conclusions follow in section 16. 
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11. PENSION REFORM IN EASTERN EUROPE 
Public pension schemes play an important role in the social security system of many 
countries and pension reform is a major issue that governments throughout the world are 
now facing due to the fiscal unsustainability of existing old age security systems. Reforms 
are occurring at a growing speed in Latin America (Chile 1981, Mexico 1991, 1997, Peru 
1993, Argentina 1994, Colombia 1994, Uruguay 1995, Bolivia 1997) and in DECD countries 
(Switzerland 1985, Australia 1992). Current discussion are taking place to reform pension 
systems in most Latin American countries together with other developing countries and the 
transition economies of Eastern Europe. In this section I briet1y summarise the major 
characteristics of public pension schemes, the reasons for their long-run unsustainability and 
finally, the major issues addressed in the reform. 
11.1 The role of public pension plans 
Public pension plans are generally mandatory, publicly managed, defined be.nefit 
based and mostly unfunded Pay-As-You-Go (PAYG). Their main economic goals are to 
provide forced savings for retirement; to provide insurance against various types of risk; to 
provide intergenerational and intragenerational redistribution of income (The World Bank 
1994). 
The reason why people should be forced to save for their retirement is somewhat 
paternalistic and it is based on the assumption that workers do not fully anticipate their 
retirement needs. By making the scheme mandatory governments' aim is mainly to limit old 
age poverty but a further reason for compulsion may also be dictated by the fact that public 
pension schemes have an important income redistr~butive aspect that governments may want 
to enhance. 
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Public pensions schemes provide insurance for participants against different types of 
risk such as long-term investment risk, inflation risk and longevity risk. Insurance against 
long-term investment risk is achieved by the provision of defined benefits for retirees; 
insurance against inflation and the erosion of the real value of benefits is achieved when 
contributions and benefits are fully indexed; finally, retirees are insured against longevity 
risk since pension annuities are paid for an indefinite' number of years after retirement. 
Nevertheless, the insurance providedby public pension schemes is incomplete even when 
systems are actuarially fair since there is always a political risk, linked to the public 
management of the scheme, that participants cannot avoid (Davis 1995). 
Another characteristic of public pension schemes relates to their redistributive 
power. Apart from the redistribution that occurs along the life cycle of participants, P A YO 
schemes may allow for both inter and intragenerational income redistribution. 
Intergenerational redistribution takes place across cohorts and it occurs when the schemes 
are in a period of over or under accumulation. When the rate of growth of the labour for.ce is 
higher than the rate of growth of capital, cohorts liv~ in a period of overaccumulation and 
benefit from the P A YO system. If the economic system is in a period of underaccumulation 
and the rate of growth of the labour force is lower than the capital rate and existing cohorts 
are worse off (Blanchard and Fisher 1989). Intragenerational redistribution takes place 
within cohorts and more specifically, between agents with low survival probability and 
agents with high survival probability. The possibility of redistribution arises because public 
pension plans pool together types with different risk and pooling equilibria are stable; 
because of compulsory participation low risk types cannot drop out and problems of adverse 
selection are avoided. 
A final major characteristic of public pension schemes relates to progressivity. In 
general, the redistribution impact is higher the higher the progressivity of the social security 
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system. Increasing levels of progressivity can be achieved for both contributions and 
benefits, depending on how these are designed. Contributions can be a) regressive, b) 
proportional and c) progressive while benefits can be a) earnings related (with higher 
benefits to those who earned or contributed more); b) flat rate (with same benefits for everyo.ne 
per year of covered employment); c) means-tested (with higher benefits for pensioners with 
lower income and assets). For both contributions and benefits, the redistributive power of 
the system increases with the level of progressivity. 
11.2 The need for reform 
PAYG schemes can be very cheap to run when they are implemented in countries 
with a high proportion of young people since in this case few pensioners need to be sustained 
by a relatively young labour force. Nevertheless, they tend to become unsustainable when 
the ratio of pensioners to the labour force increases; although workers contributions can be 
raised to sustain the demand for pension, contribution rates cannot be raised indefinitely with 
the ageing of the population. 
P A YG schemes tend to follow a life cycle characterised by increasing coverage rates 
among workers, increasing demographic dependency ratio44 and system dependency ratio.45 
When schemes are immature (low system dependency ratio) less than 1 per cent of GDP is 
generally spent on pensions. Although contributions rates are low, the schemes run 
surpluses and high replacement rates46 can be afforded. In an intermediate stage the system 
dependency ratio increases and a larger coverage and/or increased contribution rates are 
44 Ratio of people aged more than 60 to people between 20 and 59. 
45 Ratio of pension recipients, including widows, orphans and disability pensioners to contributors. 
46 Ratio between pensions and average wages 
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needed to finance current pensions. Eventually schemes reach their maturity47 and they run 
deficits that cannot be matched by increasing contribution rates or by decreasing the average 
replacement rate. The ageing of the population puts further pressure on the system that 
eventually needs reforming. Pension expenditure in this final stage is generally 8 per cent or 
more of GOP (The World Bank 1994). As it will shown later, OECD countries with PAYO 
schemes have in average reached tins stage and the transition economies in Eastern Europe 
closely follow behind. For the two areas, average public pension expenditure reached at tile 
beginning of the nineties 9.2 and 8.4 per cent of GOP respectively. 
The problem of unsustainability of unfunded schemes can be addressed through a 
pension reform which could potentially address several other undesirable features. For 
instance, PAYG pension contributions are typically proportional to wage income and 
therefore, they distort labour market decisions. Employers are motivated eitIler to reduce 
tIleir hlring of labour and workers are motivated to reduce their effort or to escape to the 
informal sector where payroll taxes can be avoided. Distortions in the labour market stems 
from the missing link between contributions and benefits in a defined benefit P A YO system 
and they are reinforced when there are no tax advantages linked to employers contributions. 
Other undesirable features of PAYO schemes relate to their redistributive power. 
Compulsory PA YO schemes have been praised for their intragenerational redistribution 
power. Nevertheless, Nelissen (1987) argues that there is little evidence of redistribution 
from the lifetime rich to the lifetime poor while Panis and Lillard (1995) argue that there is 
empirical positive correlation between lifetime earnings and life expectancy; workers witIl 
lngher wages, who should contribute more, tend to stay more in education, therefore 
contributing in average less to the system than those who are supposed to benefit from it. 
47 A scheme is mature when increases in benefits cannot be matched by an increase in coverage of the labour 
force. 
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Furthennore, even if benefit fonnula appear to be progressive they are often earning related 
and therefore far less progressive than means-tested schemes. Finally, PAYG schemes are 
intended to insure participant from investment and inflation risks but, as said before, the 
political risk more than offsets such a positive characteristic especially in countries with 
unstable regimes. A well designed pension reform may represent an effective means to 
address the vast majority of the issues just mentioned. 
Tahle 6 State eensions in transition economies, selected countries. 
Male Demographic System 
retirement dependency dependency Social security 
Country age 1991 ratio 1990 ratio 1990 ........... !:~.p.!:.I}~.i.~~.~~ ............. I?~I}~~.~!:' .. !:~.p.~.I}~.i.~~.~~.. Year 
(per cent (per cent (per cent (per cent 
.............................................................. (P..~!..~~!!.~ ............ rp.~!..~~!J.U ........ 9!..e!-!E'-g~.~ ...... 9.r.gP..EJ. ...... f?[p..l!.r:!g.~U ...... e!..§p.E'J... ................ . 
Poland 60 28 49 48.00 22.80 30.80 14.63 1995 
FYR 
Macedonia 37.46 21.20 24.61 13.93 1994 
Slovenia 29 54 28.99 13.70 1994 
Georgia 60 30 45 31.00 11.00 1992 
Belarus 60 33 49 23.71 12.40 19.69 10.30 1995 
Hungary 60 36 59 28.39 17.60 16.61 10.30 1994 
Slovak 
Republic2 60 32 31.24 16.90 18.30 9.90 1995 
Latvia 60 33 51 41.88 16.00 25.65 9.80 1995 
Czech 
Republic2 60 32 27.79 13.42 18.80 9.08 .1995 
Bulgaria 60 37 87 24.39 10.58 18.52 8.03 1995 
Ukraine 60 36 40.09 18.00 17.82 8.00 1995 
Armenia 651 22 34 35.83 15.80 15.19 6.70 1994 
Estonia 60 32 52 31.14 10.60 19.56 6.66 1995 
Romania 60 29 62 32.41 10.50 6.50 1993 
Albania 17 37 29.76 12.20 14.40 5.90 1994 
Russian 
Federation 60 31 46 23.65 8.30 5.50 1993 
Lithuania 601 30 53 30.90 8.20 18.11 4.81 1994 
Azerbaijan 60 19 22.59 5.53 19.00 4.65 1995 
Moldova 60 26 22.80 5.32 17.60 4.11 1994 
Uzbekistan 60 15 34 2.60 1993 
Kyrgyzstan 60 20 34 42.35 11.90 2.40 1993 
16 41.13 10.90 1994 Tajikistan 60 
·Averagej······················S·O·······················3·0······················48:3·0················3·(39·············1"~Di"8············19·:4i·············8j·5 ...................... 
1: 1996. 2: Referred to the Czechoslovak Republic. 3: Weighted averages. 
Source: Fox 1993, The World Bank 1994, IMF, OECD, Local Authorities. 
The figures reported in Table 6 allow to draw some light on the problem of 
unsustainability of public pension schemes for selected transition economies. The data 
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collected refer to the years 1993 to 1996; the statutory male retirement age is in average sixty 
years for all countries in the region; average demographic and system dependency ratios are 
30 and 48 per cent respectively; pension expenditure is in average 8.4 percent of GDP. 
Pension expenditure reaches its maximum in countries like Belarus, FYR Macedonia, 
Georgia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia where between 1994 and 1995 more than'10 per cent 
of GDP was spent in public pensions. The highest percentage is observable in Poland where 
in 1995 pension expenditure was 14.6 per cent of GDP. In general, public pension systems 
in the transition economies are characterised by a large unification of pension benefits 
between the various professional categories, near-universal coverage and high statutory 
replacement rates. Furthermore, initial pension benefits are often calculated on a very 
progressive formula taking into account earnings just prior to retirement and the full service 
record (Fox 1993, Holzmann 1993). Importantly, since the share of labour income in GDP 
of the transition economies is far lower than in OEeD countries, contribution rates are 
generally higher. Average contribution rates range from 20 per cent in Estonia to 45 per cent 
in Poland while Italian pension contributions (the highest in the EU) are 27 per cent. 
Tahle 7 Social indicators: average comJ!arisons.1 
Per Male Demographic System 
Developing Capita retirement dependency dependency Social 
Countries GOP age ratio ratio security Education 
(percent (percent 
{$eee} (percentl (eercent2 ofGDPl ofGDPl 
South Asia 1,260 55.2 15.1 11.2 7.0 3.4 
East Asia 3,210 55.7 15.5 11.6 3.4 2.8 
Eastern Europe, 
Baltic's and CIS 5,210 60.0 30.0 48.3 12.3 4.8 
Latin America 5,360 60.8 14.9 21.0 3.4 4.2 
OECD Countries 19,000 64.4 32.9 39.2 16.3 4.9 
1: Weighted averages except for the system dependency ratio of Asia, Latin America and aECD. 

















Table 7 reports similar figures for other sets of emerging and developed countries. 
On the one side, emerging countries in Latin America, South Asia and East Asia have a 
relatively young population which is confirmed by the fact that delnographic and system 
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dependency ratios are very low; consequently, pension expenditure as a percentage of GDP 
is around 2 per cent. Dn the other side, DECD countries have a relatively old population and 
demographic and system dependency ratios are 33 and 40 per cent respectively; 
consequently, pension expenditure is in average 9.2 per cent of GDP. Transition economies, 
although they are classified as emerging markets, have a' demographic structure siinilar to the 
DECD countries (demographic and system dependency ratios are 30 and 48 per cent 
respectively) and therefore, similar average pension expenditure as a per cent of GDP (8.5 
per cent). 
Notice also that per capita GDP in transition economies and Latin American 
countries is considerably higher, in average, than the per capita GOP in the Asian areas. 
Nevertheless, average pension expenditure, as a per cent of GDP, in transition economies is 
close to the DECO countries while pension expenditure in Latin American countries is close 
to the average expenditure in Asian countries. TIus seems 'to confirm how pension 
expenditure is strictly related to the demographic structure of a country, rather than to its 
wealth. 
The problem of unsustainability is particularly serious for some DECD countries, 
especially when the projection of demographic and system dependency ratios are considered 
(Chand and Jaeger 1996). Vittas and Michelitsch (1995) give some projections of system 
and demographic dependency ratios for selected transition economies: by 2020, the system 
dependency ratio is expected to reach 62 and 72 per cent in Hungary and Poland respectively 
while the demographic dependency ratio is expected to reach 44 per cent in the Czech 
Republic, 54 per cent in Hungary, 44 per cent in Poland and 50 per cent in Russia. As a 
result, given existing entitlements and contribution rates, most schemes have large implicit 
debt liabilities; the fact that the transition economies have weaker fiscal systems than the 
DECD countries makes their situation even more acute. 
100 
Iceland f;m~~ I 
Australia .~mJ I 
U" ~::.:;~~::::~ =.::m· .. ::m".:.:m"· .:m·:m::m~::m·:·:m·.:·.:m::m:·:m: ... =.··:.~.... I 
Can ad a ~·.·m·m .. m .. rnrn· m .. ·m .. m· m· .. ~ .. ~ .. ~.~ .. ~. ·mJ· • I 
Norway p.:;;;;J. ;;;;;: ....;;;;;:. ;;;;;: ...~. ·~·"~":;;;:;"··:;;;:;,:;;;:;"·m .. m,,,·:;;;;J .. ·:;;;;J .. ··:;;;;J,,·;:J·, I 
New Zealand ... rn ..rn· rn,··rn··rn .. ·rn·m·m· ·m·,· m··m·m· m· ·m·, ·m-mum·";;;]·, I 
N':::'::: =p ...:~ .. ::~ ••• ~.: .  ~.:~.:~::.:~.: .••~~ •.. ~.: .. ~::.rn.: ••. rn:::m.: •• m.:.:~~::~:::.~::::~::::~ .. :.:~:: ... : .... ~ I 
Portugal." rn· rn ..m····m ..~ ..~· ~ ...~. ··~···~· .. ·~ .. ·~ .. ·~· .. ~ .. rn·rn .. m .. m .. ·~ .. ·~ .. ·~ .. ·m·.. ! . 
Austria p ... ;;] ....;;] ..:;;;;:: ....:;;;;::. ·~ .. ·~ .. ·m .. ·m .. m·· ..m .. m .. ·;;:;;;: .. ;;:;;;:· ;;] .. ·;;] .. ·;;] .. ··:;;;;:: .. ·:;;;;:: .. ·m .. ·m .. ··m .. ·m· ·m·· ·;;;;;:·· .. ;;:;;;: .. ·±?·;;] .. m .. ·· 
I Spain ................................. ' ....................... ·.·.w .... ·.· .... · ........ . 
I 
F in Ian d p ... ~.~. ~· .. ·~·····~·m··rn .. rn· ·m"· m·····~· .. ~· ..~ .. ~ ...~ ...~. ~" ~ .. ~. m· rn .. ·rn .. ··m .. ···~ .... ~ ....$.· ..~ ... ~ ...... ~ .. ~., ··m-.. m .. ·Z1·· 
i Belgium ...................... -................................................... .... ·.d .... . 
France ~·~··~ .. ;;;;;; .. ·;;:;:; .. ;;] .. m· ·m .. ~· :;;;;J ... ~ ..;:;;:;: ..;:;;:;: ...~ ... ~.~.;;;;;;. :;;;:;.;;:;:;. ;;:;:;·m· ..m·:;;;;J· ..:;;;;J· ;:;;:;: ..;:;;:;: .. $ .. I.~ ... ;;;;;; ... ~~~;:a 
Germany .··m .. :mzj .. ~ .. ~· ~ ... ~ ..~.~. ·m· m .. m·· m· m"·m··rn·,·~" ~.~ .... ~., ..~ .. ~ .. ~. ·m· ·m·$· ·rn .. ·rn·:;;:;;;· ..~ ..~·~·· ~.~ ..  
Sweden ~ .. rn .. ·:;z;:· .:;z;: .. ~ ...~ .. ~ .. ·2! .. ·~ .. ·~ .. ~ .. ~ .. ~ .. ·rn .. ·m .. ·m· .:;z;: .. ~ ••~. ·~· .. ~ .. ·2! .. ·~ .. ·m .. m .. ~ .. ·$· rn .. ·:;z;:· ..~ ..~· ·~"·2!·"·2! .. ·m· ·m .. ~ .. ·rn .. m .... 
Italy ............................................................................................. .. 
0% 2% 4% 6% 8% 10 12 14 
Figure 201995 pension expenditure in,DEeD countries as a percentage ofGDP. 
The similarity in public pension expenditure between transition economies and 
DEeD countries is even more obvious when a country by country comparison is made. 
Figure 20 reports the pension expenditure in DEeD countries as a percentage of 1995 GDP. 
It is possible to divide DEeD countries in two separate groups. In the first group (roughly 
all countries with expenditure below 8 per cent of Gnp) are countries with a low implied 
replacement ratios48 and with developed private pension fund schemes such as the United 
States or the United Kingdom. In the second group (all the others) are countries with high 
replacement ratios,49 undeveloped private pension funds and heavy P A YG schemes (notably 
Italy, Germany and Japan). 
48 The implicit replacement ratio (ratio of gross pension spending to average gross wage earnings) is for instance, 
13% in Iceland, 25% in Ireland, 45% in Norway. 
49 Italy 49%, Sweden 54%, Germany' 46%, Belgium 63%, Finland 65%. 
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11.3 Nature of reform 
Once assessed the need for reform of mature P A YG schemes it is necessary to 
analys~ what pension reforms really involve. Reforms want to achieve at least three 
fundamental aims: 1) to strengthen the link between contributions and benefits and reduce 
the distortions in the labour market; 2) to maintain the redistributive function of the PA YG 
scheme and provide income support to the old age poor; '3) to make explicit the government 
debt accrued with the PAYG scheme. 
As far as the first two objectives are concerned, these can be achieved by a two pillar 
arrangement. The first pillar would entail a small compulsory defined benefit demogrant,50 
or even better means-tested, managed by the state. Its aim would be to guarantee support to 
retired workers with low lifetime earnings and limited savings. The presumption that 
workers, especially young workers, are myopic regarding their retirement needs requires that 
this first pillar to be compulsory. The first pillar would also preserve the redistributive 
aspects of the old .PAYG scheme to a minimum extent; compulsion would overcom~ the 
adverse selection problem characteristic of private annuity markets and allow for 
intragenerational redistribution; eventual indexation of both contributions and benefits would 
account for inflation risk. Of course, political risk would not be avoided. The second pillar 
would entail fully funded, individually defined contribution accounts financed by payroll 
taxes held in private financial institutions and directly managed by participants. The scheme 
could be mandatory or voluntary .. This would strengthen the link between contributions and 
benefits thus reducing the distortions in the labour market. The redistributive impact of the 
second pillar would be limited only to a redistribution along the life cycle of participants. 
50 In a flat demogrant benefits are indexed pensions of the same dollar amount for all retirees who had contributed 
over a full lifetime work. 
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This pillar would be free of political risk, although management risk would be unavoidable 
as privately managed schemes are exposed to the riskof frauds. 
" In practice most countries go for a three pillar arrangement according to a "risk 
diversification" principle that is not well specified: a first compulsory public pillar with the 
limited objective of reducing old age poverty and insuring the different types of risk outlined 
before; a second compulsory or voluntary pillar, fully funded and privately managed based 
on personal saving accounts and occupational plans; a third pillar based on voluntary 
personal savings. The general aim of the three pillar system is to achieve an improved target 
redistribution, to lower social costs and to achieve more efficient savings allocation with the 
third pillar satisfying the needs of more sophisticated investors. 
The third objective of making explicit the government debt implicitly accumulated 
under the PA YO scheme and the funding of the transition can be particularly difficult to 
address in countries with weak fiscal systems. Large fiscal deficits are likely to be created in 
the period of transition from an unfunded to a fully funded schelne due to the shortfall of 
current worker contributions. As a matter of fact, current workers would redirect their 
contributions to personal pension fund accounts under the fully funded scheme without being 
able to provide pensioners with income. 
Oov.ernments have in general two extreme alternatives for paying their implicit debt. 
One extreme alternative is to transfer on the day of reform the full value of the inlplicit 
pension assets to pensioners and current workers by issuing bonds. The other extreme 
alternative is to keep on paying the P A YO pensions to the extent that they have been 
contributed for prior to the reform. 
The two extreme alternatives have both positive and negative aspects. On the one 
hand, the positive aspects of the one-shot strategy relate to the reduced period of time for 
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which the transition deficit is likely to last and, above all, to the credibility of the reform. 
Nevertheless, it is likely to require the existence of several economic conditions that in 
general are not yet present in Eastern Europe. First of all it requires a functioning 
government debt market since current pensioners and retiring workers have to sell bonds to 
purchase annuities. Agents need to understand the natUre of the lump sum payment so that 
sufficient long-term savings are accumulated for retirement (issue particularly important if 
the private fully funded scheme is not mandatory). Stock markets have to be able to absorb 
the large liquidity increase and a well structured legal framework and property right system 
must exist in order to guarantee worker pension accounts. Finally, governments should be 
able to correctly enforce existing laws. 
On the other hand, the long-term strategy gives more time to the economic and legal 
systems to develop but it has the drawback that pension payments and hence the transition 
deficit would last until the fully funded scheme is mature, i.e. the last contributor under the 
PAYG system has passed away (Arrau and Schmidt-Hebbel 1993). 1hls leaves time t6 
possible unwanted deviations from the strategy dueto political reasons. 
Governments can of course choose an intermediate option which is basically a 
convex combination of the two extremes previously analysed. From the second option they 
can run an "operational" deficit to pay current pensions to existing pensioners and from the 
first option they can run a "recognition" deficit by issuing bonds in order to transfer to 
workers, once they retire, the implicit value of their P A YG pension assets accrued prior to 
the reform (Arrau and Schmidt-Hebbel 1993). Such intermediate system is substantially the 
one chosen for the Chilean reform (de Fougerolles 1995, Vittas 1995a). 
TItis intermediate solution, could reflect the positive aspects of the two extreme 
solutions just mentioned. The operational deficit would not be as large as in the long-term 
strategy and the recognition-bond deficit is likely not to last as much as in the one-shot 
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strategy. The time needed for the transition to be complete can be defined by adjusting the 
relative size of these deficits. 
I In any case all three solutions need financing and this can be done either by raising 
taxes or by issuing new debt. Unfortunately, it is not possible to say which source of funding 
is best to finance the transition from a PA YG to a fully funded scheme. As a Inatter of fact, 
although the transition increases Pareto effiCiency by eliminating the distortion imposed by 
the pure-tax component of the P A YG contributions, such increase in efficiency may be offset 
by the increase in general taxation needed to directly finance the transition or to repay tile 
interest on issued debt. The net effect is therefore ambiguous (Arrau and Schmidt-Hebbel 
1995). 
12. IMPACT OF PENSION REFORM 
Any pension reform attempting to downsize the public unfunded scheme in favour of 
a privately managed, fully funded scheme is likely to have a considerable impact on mo~t of 
the features of P A YG plans outlined before. In this section I briefly summarise the results of 
tile literature on the effect that a pension reform is likely to have on insurance and 
redistribution and on aggregate savings. In the following sections I focus more specifically 
on the likely consequences of pension funds development. 
12. 1 Reform, insurance and redistribution 
Any pension reform would modify tile risk sharing and redistributive properties of 
the old social security system. Intragenerational insurance would be maintained only by the 
first public pillar and progressivity could be increased by making benefits subject to 
progressive income tax. In any case, it is unlikely that the reformed system would provide 
the same level of insurance than the old one to the extent that private defined contribution 
lOS 
schemes do not provide intergenerational and intragenerational redistribution due to their 
defined contribution and voluntary nature.51 
, Insurance against longevity would be provided by the new system through the 
private market for annuities. The problem with such market is that it is affected by severe 
problems of adverse selection because agents with a longer life expectancy are more likely to 
buy annuities. To the extent that the new second pillar is not mandatory, this form of 
adverse selection cannot be mitigated. Insurance against inflation is also likely to be higher 
in the new system if contribution and benefits are indexed. Finally, participants to the new 
system will bear the investment risk embedded in all defined contributions schemes. A 
privatised system would considerably reduce the political risk characteristic of state managed 
schemes as governments would not be able to alter social security rules in response to 
political pressures. This, for instance, has been the case with the Chilean privatised 
mandatory pension system which seems to provide high insulation against political risk 
(Diamond 1995a). Nevertheless, a private system would need a well developed regulatory 
framework to insure against the risk of frauds; furthermore, regulation has to be effectively 
implemented by the relevant authorities. Both conditions are unlikely to be met in transition 
economies and a hurried pension reform is likely to jeopardise the already weak social 
security system of many countries. 
Several criticisms have been made by advocates of egalitarian income redistribution 
about the redistributive impact of reforms. Such people tend to stress the redistributive 
characteristics of the first pillar and do not favour any reduction of its role. Nevertheless, 
there is empirical evidence of limited redistributive impact of PA YG systems (Nelissen 
1987) and furthermore, some authors (Valdes-Prieto 1994) claim that it is not necessary to 
51 The statement has to be interpreted in general terms ali fur instance, limited intragenerational redistribution can 
be still achieved for industry-based plans. 
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provide income redistribution through the social security system because progressive taxes 
and transfers can be used instead, leaving the first pillar to provide adequate pensions on an 
individualistic basis. In any case, even if reduced redistribution make low expected income 
agents worse off in the short-run, pension reform and contractual saving development more 
generally are likely to have a considerable impact on stock markets, as explained in section 
13. At least in the long-run the poor is likely to benefit from increased real wages resulting 
from an increased capital stock per worker. If short-term compensatory programmes are 
implemented, low expected income agents do benefit from pension reforms (Valdes-Prieto 
1994). 
12.2 Reform and savings 
There are numerous studies related to the effect of pension reforms on aggregate 
and/or individual savings and they provide contrasting results about the sign of such effect.52 
There are reasons for which pension reforms have a positive impact on aggregate 
savings. For instance a reform aiming at limiting the redistributive function of the social 
security system to a small flat demogrant first pillar would reduce the amount of insurance 
provided by the system and thus boost savings by low expected income agents (Hubbard et 
al. 1995). Nevertheless, this argument is somewhat weakened by the already mentioned 
empirical evidence of limited redistributive power of P A YG schemes. Another reason for a 
positive impact on savings is due to the presence of credit rationing. Credit rationed agents 
tend to have a higher propensity to save than unrationed agents as savings represent their 
only available means for asset accumulation. In case of compulsory participation to pension 
funds, it is 1ikely that agents would face liquidity constraints especially at the beginning of 
52 For an general and analytical reviews, see: An-au and Schmidt-Hebbel 1993; The World Bank 1994; Corsetti 
and Schrnidt-HebbeI1995; Davis 1?95; Hubbard, Skinner and Zeldes 1995; Mitchell and Zeldes 1996. 
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their life cycle as they would be unable to borrow to offset their forced savings. This is 
especially true for lower income agents for which forced pension saving should boost overall 
savings more markedly (Davis 1995). 
Nevertheless, the impact of reforms on aggregate savings can also be negative. 
Assuming that the reform would act as a mean preserving spread (Rothschild and Stiglitz 
1970) the increase (decrease) in risk would increase (dec~ease) precautionary savings. Since 
the reduced political risk of the reformed system may not offset the increase in risk due to 
the investment risk and reduction of insurance levels, the net effect of the reform on 
aggregate savings is ambiguous (Mitchell and Zeldes 1996). Furthermore, even if funding 
would increase personal savings, it is difficult to assess whether such increase is reflected at 
the national level. This may be due to at least three factors: 1) it is difficult to say whether 
personal saving is or is not offset by government dissavings as a consequence of tax 
concession to pension funds; 2) it is difficult to estimate to what extent personal savings 
increase as a consequence of increased rate of return on pension savings; 3) it is difticult to 
estimate whether at a company level, savings through pension funds is not offset by 
dissavings elsewhere (Davis 1995). 
In general, the reason for the ambiguous net effect of funding on aggregate savings is 
related to the fact that there is no direct relationship between level of savings and pension 
funding. Savings do not depend exclusively on the nature of the pension systems but also on 
many other factors such as per capita income, income growth, structure of the population and 
nature of financial markets. For instance, countries with high levels of pension funding such 
as the United States or the United Kingdom have also low saving ratios compared to 
countries depending on P A YO unfunded schelnes such as Italy for instance. 
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13. PENSION FUNDS AND STOCK MARKET DEVELOPMENT 
A pension reform has the immediate effect of re-allocating savings froin the state to 
institutional investors which invest them in order to guarantee the highest possible retirement 
income to contributors; subsequently, the institutionalisation of savings is likely to have an 
important impact on the development of financial markets. In the first part of this section I 
focus on the impact that the development of pension funds is likely to have on stock markets; 
further in this section I will focus on the impact that the development of stock markets is 
likely to have on pension funds. 
13.1 Pension funds development 
The reason why, within the framework of savings institutionalisation, only pension 
funds are here taken into consideration, is related to the fact that pension funds are more 
likely to have an important impact on stock markets than other institutional investors. In 
countries where the pension system does not rely on a P A YO scheme, such as the United 
States or the United Kingdom, pension funds differ from other institutional investors 
essentially for either of the two following reasons: they benefit from a constant flow of funds 
from contributors due to legal and/or contractual arrangements, and they have particularly 
long liabilities as benefits are only distributed at the time of retirement. Although constant 
flow of funds and long-term liabilities are also characteristics of certain close-end investment 
funds, pension funds tend to be the largest institutional investors in countries with no P A YO 
pension schemes and tins fact suggests tIlat tile Illost important impact on stock market due to 
institutionalisation of savings is likely to derive from the development of pension funds 
rather than from tile development of other institutional investors. 
Life insurance companies tend to be associated with pension funds when analysing 
tile effects of their development on financial markets. This is related to the fact tIlat pension-
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type products are also sold by life insurance companies which also tend to have long-term 
liabilities. Nevertheless, although financial liberalisation implies that the boundaries 
between the activity of different institutions become extremely vague, pension funds and life 
insurance companies differ for several reasons. Pension funds collect essentially workers' 
contributions and invest them while life insurance companies tend to be active in· the market 
for annuities, once benefits have to be disbursed and if pension funds do not already provide 
such service. Although life insurance companies provide pension-type products, they tend to 
do so exclusively on a voluntary basis and furthermore, the term of the liabilities deriving 
from such contracts can be considerably short. Reflecting these differences in liabilities, 
regulation tends to be more liberal for pension funds; an important difference is that life 
insurance promises are often fixed in nominal terms while those of pension funds are not. 
Institutionally, the differences between pension funds and life insurance companies are 
reflected by the fact that in pension reforms, pension funds are associated with the activity of 
the second pillar while life insurance companies tend to be associated with the activity of the 
third pillar. As it was mentioned in previous sections, the second pillar usually represents 
the principal element of the new funded pension scheme, both when it is based on voluntary 
or compulsory participation. Instead, the third pillar is essentially aimed at catering for the 
needs of more sophisticated investors. Furthermore, participation to the third pillar is 
assumed to be subject to the participation to the second pillar, and often, to the first pillar. 
All these differences imply that pension funds and life insurance companies tend to cater for 
the needs of different types of individual investors and therefore, their impact on the 
development of stock markets is likely to be different. 
The development of pension funds, can contribute to the development of stock 
markets in important ways. On the one side, potential benet1ts relate to the impact on the 
asset distribution of investment portfolios . and on allocation efficiency due to 
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institutionalisation (Davis 1995, The World Bank 1994, Vittas and Michelitsch 1995); to 
financial innovation; to the creation of specialised intermediaries providing financial services 
and finally to corporate governance. On the other side, the development of pension funds 
can have a negative impact on stock markets as their activity may increase volatility in stock 
markets. This is an important issue in emerging markets where the fragility of financial 
markets in general is of particular concern among policy makers. Finally, the impact on 
stock market development can be limited in the absence of foreign exchange controls as local 
pension funds may want to diversify risk by investing abroad (Reisen 1997). 
13.1.1 Portfolio distribution 
Pension funds tend to compensate for the increased risk of defined contribution 
schemes by pooling across assets with uncorrelated returns more efficiently than what the 
personal, sector can do. TIus implies a different distribution in the portfolio structure of 
domestic assets and a lugher concentration of foreign assets where foreign investments are 
allowed. 
Table 8 and Table 9 show the asset structure of pension funds in 1994 and personal 
sector in 1990 for selected countries. The differences in portfolio structure across countries 
are generally explained by differences in the depth of security markets, in the structure of 
liabilities, in regulatory restrictions and in investment culture (Davis 1995, De Ryck 1996). 
Nevertheless, a common feature in all countries is that pension funds tend to have a portfolio 
distribution more skewed towards equities than the portfolio distribution of the personal 
sector. For instance, Table 8 shows how in 1994 equity holdings of pension funds were 80 
per cent of tlle portfolio in the United Kingdom, 52 per cent in the United States and 29 per 
cent in Japan. Short-term and deposit holding were only 3, 8 and 5 per cent of tlle portfolio 
of the same countries respectively. In 1990 the equity holding of the personal sector were 12 
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per cent of the portfolio in the United Kingdom, 19 per cent in the United States and 13 per 
cent in Japan. Liquidity and deposit holding represented instead 47, 33 and 23 per cent of 
the portfolio of the same countries respectively. 
Table 8 Asset structure of eension fundsz 1994. 
In per cent of Fixed income and 





Ireland 55 35 6 4 
United States 52 36 4 8 
Belgium 36 47 7 10 
Netherlands 30 58 10 2 
Japan 29 63 3 5 
Denmark 22 65 9 4 
Germany 11 75 11 3 
Switzerland 11 64 16 9 
Spain 4 82 1 13 
Source: De Ryck 1996. 
Tahle 9 Asset structure of personal sector, 1990. 
In per cent of Liquidity and Life insurance, 
... ~~.~~.I .. ~~.~~~.~ ........................ ~.9!:1.~~ ................. ~~.~~~ ................. ~?~.~~ ................... ~.~p.~~~~~ .............. p..~~.~~~.~.f~.~~.~ ... . 
Japan 13 5 0 53 23 
France 34 3 0 51 12 
Italy 22 18 0 49 12 
Germany' 6 18 0 48 22 
Canada 21 6 2 39 28 
Australia 17 13 0 34 36 
United States 19 10 1 30 33 
United Kingdom 12 4 0 29 47 
Netherlands 6 8 0 29 54 
Source: Davis 1995. 
The specificity of the pension funds' portfolio distribution is also evident when 
compared with the portfolio distribution of life insurance companies. Table 10 provides 
information on pension funds and life insurance companies in the United Kingdom, United 
States, Germany and Italy in 1995. Countries like the United Kingdom and the United States 
have a pension system essentially based on fully funded private pension schemes wlnle 
Germany and Italy rely mainly on public PA YG pension schemes. 
The first difference to be noticed between pension funds and life insurance 
companies in th~se is their different relative importance. In the United Kingdom and the 
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United States pension funds are considerably larger than life insurance companies: in the 
United Kingdom the assets of pension funds and life insurance companies are 75 and 69 per 
cent of 1995 GDP respectively while in the United States the corresponding percentages are 
56 and 30. In Germany and Italy the relative importance of the two institutional investors is 
inverted. In Germany pension funds' assets to GDP are almost one tenth of life insurance 
companies' while in Italy the same ratio is only one half. The reason for this asymmetry is 
likely to lie in the fact that in Germany and Italy pension funds are not fully developed as the 
role of sustaining the pension system in these countries is performed by the P A YG public 
scheme. 
Table 10 Pension funds and life insurance ,J!ortfolio distributionsz 1995 . 
....... y.!)}.~!7~.~!!.'.~.~~.~ ............... y.!).~~!7.~.~~.<:'.~!7.~ ...................... §!7r.~.~!).y. ............................... !~.~!y. ................. . 
Pension Life Pension Life Pension Life Pension Life 
funds Insurance funds insurance funds insurance funds insurance 
Assets1 74.92 69.44 55.66 29.59 2.90 20.52 5.73 9.57 
Equitl 80.00 58.95 52.50 17.05 11.00 2.76 7.83 5.40 
Equity3 49.40 33.74 37.47 6.47 1.33 2.37 2.54 2.92 
Loans2 0.02 1.45 3.03 14.54 40.24 66.68 0.00 0.00 
Long-term bonds2 12.41 16.44 27.20 57.44 na na na 47.35 
Li9Uidi!l 4.41 7.96 4.38 8.77 15.52 34.36 376.16 24.22 
1: per cent of GOP; 2: per cent of assets; 3: per cent of stock market capitalisation of the London, New York, Frankfurt and 
Milan stock exchanges respectively; 4: proxied by the ratio between cash deposits and equity. . 
Source: OEeD. 
The second difference between pension funds and life insurance companies lies in 
their asset portfolio distribution. Both in the United Kingdom and the United States pension 
funds invest more in equities and less in bonds (even long-term bonds) than life insurance 
companies. In the United Kingdom, for instance, pension funds investment in equities 
represents 80 per cent of total assets which means that they own almost 50 per cent of the 
1995 London stock market capitalisation. Comparative percentages for life insurance 
companies are instead 59 and 34 per cent respectively. The same pattern arises in the United 
States although with a lower magnitude. Notice in fact, that life insurance companies in the 
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United States own only 6 per cent of the New York stock market capitalisation as most of 
their financial assets are allocated in mortgage loans and long-term bonds. 
, Investment behaviour of pension funds is similar in Germany and Italy in the sense 
that equity investment is higher than for life insurance companies. Nevertheless, the 
underdevelopment of stock markets in these cquntries implies that assets are mainly 
allocated to mortgage loans (Germany) and long-term bonds (Italy) and in general in non 
financial assets. 53 This also implies that both pension funds and life insurance companies in 
Germany and Italy tend to have more liquid an asset position than in the United Kingdom 
and the United States. The last row in Table 10 reports the percentage of cash deposit over 
equities and it is meant to represent a proxy of asset liquidity. In the United Kingdom and 
the United States, where pension funds perform their role of sustaining the pension system, 
portfolio distributions are more skewed towards equities and therefore, pension funds 
positions are less liquid than life insurance companies'. In Germany and Italy this is not the 
case as there is no incentive for pension funds to allocated contributions to high risk, long-" 
term assets as retirement income is mainly provided by the state through the PA YG scheme. 
It seems to be the case that pension funds invest more in equities than life insurance 
companies in all four countries. Nevertheless, mainly because of their longer term liabilities, 
only in the United Kingdom and the United States can pension funds have an impact on stock 
market. TIle incentive to invest equities is there particularly strong as only high real returns 
determine the payment of high pensions in a fully funded scheme. TIus suggests that an 
eventual pension reform can be particularly beneficial for investment and public finance in 
the transition economies because of the specific structure of the balance sheet of pension 
funds. The weakness of firms in transition is such that external funding is often available 
53 Italian non financial assets of pension funds and life insurance companies were, in 1995, 37 and 44 per cent of 
total assets respectively. 
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only to few well reputed companies and even for them funding is on a short-term basis. The 
development of pension funds would increase the availability of long-term finance via equity 
and corporate bonds; it would help reduce leverage and cost of capital if aggregate volume of 
financial savings is raised by the diversity of instruments available to households. 
Ultimately this would reduce firms' sensitivity to short.:term shocks. The govefJlment debt 
finance by means of domestic securities could benefit in similar ways. 
13.1.2 Innovation 
Pension funds development can also be beneficial to product innovation in capital 
markets by stimulating the use of hedging strategies and derivatives. For instance, the effect 
of pension funds development on innovation is well doculnented in the United States with 
the introduction of ERISA in 1974. The requirement of fixed duration for investment 
instruments has stimulated the creation of new iinancial instruments such as zero coupon 
bonds and collateralised mortgage obligations. The long-term maturity of liabilities of 
pension funds has also stimulated the development of immunisation strategies based on long-
term CPI-indexed bonds and index-linked mortgages. Notice that int1ation-hedging is 
particularly important where benefits are linked to final salaries but its relevance for pension 
funds should not be overstated. In the United Kingdom index-linked bonds represent only 3 
per cent of pension funds assets as returns on equities seem to more than compensate for the 
decreased matching between assets and liabilities (Davis 1995). Another area where 
innovation can be stimulated by the development of pension funds is in the use of 
derivatives. For instance, futures can be use to improve asset allocation between different 
national markets when derivatives markets are more liquid than the market for the underlying 
instruments. Options instead, can be used to profit from shifts in currencies. In general, 
innovation would be particularly beneficial in developing stock markets. Even if lnost of the 
developments seen in the United States would not be on the immediate agenda in transition 
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economies, the creation of ad hoc instruments suiting the needs of pension funds would only 
increase efficiency if only through an expanded set of investment opportunities .. 
13.1.3 Volatility 
The major counter argument to the beneficial impact of pension funds development 
on stock markets is given by the possible increase in volatility that larger pension funds and 
institutional investors in general may generate in the stock market. A general perception 
about emerging equity markets is that security prices are subject to substantial variation 
around their fundamental values. Among the authors supporting tins view: Gooptu (1993), 
for instance, argues tIlat increased volatility may be the result of herding behaviour, portfolio 
activities and general short-terminism of institutional investors. Williamson (1993) suggests 
that herding behaviour among foreign investors may cause the development of bubbles in 
asset prices. Howell (1993) argues that the absence of long-term domestic investors causes 
foreign investors to be marginal and their mobility causes high price volatility among 
securities. NevertheIess, in a more recent study, Richards (1996) finds no empirical evidence 
to support the view of positive correlation between the development of institutional investors 
and increasing volatility in emerging stock markets. He shows that emerging stock markets 
are indeed more volatile tIlan mature markets but volatility has not increased in recent years. 
It may actually be possible that emerging markets have become less volatile with the 
increasing participation of foreign institutional investors since more investors now share a 
given amount of risk and therefore, volatility of returns is expected to decrease. 
13.1.4 Foreign investment 
In the case of absence of foreign exchange controls, pension funds may want to 
invest abroad in order to diversify risk and Reisen (1997) argues that tins is likely to be the 
case in developing countries. Because of their lower per capita income, investors in 
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developing countries are likely to be more risk averse and hence, they would buy a higher 
share of foreign assets than investors in developed countries. TIus seems to assume that a 
developing and developed countries have the same asset return distributions. But if the 
underlying distributions are different, covariances are different and the respective shares of 
foreign assets do not necessarily reflect anymore only'the degree of risk aversion in one 
country. He also adds that institutional investors display 'a "home bias" for assets and in the 
OEeD countries this seems to be related to the fact that pension funds may wish to limit the 
currency exposure of their portfolios, pension fund trustees may have a low risk tolerance, a 
track of high real returns on domestic bonds and loans may exist. These same reasons would 
only partially apply to developing countries which would therefore display a less pronounced 
"home bias". 
13.2 Stock market development 
The development of stock markets in transition economies is strictly linked to the. 
question of optimal configuration of the financial markets in these countries. Given' the 
specificity of the transition process to market based econOlnies, the optimal configuration of 
the financial sector should guarantee that newly privatised firms be restructured, effective 
mechanisms of corporate governance be in place and finally, that short and long-term 
liquidity be available to firms at low costs in order to promote economy-wide growth. 
Naturally, the achievement of these objectives is strictly related to reforms in other 
sectors such as fiscal reforms, enterprise reforms and legal reforms. For instance, banks rely 
on the legal system, including procedures for collateral recovery and bankruptcy laws to 
enforce their claims and perform their role of monitors of firms. Stock markets require 
company laws which define the rights of shareholders and protect minority shareholders. 
Enterprise reform, including privatisation and free entry of new private firms, is needed to 
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impose financial discipline on entrepreneurs. Fiscal reform would release the pressure on 
banks to lend to the government sector and relax the fiscal burden on firms, already exposed 
to the macroeconomic shocks embedded in the transition process. In tillS section I analyse 
how the lack of long-term finance and effective corporate governance can be addressed 
through the development of stock market. 
Between 1990 and 1994 gross financial savings of enterprises funded 33.7 per cent 
of investments in Russia, 79.3 per cent in Romania and an average of 129.2 per cent in tile 
Czech Republic. The net borrowing from banks and other financial institutions averaged 8, 
12.6 and minus 14.3 per cent in the same countries and over the same period respectively. It 
seems that in transition economies, weaknesses in tile financial sector requires firms to rely 
on internal financing (Johnson et ai. 1997). Given the relative weak governance structure of 
enterprises, further external financing would improve financial discipline and allocative 
efficiency of investments. Nevertlleless, banks in transition economies are in general still ill 
equipped to perform the governance and allocate funds efficiently. Among t1le reasons for 
tillS are a general lack of lllstorical information about enterprises; lack of a satisfactory 
system of ongoing monitoring of loan portfolio quality; lack of qualified personnel able to 
deal Witll areas of credit risk, lack of appropriate loan restructuring and insolvency functions 
within banks; lack of appropriate prudential regulations and loans and credit risk assessment 
procedures· linked to the specificity of transition economies. In tillS framework the 
establishment of a well functioning banking system and prudential supervision rules is 
essential for tile restructuring of enterprises and for governance improvement. For instance, 
it has been argued that emerging economies mostly need the existence of a reasonable 
efficient, ordinary banking system til at collects short-term deposits, handles transfers of 
funds, provides firms with working capital and wlllch is suf1iciently well capitalised to cover 
ordinary banking risks (Gross and Steinherr 1995). 
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This stress on the banking sector may lead to underestimate the importance of 
sufficiently flexible corporate governance mechanisms in a transition period. Even a well 
functioning banking system may have severe limitations in performing an effective corporate 
governance role and sustain long-term growth in the period of transition because of banks' 
short-term objective of loans repayment and the fact that working capital and short-term 
investment loans do not represent major components -of firms' long-term growth. If the 
banking sector cannot provide long-term finance through loans, it Jnay be provided through 
equities by the stock market. Its development is likely to benefit the financial sector in 
several ways as it is likely to create new lending opportunities and therefore, lower the cost 
of capital for firms. It is also likely to improve corporate governance through the promotion 
of information disclosure and stock brokers' activity. The larger availability of information, 
in turn, can help the banking sector in assessing risk and resolve the bad loan problem, 
largely at the origin of most banking crisis. 
13.2.1 The role of stock markets. 
Stock markets are supposed to perform two main roles: 
• Stock markets provide long-term finance to firms. 
• They provide evaluation of the financial information produced by firms and improve 
corporate governance. 
King and Levine (1993) argue that financial development influence long-term 
growth by improving the probability with which innovative projects are financed.54 In tlus 
sense, the absence of a stock market can be seen as an "internal" constraint for the financial 
54 For a review of the literature on the relationship between financial development and growth see: de Gregorio 
and Guidotti (1995). 
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sector and economy-wide development. The principal reasons being that an efficient stock 
market represents a means to attract long-term and cheap equity tinance, to. attract foreign 
capital as a circuit for transferring know-how, to improve resource allocation and accelerate 
economic growth. Large stock markets may decrease the costs of mobilising savings and 
facilitate investment by lowering the costs of equity finance. Bencivenga, Smith and Starr 
(1996) and Levine (1991) underline how. liquidity is -important for growth as tIns allows 
long-term investments to be undertaken without investors needing to relinquish the control of 
their savings for long periods of time. Levine and Zervos (1995), using a cross section of 49 
countries from 1976 to 1993, show how stock market size and integration is positively linked 
to growth. 
The development of stock markets implies also that an increasing volume of 
financial information be produced. Firms have a private incentive to produce reliable 
information as tIns allows them to lower the cost of financing capital (Dhaliwal 1979, 
Diamond 1985, Diamond and Verrecchia 1991). It is also likely that positive externalities 
exist in producing information, bOtIl for other listed firms and for otIler agents operating in 
the stock market. Firms listed on the stock exchange are asked to produce a standardised set 
of information and it is likely tIlat average proi1ts increase with tIle number of i1rms being 
listed. TIns for the simple fact tIlat standardised information may decrease transaction costs 
among participating firms. 
Holmstrom and Tirole (1990, 1995) argue that liquid stock markets create demand 
for information about firms and therefore, improve corporate governance. An increase in 
market liquidity can ease shareholders' exit and lively take-over activity wInch could 
represent an important discipline factor in controlling managerial incompetence. 
Alternatively, Diamond and Verrecchia (1982) and Holmstrom and Tirole (1990) argue that 
information in stock prices allows for effective lnanagerial schemes to be implemented as the 
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mitigation of the principal agent problem makes it easier to link manager compensation to 
stock performance. In this framework, the development of stock markets is likely to promote 
liquidity and information disclosure and therefore, promote firm restructuring and effective 
governance. 
Several criticisms have been made about the importance of stock market 
development with reference to the issues before mentioned. As far as the resource allocation 
role of stock markets is concerned, Mayer (1988), in his study of France, Germany, Japan, 
UK and US, argues that stock markets did not represent an important source of firm finance 
in the period 1970 ... 1985 while the most important source of funds was retained earnings. 
The allocative' efficiency of stock markets can be limited by problems of asymmetric 
information. When firms cannot effectively signal their type though the stock market, the 
cost of capital for the good (bad) types is higher (lower) than it would be in case of perfect 
separation. TIus form of subsidisation, typical of pooling equilibria, implies that funds are 
not allocated in an efficient way. Allen (1993) argues that the relative importance of stock 
markets and banks in corporate finance varies with time. Stock Inarkets are more important 
in those countries and/or time periods when there is disagreement about production functions 
while banks are desirable institutions for allocating resources where there is agreement on 
technology and the main problem is monitoring tirms. On the informational role of stock 
markets, Stiglitz (1985, 1994) argues that the quality of information about firms produced by 
the stock market is too low to address investors' decisions and that investors have to rely on 
specific intermediary agents for such service. Criticisms have also been made of the idea of 
take-overs as a corporate governance mechanism as both theoretical and empirical literature 
have not produced unambiguous results on this issue (Davis 1995, Filipovski 1996). 
Finally, the inference that banks are likely to benefit from increased information is 
somehow weakened by the argument that banks do not necessarily rely on public information 
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but on customer relationship and borrowers' reputation in their lending policies. 
Nevertheless, there is empirical and theoretical evidence that banks do benefit from the 
increased information in their lending operations as stock market and banking sector 
represent a complementary rather than alternative source of finance for firms as suggested by 
Demirgii<;-Kunt and Maksimovic (1995), Levine and Zervos (1995) and by Boyd and Smith 
(1996). TIus is inferred by observing that debt-equity' ratios tend to increase in the initial 
stage of stock market development in developing countries. Tile emergence of equity as a 
major instrument of external finance occurs in more soplusticated economies where debt-
equity ratios tend to be lower. Tl1is is confirmed by a study by Demirgii<;-Kunt and Levine 
(1995) who show how, in a panel of 41 countries over the period 1986 - 1993, countries with 
well developed and efficient stock markets also have well developed and efficient bank and 
non-bank financial intermediaries. 
13.3 Stock markets and pension funds development 
If pension funds can influence the development of stock Inarkets for the reasons 
before mentioned, it is also possible to find a feedback from stock markets to pension funds 
development wluch goes through the promotion of information disclosure on the part of 
firms wllich, in turn, is an important element for the development of efficient mechanisms of 
corporate governance. 55 
Two main models of corporate governance can be identified. Tile "insider model" 
relies on the direct representation of specific interests on the board of directors and through 
direct monitoring and disciplining of management via capital or debt. TIus model can be 
found in many DEeD countries (Japan, Germany, France, Netherlands, Switzerland). Tile 
55 For an analytical survey of the issues of corporate governance in transition economies see: Frydman, Gray and 
Rapaczynski 1996. 
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"outsider model" is used in the United Kingdom and the United States where monitoring and 
disciplining takes place via the capital or debt market. Hence, corporate governance can be 
seen as the result of four main forms of control on management behaviour. Control can be 
direct and/or indirect and it can be exerted through equity and/or debt. 
A first form of control is exerted indirectly by the market through equity where the 
thrcat to managers is given by the threat of take-overs. TIns acts as a constraint on 
managerial behaviour as management deviations from shareholders interests is likely to be 
reflectcd by a low share value as shareholders dispose of their holdings. TIle likelihood of 
acquisition increases and therefore, the probability of a change in the management. LatTont 
and Tirole (1988) and Scharfstein (1988) argue that well functioning stock markets that make 
the threat of take-over credible induce manager to maximise firms' profits. Pension funds 
are major shareholders and their role in take-overs can be crucial. Nevertheless, with 
exception of South Africa where pension funds seem to exercise a direct control of the 
management (Vittas and Michelitsch 1995), little empirical evidence exists that suggests an 
important role of pension funds in take-overs (Davis 1995). 
A second form of control is exerted indirectly by the market through debt. TIle 
causes of constraint managerial behaviour are here the decreased internal resources at 
disposition and the inspection of the stock market related to debt issues (Jensen and 
Meckling 1976). The extent to wInch tins form of control is desirable is probably limited as 
increased leverage exposes firms to temporary shocks and can raise bankruptcy rates. 
Pension funds would represents an alternative source of finance and the eventual decrease in 
corporate g~:)Vernance wInch derives may be offset by increased control through equity. 
A third form of control is the direct control through equity that the board of directors 
exercises on behalf of the shareholders. Institutional investors are likely to exercise tins 
control more efficiently than individual investors. The role of pension funds seems to be 
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increasing in this area (Davis 1995) partly motivated by concerns on the effectiveness of 
take-overs and leverage as a means of corporate governance. 
Finally, the direct control exercised by banks through debt is the last form of 
management control. In this area banks have a comparative advantage deriving from 
ongoing credit relationships, the knowledge of borrowers' deposit history and the use of 
transaction services. Nevertheless, the privileged relationships with banks have some major 
drawbacks for firms' financing policies. Bank loans tend to represent a short -term resource 
for firms which limits the possibilities for growth. Furthermore, information acquired 
through reputation is likely to be non-transferable and tllis can limit tlle ability of borrowers 
to switch to equity finance. Pension funds clearly have a passive role in tllis area but they 
can contribute by providing an alternative source of finance and by stimulating tlle diffusion 
of information. Information is likely to improve corporate governance in general and banks' 
loan monitoring activity. 
The main issue related to tlle reciprocal impact of pension funds and stock market 
development is not to determine wllich of tlle corporate governance models previously 
outlined is likely to emerge in the transition economies. The main issue is to outline that the 
development of bOtll stock market and pension funds is possible only if firms have strong 
incentives to disclose information about their types. Firms, especially good firms, have a 
strong incentive to disclose information if tllis allows theln to obtain equity finance at a 
lower cost. In the next section I will show how this is likely to be the case. In a simple 
signalling model, I will show that firms seeking finance without the possibility of signalling 
to investors, their true type are likely to be pooled and treated as being the average type. Tllis 
means that in a pooling equilibrium the same premium is paid for a given level of equity 
finance by all firms. If instead firms can fully separate themselves, different firms will be 
paying different premia for the same level of 11nance with good type paying less then bad 
124 
types of course. The incentive to separate lies exactly in the fact tl1at types better than the 
average type would obtain the same level of equity finance at a lower cost. 
Information disclosure is also beneficial to pension funds and to the quality of 
corporate governance. Factual evidence suggests that pension funds invest in companies on 
a portfolio basis more than as controlling agents. TItis means that they rely on third-party 
credit assessment for their investment deCisions in order to contain transaction costs and 
hence, they have an interest in supporting the development of a wide range of services, such 
as credit rating, accounting and auditing services. Vittas and Michelitsch (1995) argue that 
in many countries,' specialised agencies have also emerged that scrutinise the governance 
structure and monitor the corporate performance of different corporations in order to advise 
pension funds in tl1e exercise of their voting rights. High liquidity and capitalisation together 
with an increased availability of information and the consequent development of a wide 
range of information-related services, would allow pension funds to operate on a portfolio 
basis, to diversify risk more efficiently and to represent an important supply of long-term 
. finance which would contributed to liquidity. The stock market activity of sorting 
entrepreneurs coupled with superior ability in providing appropriate financing to investors 
can lower the cost of investing in productivity enhancement and stimulate economy-wide 
growth. 
14. PENSION FUNDS, STOCK MARKET AND FIRMS' INFORMATION 
DISCLOSURE 
TI1e following model analyses the relationships among three sets of agents: a 
continuum of firms, a stock market and pensio~ funds. The complex interactions among 
these agents are simplified to highlight the impact on the creation of information on the part 
of firms. Such information is processed by the stock market and then sold to pension funds. 
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Pension funds rely on the evaluative function of the stock market in order to address 
portfolio policies and provide firms, through the stock market, with long term equity finance. 
The development of the stock market is strictly related to tlle development of pension funds 
with cyclical feedback among the two sets of agents. 
On one side of the economy, firms with different probability of survival (hazard rate) 
seek long term equity finance to boost their net revenues and tlllS is obtainable only if firms 
meet some given information disclosure requirements. Firms' incentive to produce 
information is strictly related to the fact that information allows them to obtain equity 
finance at decreasing costs. I used a stylised signalling game to model the disclosure of 
information on· the part of the firms. In equilibrium, the amount of information disclosed is a 
positive function of the heterogeneity of firms listed on tlle stock exchange as a hlgher level 
of signal is needed to separate a larger number of different l1rms. 
In the middle, the stock market is composed of a stock exchange and a set of 
information intermediaries such as brokers, credit rating companies, audit firms et cetera. 
The stock exchange represents the only means where firms can sell their shares. In principle, 
tlle stock market promotes information disclosure by allowing a certain number of firms to 
be listed on the stock exchange as tIllS represents a source of revenue. Nevertheless, a<; tIle 
stock market is the only agent responsible for the evaluation of information, entry may be 
limited to a number of firms smaller than what is socially desirable. I will show tllat social 
welfare is not maximised when tlle stock market maximises monopoly profits. 
On the other side of the economy pension funds purchase firms' financial 
information processed by the stock market. Contrary to individual investors, pension funds 
possess the technology to efficiently process the. information produced by the stock market 
and the larger the availability of information the more efficiently savings are likely to be 
allocated by pension funds whlle addressing their portfolio policies. Pension funds represent 
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also a strong supply of long term finance in the economy since the structure of their 
liabilities forces them to have a portfolio distribution markedly skewed towards equities. 
This means that their presence in the economy is likely to promote both information 
disclosure on the part of firms, and the development of information intermediaries. I will 
show in a framework of bilateral monopoly with efficient bargaining how pension funds are 
likely to promote the development of the stock market through increasing bargaining power 
and thanks to a general increased efficiency of the financial sector. The growth of the stock 
market in turn, positively affects the development of pension funds as a larger number of 
listed firms implies more information being produced and therefore, a more efficient 
allocation of funds. 
The fundamental assumption made here is that long term equity finance favours 
economy-wide growth and that information disclosure improves on the one side corporate 
governance as it offsets the possible negative impact on governance of institutional investors 
portfolio policies; on the other side it facilitates risk diversitication policies of pension funds 
and therefore, it promotes their development. Improved governance, together with the 
increased efficiency represented by the development of pension funds, can lead in turn to a 
decrease in the cost of capital with positive feedback on economy-wide growth through its 
impact on the supply and demand for long term finance. 
14.1 Firms 
In the economy there is a continuum of risk neutral, profit maximising firms 
uniformly distributed56 over the interval H = [0,1]. Firms differ only by the quality of their 
management which is translated into firms having a constant but different probability of 
56 The use of the uniform distribution simplifies the treatment of the model without limiting the generality of 
results. 
127 
bankruptcy at any given time. In other words, a firm with a hazard rate ho has a probability 
of failure lower than a firm with a hazard rate hI > ho. Firms' individual types (realisation of 
h) cannot be observed by investors and firms alone cannot credibly inform investors about 
the quality of their management.57 Nevertheless, investors know the distribution of types 
..:.. 1 
over the interval H = [0,1] and therefore, they know the average hazard rate h = - in the 
2 
firms' population. 
Each firm has been in operation for an indefinite period of time producing profits 
very close to zero. It is possible to assume that firms have been financing their activity 
through bank loans and that at a specific point in time they see the possibility of running a 
project which will increase their gross revenue flow to X during their infinite lifetime 
horizon. For simplicity I assume that such a project is the only way that firms have to 
produce positive profits. ll1erefore, given a safe rate of interest r, the expected present value 






Firms have to rely on the local stock market for financing the project since they are 
assumed to have insufficient internal resources to meet the necessary investment and banks 
are unlikely to lend either than for the short term projects. Foreign stock markets are also 
assumed to be out of the reach of firms and this is a plausible assumption for firms located in 
emerging markets with low performance levels and/or inability to meet western information 
disclosure standards. 
57 The banking sector is not explicitly modelled here. Its introduction would not affect the level of information 
possessed by investors about firms' types as the information gathered by banks through their ongoing credit 
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The total investment cost to be sustained in order to run the project is given by two 
components. The first component is a fixed level of equity finance I provided by investors 
and the second component is a signalling cost i met by firms' internal resources. The reason 
for introducing signalling costs is that one of the functions of stock" markets is to evaluate 
firms and new investment projects; the variable "i" synthesises both the costs and the level of 
information produced by firms before equity transactions take place.58 In tIlis sense, tile 
production of information is seen as a necessary condition for firms to be listed on the stock 
exchange.59 
The equity finance I is provided by risk neutral investors against a claim share 
S E [0,1] on the expected present value of the firm. Hence, the expected present value of an 
h type firm is simply the value of the infinite stream of gross revenues from tile project 
minus the investors' claim on such revenues and minus the pre-floating costs i, all in 







s(h) = (r + h)-
X 
relationships with borrowers is private to banks and not likely to be transferred. 
58 Even if floating costs are fixed for all firms, this allows for the possibility that better finns may want to sustain 
higher pre-floating costs (by choosing better audit firms to analyse their books, for instance) in order to present 
themselves to investors as better investment. 
59 The same set-up can be re-interpreted as a problem of a single firm facing a continuum of projects ranked 
according to their probability of failure hE [0,1]. In this situation the unique firm would choose a different levels 
of signal i according to which project is fmanced. 
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is the capital share that an h type firm needs to sell in order to obtain the equity 
finance l. 
Two implications of ( 49 ) are worth mentioning. First, the expected value of a bad 
firm is lower than the expected value of a good firm because: a) for any given level of signal, 
good firms discount time at a lower rate (they are more patient) and b) as s'(h) > 0, good 
firms pay a lower premium60 than bad firms on the' same level finance I. Second, a 
participation constraint exists for a firm to undertake the project given by X ~ (I + O(r + h). 
The possibility of firms selling more than 100 per cent of their shares is here excluded as tIils 
would imply making negative profits. 
14.1.1 Pooling equilibrium 
Firms are motivated to produce information about their type since, as previously 
mentioned, this may reduc~ the cost of capital. Nevertheless, if the stock market does not 
perform its evaluating function, firms' signal becomes unobservable by investors.61 In such a 
set-up, the optimal level of information produced by firms is i = 0; firms are pooled together 
and they are all perceived as being the average type Ii . 
In a pooling equilibrium all firms sell the same capital share and investors make on 
average zero profits. The fact that the same level of shares is sold by different types of firm 
means tIl at better types are subsidising the presence of worse types. As a lnatter of fact, 
60 Noti~e that the amount of shares sold against I can be seen as the firms' cost of capital or in other words, the 
premium that bad firms have to pay for the low quality of their management. Alternatively s(hy1 can be 
interpreted as the price at which a type h firm is selling its shares: the shares in good firms cost more than the 
shares in bad firms. 
61 Without the intermediation of the stock market, investors are not likely to possess the resources needed to 
screen the volume of information produced by the firms. The absence of stock market intermediation makes 
information de facto unobservable~ 
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firms whose value is higher than the average firm value would be better off by separating 
themselves as this would yield a lower cost of capital. 
14.1.2 Separating equilibrium 
If the stock market performs its informational function the pooling equilibrium is not 
stable. Better types can use the signal i to reveal their type to investors and therefore, lower 
their cost of capital. In our simplified world the stock market performs its informational 
function when it provides a mechanism to reveal the signal i of every firm h to investors. For 
the moment I will assume that such activity is costless; later on this will be relaxed and 
resul ts compared. 
Firms use the signal to reveal information about their type and investors observe the 
signal and form an inference about types. A separating equilibrium exists when types are 
correctly inferred and no type has incentive to mimic anybody else in equilibrium. 
Following. Bernheim (1994) let ~(b,i) be the function that for any signal i assigns a 





f ~(b,i)db = 1 
}[ 
Each firm will decide the optimal level of signal by solving the following probleln: 
max 
j 
Vh = [l-s(~(b,i))]~-i 
r+h 
s(~(b,i)) = [r + ~(b,i)]i.. 
. X 
and a fully separating equilibrium is characterised by a function ~sCi) such that: 
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(53 ) ~(b,i) = {Ol b = ~s(i) 
otherwise 
( 53 ) implies that a type h firm choosing to signal i is perceived by investors as 
being type b with probability one. In equilibrium, indifference curves must be tangent to 
~sCi) in the choice-inference space (i x b) and the signal i must be self-fulfilling62 in the sense 
that ~,l i) = h. 
After totally differentiating Vh, applying the equilibrium condition ~sCi) = hand 
solving the resulting differential equation, one obtains the following equilibrium inference 
function: 63 
" i (54 ) r+h(i) = (r+ h)e I 
" 
where h is the type that finds optimal to signal i = 0 before flotation, also called the 
marginal type. 
The inference function correctly reveals individual firms' type h to investors once i 
is signalled; its inverse is therefore, the signalling function that yields the optimal level of 
signal produced by each individual firm. Thus: 
(55 ) i(h) = [log(r + I~) -log(r + h) ]1 
Figure 21 shows the signalling function for all possible types. Notice that the level 
of signal is monotonically decreasing in h: the best type will produce i(O) = imax and the worst 
type will produce i(1) = imino 
62 The self-fulfilment condition requires that in equilibrium, for any given signal i, the type h signalled by the firm 
coincides with the investors' inference b; i.e. b = h. 
63 See Appendix 17, page 164 for formal derivation. 
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If the marginal type is internal to H as shown in Figure 21, then types h > h produce 
a negative level of signal. This makes little sense as it is possible to show (by substituting ( 
A 
54 ) into( 50 » that types h> h would require to sell more than 100 per cent of their capital 
in order to obtain the equity finance I. TIus is not possible because the presence of ~le 
participation constraint would imply that types worse than the marginal type make negative 
profits. TIle exclusion of some types has to be incentive compatible in the sense that 
excluded types do not want to be in the equilibrium. Furthermore~ incentive compatibility 
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Figure 21 Signalling function in a partially separating equilibrium. 
A 
Let's start by showing that incentive compatibility holds for types h E [O,h] by 
considering the following two functions: 




(57 ) Vh~lh =[l-s(h)]~-i(h) 
J r+h. 
J 
where i(h) is defined by ( 55). Equation ( 56 ) ,is obtained by substitutin.g ( 55 ) roto 
( 49 ) and it yields the equilibrium expected value of all possible firms h E [0, h ]. It is 
strictly decreasing with h and strictly convex over the same interval. Equation ( 57 ) yields 
the equilibrium expected value of an hj type firm mimicking some other types hE [0, l~]. It 
is non-monotonic in h and strictly concave over the same interval. Both functions are shown 
in Figure 22 where ( 57 ) is shown for two different types hi > ho• 
Figure 22 Optimal value functions and mimicking behaviour. 
Incentive compatibility implies that types are always worse off, in the sense that they 
make lower expected profits, if they decide to produce a level of signal ditTerent from the 
optimal one given by (55). TIus be shown by dIfferentiating (57) with respect to h. TI1US: 
134 
(58 ) a Vh: Ih = {$ 0 h ~ h j 
ah >0 h<h· 
. J 
Notice how the mimicking value function reaches its maximum64 when firms signal 
correctly their type, i.e. when h = hj • ll1erefore, any signal level different from the one 
yielding the correct inference, yields a lower expected present value for the firm and, 
therefore, it is not chosen. 
Incentive compatibility holds also for types hE (h,1] who weakly prefer to be 
excluded. TIns is possible only if the marginal type makes zero expected profits in 
equilibrium. In order to prove this let's assume for one moment that it makes positive 
expected profits, i.e. "rz* > o. In this case, it is possible to find an h' E (/~ ,1] excluded from 
the stock market (and therefore making zero profits) wInch has incentive to mimic I~. 
Notice that in this case Vh~I}~ > 0 as positive expected profits for h imply s(h) < 1. Since 
tins violates the incentive compatibility requirement of the equilibrium, h has to make zero 
profits. In this case excluded types are indifferent between being excluded and mimicking 
h ; i.e. Vh~lh = 0 since s(h) = 1. 
The zero profit condition for tile marginal type implies that I~ is defined by: 
(59 ) A X r+h=-
I 
This in turn allows us to identify two possible cases for the separating equilibrium 
given earlier. 
2 * a Vh .1h 





1. If ~;;::: r + 1 the marginal type is h = 1 since no h > 1 type exists. TIle marginal type 
I 
produces a signal i(l) = 0 as he needs not to separate himself from any other type; it 
sells an optimal equity share s(1) :::;; 1 and makes expected profits y;*;;::: O. In tillS 
case we have a fully' separating equilibrium., Notice that in a fully separating 
equilibrium the marginal type may ,be making P?sitive expected profits without this 
undermining the incentive compatibility requirement as there are no types left 
outside the equilibrium. 
2. If!!.- < r + 1 the marginal type is h E (0,1) producing a signal i( I~ ) = 0, with an 
I 
optimal equity share sold is s( I~ ) = 1 and making expected profits Vh* = O. In tillS 
case we have a partially separating equilibrium, fully separating for all "active" 
firms. 
14.2 The stock market 
In the previous section, tile stock market functions were limited to the provision of 
long term equity finance through the stock exchange and to the evaluation of firms and 
firms' projects. The first function was performed by allowing firms to sell equities and the 
second function was performed at a zero cost by simply enabling firms' signal to be observed 
by investors. In tillS situation we saw til at a partially separating equilibrium can be obtained 
with types h E [0, h ] allowed to t10at and types h E (/~, 1] excluded from tile equilibrium. In 
equilibrium, the expected value of tile marginal type h is zero, a necessary condition for the 
equilibrium to be incentive compatible. 
In this section I relax ilie assumption of costless stock market evaluation as it is 
unlikely iliat information is simply transferred to investors at a zero cost. Legal requirements 
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provide that firms' financial information be certified by specialised institutions. 
Furthermore, it is often the case that information needs to be tailored by a large series of 
intermediaries such as stock exchanges, credit rating companies, brokers, auditing firms et 
cetera, as the quality of information produced by firms may be unsuitable to address 
investors' choices. Information intermediaries process the signal produced by firms and 
repackage it in order to facilitate investors' decisions. 
In the presence of information processing costs, a monopolist stock market has an 
incentive to limit the entry of firms: i.e. it has an incentive to limit the number of firms listed 
on the stock exchange. This derives from the fact that firms with a high hazard rate produce 
a low level of signal in equilibrium and this signal may too low to produce enough revenues 
to cover the processing costs. Since firms with a high hazard rate have also low expected 
profits, the stock market can exclude these types by imposing an entry fee that cannot be 
afforded by the bottom end of the distribution of firms. 
The stock market maximises monopolist profits by establishing an optimal. entry 
level for firms, which in turn determines an optimal entry fee and therefore, an endogenous 
level of excluded firms. In order to write the maximisation problem of the stock market, lets' 
define revenues and costs involved in the information processing activity. 
In the presence of information processing costs, the revenue sources to the stock 
market are now two: the revenue related to the stock market activity of processing the 
information produced by firms, and the entry fee levied in order to exclude "non profitable" 
firms. TIle first source of revenue depends on the entry level (equilibrium marginal type) g 
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established by the stock market65 and be will·be denoted by i(g,h), which is the equilibrium 
signal that an h type firm produces when the marginal type is g: basically (55 ) with it = g . 
The entry fee is also a function of the stock market's optimal marginal type and it 
will be denoted by ~(g). In order to determine the functional form of the entry fee, let's 
consider the expected value of a firm paying it: this is given by ( 49 ) to which ~ has been 
subtracted. Thus: 
(60 ) v,* = [1- s(h) ].-£- i - ~ 
h r+h 
In equilibrium, the marginal type produces a level of signal equal to zero; 
furthermore, it is required to make zero expected profits otherwise it is possible, like the 
previous section, to find at least one excluded h' E (g,l] that would make positive expected 
profits by mimicking g. TIle zero profit condition on g defines the entry fee imposed by the 
stock market on all types hE [O,g]. Thus: 
(61 ) X ~(g)=--I 
r+g 
The revenues from information intermediation are likely to be positively correlated 
with the level of signal produced in the economy and for simplicity I will assume that total 
level of signal and revenues coincide. TIle costs of intermediation are also likely to be 
positively correlated with the number of firms listed on the stock exchange and for simplicity 
I will assume that costs increase at a constant rate; i.e. C'(g) > ° and C" = 0. 
It is now possible to define the profit maximisation problem of the stock market: 
"-







1t sm (g) = J [i(g,h) + ~(g) - C']dh 
o 
The maximisation ( 62 ) yields the following first order condition:66 
( X) r ' ---J ---C' r+ g r+ g 
O~--------------~--~~~------~~-A--+h 
grm grw h 
Figure 23 Stock market and social welfare maximiser problems. 
The left hand side and right hand side of ( 63 ) are the stock Inarket marginal 
revenues and marginal costs respectively.67 Notice that the presence of information 
processing costs implies that the solution to the problem has to be an interior solution; i.e. 
type with no information processing costs. 
66 See Appendix 17, page 164 for formal derivation. 
67 The second order condition is verified as: (1 -~) r 2 < 0 
r+g (r+g) 
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gsm < Iz. TIle solution gsm = h is feasible only in the absence of information processing 
costs. 
, TIle solution just derived is illustrated in Figure 23, where R'sm represents the 
marginal revenues and C' the marginal costs of the stock market. TIle stock market 
maximises 1tsm(g) when R'sm = C' which in turn implies that entry is allowed only to types 
14.2.1 Limited entry and social welfare 
TIns solution is a typical monopoly solution and it is clearly inefficient from a social 
welfare point of view. Wlnle the monop<?list stock market limits entry after taking into 
consideration only its own private incentives, a social welfare maximiser would instead linnt 
the entry into the stock market by maximising the total welfare in the economy. 
In order to show the inefficiency of the stock market solution let us define the soci~l 
welfare function as the sum of investors' profits, stock market profits and firms' ptoflts. 
These are given by: 
g[ X ] f s(h)--I dh=O 
o r+1z 
(64 ) g{ X } f [1- s(h)]--i(g,h) -~(g) dh ~ 0 o r+h 
g f [i(g,h) + ~(g) - C')dh ~ 0 
o 
The social welfare function is given by the sum of the elements in ( 64). TI1US: 
(65 ) sw = J{[l- s(h)]~ - C'}dh 
o r+h 
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The social welfare maximisation with respect to g gives the following first order 
condition:68 
(66 ) (~-IJ=C' r+g 
The left hand side gives the social marginal revenues R'sw and the right hand side 
gives the social marginal costs C'. Notice that, since R'sw > R'.m! for all possible g, it must be 
the case that a social welfare maximiser allows more entrants in the stock exchange than a 
monopolist stock market: i.e. gsw > gsm. 
With the aid of Figure 23 it is now possible to compare the stock market solution 
(gsm) with the social welfare maximiser solution (gsw) and show how the former is less 
efficient than the latter. TIle elements shown in Figure 23 are: the stock market marginal 
revenues R'sm; the social marginal revenues R'sw; the stock nmrket (or social) Inarginal costs 
C'; the entry fee ~(g~m) when the marginal type is g~m; the signalling function (the bgsm curve) 
when the marginal type is g~m; the signalling function (the ag~w curve) when the marginal 
type is g~w. Notice that when the marginal type is gsw the entry fee becomes ~(gsw) = C'. 
TIle stock market sets an entry limit equal to g when R'sm = C'; in this way it 
maximises its profits which are given by the difference in the areas below R'sm and C'. 
Notice that the area below R'sm is given by the sum of the areas below the bgsm curve and 
~(gsm)' The social welfare maximiser, instead, sets an entry limit equal to gsw when R'sw = C'; 
in this way it maximises social welfare which is given by the ditlerence in the areas below 
R'sw and C'. 
68 The second order condition is verified as: cP s~ = 
()g 
X 
·--"""'2 <0. (r+ g) 
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It is easier to identify the changes in welfare when the equilibrium is attained at gsw 
after re-arranging the expression for the stock market profits. Thus: 
(67 ) 
The total stock market profits are the sum of three elements appearing to the right 
hand side of ( 67). The first element gives the gross revenues from firms' signal (area 
bOgsm); the second element gives the gross revenues from firms' entry fee (area cOgsme); the 
third element gives the total costs (area dOgs,J). 
In the social welfare maximiser solution an extra (g~w - gsm) firms are allowed to 
entry and the stock market gains the area (fgs~s..J) in terms of extra gross revenues. TIns is 
equal to the increase in the signal (abgsmgsw)69 minus the loss in entry fee (cd/e) given by the 
fact that all entrants pay a lower entry fee, plus the gain in entry fee (fg~mg~wi) given by the 
fact that now there are more firms paying the entry fee. At the same time, the stock market 
loses the area (fgsmgswi) representing the costs undertaken when processing the signal of the 
extra (gsw - gsm) firms. The net welfare loss for the stock market is therefore given by the 
area (fli) above R'sm and below C. With similar reasoning the net welfare gain for the 
society is given by the area (eli) below R'sw and above C'. 
Therefore, when the equilibrium conditions change the welfare modifications among 
agents are as follows: investors are indifferent when the equilibrium changes as their profits 
are always zero; the stock market has a net welfare loss given by the area (fli); the society 
has a net welfare gain given by the area (eli); therefore, it must be the case that firms have a 
net welfare gain given by the area (efli). Notice that the area between R'sw and C' is the total 
69 Notice that the increase in the signal from bgsm to agsw is due to the fact that more fIrms are allowed to be 
floated and therefore each type has to produce a higher level of signal to separate himself from all other types. 
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welfare of the economy and the area between R'sm and C' is the total welfare of the stock 
market. Therefore, the area between R'sw and R'smis the total welfare of firms. When the 
equil~brium is attained at gsw firms increase their signal but pay a lower entry fee so that 
profits increase. The extra profits are composed by a shift in welfare from the stock market 
to firms equal to the area (fli) and by an extra welfare gain given by the area (eli) which 
represents a net gain for the society. The marginal finn makes zero expected profits as its 
only costs are ~(gsw), equal to Vg~ . 
14.3 Pension funds 
In the previous section we saw how the stock market may have the incentive to limit 
firms' entry in the stock exchange as tIns maximises monopoly profits. Limited entry is 
achieved through an entry fee that cannot be afforded by the bottom end of tIle distribution of 
firms and the consequence of tIle monopolistic behaviour of the stock market is tIlat social 
welfare is not maximised. Welfare can be increased if a lngher number of firms were listed 
on the stock exchange. In tIns section I consider how the development of pension funds can 
offset the monopolistic power of the stock market, force a more competitive solution and 
contribute to the development of the capital market in general. 
The ability to offset tIle monopolistic power of the stock market relates to the fact 
that pension funds are a major supply of long term equity finance and at the same time they 
are major buyers of financial services from the stock market. In particular tIley benefit from 
a developed market of information intermediaries as tIns allows them to assess portfolio 
policies and diversify risk more efficiently. The monopsonistic power of pension funds Inay 
force the stock market into bargaiIling over the quantity of information produced in the 
economy as the demand for information perceived by the stock market is likely to increase 
with tlle presence of pension funds. FurtIlermore, the development of pension funds may 
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contribute to the development of capital markets as funds' activity stimulates the creation of 
new financial instruments and improves the efficiency with which the financial sector 
allocates savings. Both pension funds and new financial instruments represent a 
diversification in the portfolio of investment opportunities for individuals. A richer portfolio 
of investment opportunities in the utility function is likely to increase individuals' savings, 
contributing therefore, to the development of the stock market. 
14.3.1 Bilateral monopoly 
In this section, I analyse how pension funds can offset the monopolistic power of the 
stock market in a framework of bilateral monopoly with efficient bargaining. In order to do 
so, it is necessary to define the profit functions of both stock market and pension funds. 
The stock market's profit function is given by the maximand in ( 62 ) to which an 
extra term F has been added. This new term captures the revenues from the sale of 
information at a fee F.70 Thus: 
g 
(68 ) rtsm(g,F) = J [i(g,h) + ~(g) - C']dh + F 
o 
Pension funds' profits will of course depend on the amount of information in the 
economy,. on the fee charged for such information is bought from the stock market and 
finally on the degree of bargaining power that pension funds have in the determination of 
price and quantity traded. Let's assume for the moment that only one pension fund exists 
and that its profit function is given by: 
70 I use g as a proxy of the volume of information produced in the economy as information is monotonically 
increasing with the number of fIrms listed on the stock exchange. Therefore, in what follows "information" and 
"number of listed fIrms" will be l1sed interchangeably. 
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(69 ) 1C p! (g,F,a) = Q(g,a) - F 
where a E [0,1] is a measure of the pension fund's bargaining' power.71 The 
"production function" Q captures the gross revenues to pension funds deriving from the 
number of firms listed on the stock exchange for ~ given level of bargai~ng power. 
Revenues are assumed to be increasing in g and a. Furthermore, Q::,g > 0: i.e. the marginal 
product of information increases with the bargaining power of pension funds. 
The assumptions just made need to be justified. Pension funds benefit from a large 
number of listed companies for at least two main reasons. Firstly, the number of listed firms 
is positively correlated with the level of information produced in the economy, as we have 
seen in the first part of the model. Information decreases uncertainty about investment 
outcomes as it allows investor to know the exact probability of success h of their investment 
and therefore, the right price to be paid. Secondly, a high number of listed firms tnakes it 
easier for pension funds to find investments with expected returns with low (or even 
negative) correlation with the market portfolio returns; i.e. it facilitates the adoption of risk 
diversification strategies. Notice that projects are all independent and hence, they have zero 
covariances. If separation allows investors to correctly infer the probability of success of 
their investments, it certainly does not enable them to diversify risk. Individual investors do 
not possess sufficient funds to invest in all listed companies and therefore, reduce the 
variance of their investment; tlus can be done only when savings are pooled together in a 
pension fund. Hence, tl1e level of information processed by the stock market is an 
intermediate good that enters the "production function" of pension funds and it is here 
proxied by the number of listed firms. Thus, Q'g > 0. 
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The other idea is that pension funds, unlike individual investors, are not perfectly 
competitive and therefore, they have some form of bargaining power. If the market of 
pension funds is perfectly competitive, each pension fund will make zero profits; i.e. 
Q(g,O) = F. Although they still posses a superior ability to process information and can 
diversify risk, they have no bargaining power in the determination of the fee F at which they 
purchase information g from the stock market; i.e. the ~tock market will set fee and quantity 
such that no surplus is left to pension funds. The central assumption of this last part of the 
model is that pension funds are not perfect competitors as they are major providers of long 
term finance and also the most important beneficiaries of the evaluating activity of the stock 
market: this distinguishes them from small individual investors with no market power. Thus, 
Q'a>O. 
It is easy to justify the last assumption about pension funds production function: i.e. 
Q;:,g > 0. Pension funds are simply more efficient than individual investors in processing 
information. Such efficiency is likely to increase with the importance of pension funds if we 
agree that the larger a pension fund the better qualified its fund managers. This means that 
the marginal product of information increases with the bargaining power of pension funds. 
After having defined the profit functions of the stock market and of pension funds it 
is possible to analyse the bargaining problem between the two monopolists. What is likely to 
happen in the bargaining process over the fee o,f the intermediate good g is that firstly, 
pension funds and stock market will bargain on an optimal pricing rule for information for 
any given level of g. TIus is due to the fact that pension funds cannot directly detennine the 
entry level of firms but they can certainly commit to a specific pricing mechanism. 
71 For instance, ex = 0 means, that pension funds have no bargaining power in the determination of fee and 
quantity traded. 
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Subsequently, the stock market will maximise its profits by setting an optimal entry level, 
given the optimal pricing rule. Since this "two-step" procedure is equivalent to an efficient 
bargaining problem where pension funds and stock market bargain simultaneously on price 
and quantities, it is possible to re-write the problem just outlined in terms of a generalised 
Nash bargaining problem. Thus: 
(70 ) n a. I-a. max = 1tp!1tsm 
g,F 
where a E [0,1] is the pension funds' share of joint profits 1t1 = 1tsm + 1tp! which 
determines tlle bargaining power of each agent;72 1tp! and 1tsm are the profit functions of the 
pension funds and stock market respectively and the maximisation is conducted 
simultaneously with respect to price and quantities, as we are considering an efficient 
bargaining solution. The maximisation of log(n) yields the following two first order 
conditions: 
(71 ) a I-a a -log(n) = - --= 0 
aF 1tsm 1tp! 
and 
(72 ) ~lOg(n) =~Q; + I-a[(~_ IJ_r_- C'] = 0 
ag 1t~ 1t~ r+g r+g 
From ( 71 ) it is possible to derive the optimal fee charged to pension funds for the 
purchase of information. Thus: 
72 Notice that the bargaining power of each agent is determined by the relative shares of joint profits. This of 
course may not be the case if for instance, the evaluating cosl'i for the stock market are considered sunk cosl'i 
147 
g 
(73 ) F = (l-a)Q-aJ[i(g,h)+~(g) -C']dh 
o 
which can be then substituted into ( 72 ) in order to obtain the optimal firms' entry 
level. This is given by the value of g that solves: 




Figure 24 Shift in the demandfor information with the introduction of pension funds. 
By comparing ( 74 ) with ( 63 ) it is possible to establish that as long as pension 
funds' marginal product for information Q; is positive, their creation is likely to positively 
affect the development of the stock market. TItis can be seen in Figure 24 where C' is the 
marginal cost schedule of the stock market; R's1I1 is the schedule of the marginal revenues in 
when pension funds and stock market enter the bargaining process. Nevertheless, changing the structure of the 
problem would not affect the qualitative results. 
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the absence of pension funds and R'] is the schedule of marginal revenues of a vertically 
integrated stock-pension funds market. 
If Q; > 0 , the introduction of pension funds produces an increase in the demand for 
information in the economy which is reflected by a shift to the right of the marginal revenue 
schedule: Le. in Figure 24, R'sm shifts to R']. With unchanged marginal costs, the 
introduction of pension funds is likely to positively affect the size of the stock market as the 
number of listed companies increases from gsm to g]. 
14.3.2 The development of pension funds 
In the previous section, we saw how the creation of pension funds is likely to 
positively affect the size of the stock market. Tins is related to the fact that funds are more 
efficient than individual investors in the use of information produced by the stock market 
wInch in the model is summarised by a positive marginal productivity of information. In this 
section I will show how the development of pension funds can have a further impact on the 
development of the stock market through two different channels: through an increase in 
bargaining power and through a general increase in the efficiency with wInch savings are 
allocated. 
The development of pension funds is likely to be translated into an increasing 
bargaining power in the allocation of joint profits; Le. into an increase in <x. Tile study of 
the comparative static of the equilibrium (Le. the solution to ( 73 ) and ( 74 )) can be done 
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Figure 25 Nash bargaining solution and bargaining power. 
Figure 25 allows us to determine the behaviour of the equilibrium {g,F} in the first 
orthant, for any level of a E [0,1] which is measured on the axes of the other three orthants. 
In the first orthant, the upward sloping and vertical curves intersecting at c are the cost· of 
buying information for pension funds, given by ( 73 ), and the solution for g of the 
bargaining problem, given by ( 74 ), when a = O. In the second orthant there is the plot of 
the information cost for pension funds F as a function of the bargaining power a. Notice 
that the first derivative of ( 73 ) with respect to a is strictly negative as long as 
g 
Q+ J[i(g,h)+~(g)-C']dh>(l-a)~. TIus conditions implies that total profits of the 
o 
integrated market are greater than the stock market share of the marginal product of 
information. In the third orthant there is the plot of the solution g to (74) as a function of a. 
Notice that because of the assumption of increasing marginal product of information 
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Q;;,g > 0 for pension funds, any increase in bargaining power a must be matched by an 
increase in the number of listed firms g in order to attain again the equilibrium. 
When the bargaining power of pension funds is null, the equilibrium solution is 
given by a fee for information that sets pension funds profits to zero: i.e. Fh = Q(gsm,O), with 
a total number of listed firms equal to gsm. When a increases to a', the marginal revenue to 
the integrated stock-pension funds market will increase and as a consequence, for a given 
level of g, (73 ) will shift down and to the right hand side in the first orthant. Notice that the 
cost of information F is not defined above Fh and to the left hand side of gsm as a higher price 
and/or lower quantity would violate the participation constraint for pension funds. At the 
same time, since the marginal product of information increases with the bargaining power of 
pension funds, a larger number of listed firms is necessary to attain again the equilibrium; i.e. 
the solution to ( 74) shifts to the right. Finally, when a = 1, pension funds will set quantity 
and price such that the stock market profits are zero: i.e. Fl = 1tsm and g = gIl. Notice again 
that below Fz and to the right hand side of gIl functions are not defined as tIllS time, tIle stock 
market would not participate to the market. The intersections between (73 ) and tIle solution 
to ( 74 ), for all a E [0,1] defines tIle contract curve ee' of the bargaining problem between 
pension funds and stock market. 
It is interesting to compare tIllS solution with the standard theory on bilateral 
monopoly.73 As far as tIle equilibrium information fee is concerned, tIle standard result of the 
theory still holds true. TIle fee represents a mechanism for sharing joint profits between the 
upstream and the downstream monopolist and it decreases with the bargaining power of tIle 
upstream monopolist. TIllngs are slightly different as far as the equilibrium quantity of the 
intermediate good is concerned. In a bilateral monopoly framework with efficient bargaining 
73 See for instance Blair, Kascrman and Romano (1989). 
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and where the bargaining power of the downstream monopolist increases joint profits, the 
contract curve is not vertical anymore at the level of g that solves the joint profit 
maximisation problem as standard textbooks suggest. Since the marginal product of the 
intermediate good (here, information or number of listed firms) increases with the bargaining 
power of the downstream monopolist a higher volume of intermediate good must be traded to 
be in equilibrium and the contract curve is therefore, doyvnward sloping. 
The development of pension funds has a further long-run inlpact on the development 
of the stock market through the efficiency with which savings are allocated and therefore, 
through the level of interest in the economy. In the previous sections, it has been argued that 
pension funds ·activity stimulates the creation of new financial instruments and improves the 
efficiency with which the financial sector allocates savings. TIus increase in investment 
opportunities is likely to foster individuals' savings as new instruments modify individuals' 
utility function. TIle increase in the supply of funds is likely to drive down the level of 
interest in the economy in the long-run further stimulating the development of the stock 
market. ' 
TIllS can be seen by noticing that the marginal revenue in ( 74 ) is a decreasing 
function of the exogenous level of interest in the economy. TI1US: 
(75 ) - ---I --<0 d (X J r 
dr r+ g r+ g 
for r > (2: - 1) which is the condition that has to be met for an internal solution 
g E (0,1) of the optimal entry level. 
In other words the increased efficiency in the financial market and the increase in the 
supply of funds from households drives down the interest level in the economy. This 
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reduces the cost of equity finance in the sense that for the same long term investment levels, 
firms have to sell a smaller share of their capital. A lower cost of capital implies that the 
present value/profit of firms increases and a larger volume of information can be disclosed. 
An increase in information disclosure, in turn, is likely to have a positive effect on firms' 
corporate governance and on the development of the stock market. 
Stock market revenues increase with information disclosure and a larger number of 
companies are likely to be listed on the stock exchange. TIus increases the ability of pension 
funds to diversify risk and allows them to offer portfolios with a higher expected return to 
risk ratios to individual investors. 
The increase of portfolios expected return is likely to promote individuals' savings 
and therefore, increase the bargaining power of pension funds. On the one side, the 
development of pension funds may have a negative impact on corporate governance, as it has 
been argued in the previous sections, since pension fu~ds tend not to exercise a direct control 
on assets. On the other side, the increasing levels of information disclosure that 
accompanies the development of pension funds is likely to offset such negative impact 
Eventually, improved governance, together with the increased efficiency represented 
by the development of pension funds, can lead in turn to a decrease in the cost of capital with 
positive feedback on economy-wide growth through its impact on the supply and demand for 
long term finance. 
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15. PENSION FUNDS AND STOCK MARKET DEVELOPMENT IN THE 
TRANSITION ECONOMIES 
15.1 Evidence of pension funds development 
Only three countries in Eastern Europe have so far enacted a law regulating the 
activity of private pension funds. These are Hungary (law on Voluntary Mutual Benefit 
Funds, November 1993), the Czech Republic (February 1994) and the Slovak Republic (July 
1996). Other countries have prepared drafts of new laws to be enacted in the near future or 
simply have laws providing the existence of private pension funds but not their regulation. 
Russia is an example of where pension funds exist but are completely unregulated.74 
Legislation in each country provides the existence of privately managed pension 
funds based on voluntary provision and membership, and determined both on a defined 
benefit and contribution basis (with the exception of the Czech Republic where pension 
funds are"determined only on a defined contribution basis). In these countries, the provision 
of pension funds is generally not linked to a radical reform of the public pension systeln. 
Nevertheless, a more advanced reform attempt is taking place in Hungary where a draft for a 
law providing pension funds determined on a compulsory basis has just been prepared. 
In general, efforts to reform the public P A YG systems in most transition economies 
are aimed at raising retirement ages, limiting occupational privileges, strengthening tlle link 
between contribution and benefits (for example, by lengthening the base for calculating 
pension entitlement to cover as much as possible of tile working life-titne) and establishing 
clear rules of indexing (EC Commission, 1996). TItis means that private pension funds, 
74 For a detailed description of private pension fund laws and drafts for selected countries see: Lankes and 
Impavido 1996. 
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rather than a chance of reform, seem to be perceived as an instrument targeting professionals 
willing to increase their retirement savings. Furthermore, participation to the private 
schemes is always subject to participation to the public PA YG scheme and tlllS represents a 
considerable constraint to the development of pension funds. 
Table 11 Pension funds develoement, end 1996. 
Number of Members Assets 
.... ~~~.~.~!Y. ............................... !~~~.~ .................. r~~~) ............... f.~ .. ~~ .. ~.p.~ ..... . 
Hungary 212 300 0.40 
Czech Republic 44 1,200 0.14 
Russia 1,000 na 0.05 
Slovak Republic 0 0 0.00 
Source: Communication with supervisors and EU task managers. 
Table 11 reports some information relating to the size of tlle pension funds market in 
the Czech Republic, Hungary, Russia and Slovak Republic. Private pension funds are 
significant only in Hungary and in tlle Czech Republic where, at the end of 1996, tlle share of 
assets in GDP was 0.4 and 0.2 per cent respectively. Assets in Hungarian funds have 
reached ~UF 24 billion (US$ 136 million) against HUF 6.6 billion (US$ 47.3 million) at the 
end of 1995. In the Slovak Republic no pension funds exist although the new pension funds 
law was enacted almost one year ago and the only pension-type product is sold by life 
insurance companies. Funds in the Russian Federation have been operating in a legislative 
vacuum and therefore, have been unable to attract significant contributions. The shares of 
assets in GDP are very small even when compared to the same shares of German and Italian 
pension funds reported in Table 10. Nevertheless, tlle number of funds tllat have been set up 
since legislation was passed is hlgh both in Hungary and in the Czech Republic. In tllese 
countries almost one quarter and one fifth of the corresponding working population 
contribute in one way or another into pension funds. 
According to laws and drafts for laws not yet enacted, regulation in Eastern Europe 
on asset allocation varies greatly from country to country. Table 12 reports information 
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about the legal investment requirement, minimum capital requirements and tax treatment of 
pension funds. Already at a first glance, the differences in regulation across countries appear 
evident. 
Table 12 Pension funds legislation. 
Investment limits (in per. cent of total 
...................................... ~~~.~~~) ...................................... 
State Other 
bonds state Listed Real 
Min. capital Foreign and cash securities shares estate 
Count~ reguirement Earticieation Taxation 1 Portabili!1 (min.) (max.) (max.) (max.) 
Czech Republic CZK20m Unlimited ITT2 Full no fee free free free free 
Hungary HUF 20m 3 Unlimited EEE Full with 10 30 60 30 
fee 
Lithuania, TBA TBA EET Full no fee TBA TBA TBA TBA 
Poland TBA TBA EET Full no fee 10 30 30 10 
Russia na na TIT Full no fee TBA TBA TBA TBA 
Slovak Reeublic SKK30m na EET Full no fee free free na 20 
1: "T': taxed; "E": exempt. First position refers to contributions, second to investment income and third to benefits. 2: State 
subsidy for contributions instead of exemption. 3: The minimum capital requirement of nUF 20 million is required for funds 
established as legal entities separate from the sponsor. 
Source: Pension funds regulation. 
Generally, pension funds have to invest a minimum of 30 per cent of assets in State 
bonds of or other government securities. Such minimum investment requirement in risk free 
assets is studied to force funds to have low risk portfolios. Low risk portfolios have been 
proven to be necessary in the initial stage of reform to prevent the occurrence of theft, fraud 
or mismanagement (de Fougerolles 1995). At the same time different legislation provide 
different limits for equity investment. For instance, funds can invest in listed shares with 
limits of 30 and 60 per cent of assets in Hungary and Poland respectively while in the Czech 
Republic a "prudent man rule" exists with no normative prescriptions on investment 
behaviour. In any case, even for the Czech Republic where no positive portfolio regulation 
exist, active pension funds in Eastern Europe invest mainly in State bonds or in other 
government securities and for the moment it looks like as if pension funds in Eastern Europe 
play an important role only in debt financing. 
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Also the way pension funds are taxed differs considerably across countries. In 
Hungary strong tax incentives exist for pension funds (exemption of contributions paid by 
corporations, investment income and benefits) while in the Czech Republic the tax treatment 
is almost diametrically different (taxation at all three stages). 
In any case, although the establishment of a supportive legal and regulatory 
framework constitutes an important step towards the Uevelopment of pension funds many 
other steps have to be taken before the sector is likely to fully develop. Consistency of 
existing law with other commercial legislation remains mostly untested. TIle management of 
pension funds during the transition process is complicated by the instability of the general 
economic and political environments. Challenges include institutional weaknesses such as 
the shortage of local providers, regulators and consumers. At the same time, underlying 
assets and liabilities risks are high and capital markets are considerably immature. TIlls, 
together with the shortage of local long-term funds implies that the distribution of assets is 
markedly. skewed towards bonds and other government securities. Finally a concrete 
willingness of reforming the state pension system has not fully emerged in any transition 
economy All tillS means that although pension funds have the potential to contribute to the 
development of stock markets, the realisation of tillS possibility is unlikely to take place in 
the short -run. 
15.2 Evidence of stock market development 
Stock markets in transitional economies are still far from performing the roles before 
outlined in an effective way. Feasible stock Inarkets have been established only in the 
Russian Federation, tile Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary and the Slovak Republic. 
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Table 13 reports some information rdated to the size and activity of the major stock 
exchanges in transition economies and comparative information for other emerging and 
developed markets. 
Stock Inarkets in transition economies possess characteristics typical of emerging 
markets in early stages of development: a small number of listed companies' (notice that 
Table 13 reports the aggregate figure of listed and non listed companies), relatively small 
market capitalisation, high concentration, low turnover and high volatility. 
TahIe 13 Stock market deveIoement in the transition economies, end 1996.1 
. Number Shares Turnover per Annual Share Share 
of shares2 capitalisation Session Turnover turnover capitalisation 
~ US$ million)3 
(percent of (percent of 
Stock exchange (US$milliont (US$milliont capitalisation) GOp) 
Russia (RTS)" 160 19,911.50 41.00 10,800.00 54.24 3.94 
Prague 1,671 19,790.15 36.84 9,172.60 46.35 40.03 
Warsaw 83 8,155.99 41.73 10,432.39 127.91 6.43 
Bratislava 950 5,632.66 12.80 3,200.00 56.81 30.93 
Budapest 45 5,269.09 12.23 3,031.99 57.54 12.55 
Zagreb 68 1,359.12 na 103.86 7.64 7.52 
Ljubljana 52 1,229.47 0.58 145.25 11.81 7.32 
Vilnius 350 899.93 0.33 47.23 5.25 8.98 
Tallinn 16 896.20 1.39 366.30 40.87 18.80 
Kiev 0 600.00 na 17.00 2.83 1.38 
Riga 34 115.23 0.12 11.67 10.13 2.34 
Bucharest 21 72.64 0.245 6.24 8.60 .0.28 
Skopje 3 63.61 na 0.40 0.63 1.83 
Sofia 26 4.86 0.045 0.01 0.17 0.17 
NYSE - 5,654,815.40 - 3,082,916.10 54.52 77.99 
London 1,346,640.70 1,153,221.30 85.64 121.32 
Germany 577,364.80 593,936.20 102.87 23.96 
Paris 499,989.60 716,507.60 143.30 32.25 
Kuala Lumpur 213,757.40 60,792.40 28.44 254.17 
San Paulo 147,635.80 57,024.50 38.62 21.94 
Thailand 135,774.20 59,303.30 43.68 81.31 
Mexico 90,694.00 35,037.20 38.63 37.63 
Santiago 72,927.70 11,411.60 15.66 108.36 
Buenos Aires 37,783.80 31,932.60 84.51 13.45 
New Zealand 31,949.80 8,718.00 27.28 54.89 
1: data for comparative stock exchanges refer to 1995; 2: data for transition economies refer to listed and unlisted shares 
while data for comparative stock exchanges refer to listed shares only; 3: exchange rate of 6 Jan 1997; 4: 90 stocks on 
RTS-l and 70 stocks on RTS-2, all other data refer to RTS-l only. Annual turnover is a projection of Jan 1997 total 
tumover; 5: US$ thousands. 
Source: communication with individual stock exchanges. 
Other common features are the predominance of individual investors although it is 
claimed (Euromoney 1997) that the presence institutional investors is quickly rising. 
Nevertheless, activity varies greatly across stock markets in the transition economies, mainly 
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reflecting the different structure of the privatisation programmes recently implemented. 
Differences in activity are summarised in the last two columns of Table 13 where the ratio of 
market capitalisation to GDP measures the extent to which securities are used to raise capital 
and diversify risk and the ratio of annual turnover to capitalisation reflects liquidity and 
transaction costs. 
In the Czech Republic, the Prague Stock Exchange (PSE) includes three levels of 
listing and trading: the main, secondary and free markets. Stock.1;j are divided among these 
levels on the basis of size, liquidity and information disclosure requirements. Companies 
and funds in the main and secondary markets (44 and 54 stocks respectively) are required to 
provide quarterly financial statements winle all companies are required to report transaction 
in excess of US$ 7,500. Continuous trading takes place only in the main market for selected 
stocks (11 stocks) whlle the other stocks have price fixings five times a week. In the Czech 
Republic, the two waves of mass privatisation programmes (1993 and 1995) resulted in more 
than 1650 companies being floated across the three tiers of the stock exchange and 
capitalisation has reached almost US$ 20 billion at the end of 1996 (40 per cent of GDP). 
The mass participation of the population in the voucher programme as well as the activity of 
the Investment Privatisation Funds (IPF) have produced the potential for hlgh volumes of 
transactions. As a matter of fact annual share turnover has been increasing by 150 per cent 
in average since 1993 and reached at the end of 1996 a level of 40 per cent of total 
capitalisation. Although the PSE turnover is far from being comparable to the turnover in 
developed markets, it is still one of the highest in the region. 
In Hungary, the absence of an aggressive mass privatisation programme has implied 
a slower development of the stock market. At the end of 1996, the number of listed and non 
listed shares at the Budapest stock exchange (BSE) was considerably small (20 shares in the 
listed "A" and 25 in the listed "B" category respectively) and the share of capitalisation in 
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GDP was 12 per cent. Nevertheless, the annual share turnover reached US$ 3 billion, 
corresponding to 57 per cent of share capitalisation .. 
Similar relationship between privatisation programme and stock market development 
can be observed in Poland. TIle combination to different approaches to privatisation and the 
favourable tax treatment (capital gains are tax exempt' as well as re-invested dividends) has 
contributed to making the Warsaw stock exchange (WSE) the most active in the area. 
Average session turnover equalled US$ 40 million during 1996 (113 per cent more than in 
1995), corresponding to nearly 128 per cent of share capitalisation. Capitalisation of the 
WSE is considerably small (6.5 per cent of GDP) but it has increased in average by 133 per 
cent since 1993 reaching at the end of 1996 a level of more than US$ 8 billion. The lnass 
privatisation programme which got under way only recently should promote the development 
of the stock market as it did in the Czech Republic. 
In the Slovak Republic, the Bratislava stock exchange (BSE) has 33 full members; of 
which 17 banks and 16 brokerage houses. TIle equity market is divided between listed and 
non-listed shares. As of November 1996 the number of listed shares was 18 (of which 11 in 
the senior market and 7 in the junior market) while the number of unlisted shares was around 
939. In order to be listed in the senior market companies need to have, among other things, a 
minimum capital of SKK 500 million (SKK 100 million for the junior market) and need to 
have been in activity for at last 3 years (1 year for the junior market). At the end of 1996, 
total equity market capitalisation was US$ 5,632 million (15 per cent more than the previous 
year) which corresponds to 30 per cent of GDP while annual turnover was US$ 3,200 million 
(57 per cent of capitalisation). Similarly to the Czech republic the high number of listed and 
non-listed shares is due to the voucher privatisation programme but only few of them are 
actually traded. (Gilson 1997). 
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In the Russian Federation the bulk of equity trade takes place in the Russian Trading 
System (RTS) that since 1995 has been regulated by the National Associations of Security 
Market Participants (NAUFOR). The RTS is the single most important development in the 
infrastructure of the equity capital market. The system accounts for around 50 per cent of all 
trading activity in Russian equities and it consists of more than 150 members. On level one 
there are almost 90 stocks and recorded volume reach~d US$ 900 million in January 1997. 
Trading over the second level of the RTS (the second-tier stock listing) began in December 
1996 and at present 70 common and preferred shares are listed. Estimated capitalisation on 
RTS-l was US$ 20 billion at the end of 1996 with an annual turnover of US$ 11 billion. 
Average turnover per session is estimated to increase by 75 per cent in 1997 reaching the 
value ofUS$ 70 million at the end of the year (Euromoney 1997). 
Although stock markets in the region show some degree of diversity, the common 
feature is that they are still in a state of infancy if compared to stock markets in developed 
and other. emerging markets. Underdeveloped securities markets can be a serious constraint 
to the privatisation process particu1arly when public offers of shares is used as a method. 
Furthermore, underdeveloped securities markets do not represent an efficient corporate 
governance mechanism and tlns may hamper restructuring where it is actually mostly 
needed. The development of stock markets in transition economies can promote information 
disclosure and have positive spillovers on the restructuring of the newly privatised 
companies and on the liquidity of the companies already restructured. 
16. CONCLUSIONS 
Public P A YO pension schemes in Eastern Europe are characterised by a high 
expenditure share in per cent of ODP, normally accounting for between two tlnrds to three 
quarters of total social security outlays. Although these countries are classified as emerging 
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markets, their average public pension expenditure is by far out of line with respect to the 
average expenditure of Latin American and South East Asian countries, for instance. This 
can be explained by the differences in demographic structure between Eastern European 
countries and other emerging markets. Many transition economies have a demographic 
structure similar to the one of GEeD countries with high demographic. and system 
dependency ratios; therefore, average expenditure le'(els are also similar. Public PAYG 
pension schemes in Eastern Europe are also characterised by almost universal coverage, high 
replacement and contribution rates, and low retirement age. As a result, most schemes have 
large implicit debt liabilities which can only increase with the progressive ageing of 
population. Furthermore, the transition process has contributed to eroding the real value of 
pension benefits, therefore giving rise to concerns about increasing old age poverty levels. 
The development of pension funds, which can be seen as an immediate consequence 
of a pension reform, can have a profound impact on the development of financial sectors and 
more specifically of stock markets. Pension funds represent an important source of long-
term finance deriving from employers and employees' contributions. In developed countries 
where pension systems are not based on public PA YG schemes like in the United States and 
in the United Kingdom, pension funds are the strongest institutional investors in the stock 
market. 
Pension funds can also play an important role in promoting efficient mechanisms of 
corporate governance. Factual evidence shows that pension funds do not play an active role 
in corporate governance as controlling shareholders but they rather adopt a portfolio 
approach and control is possibly exerted through take-overs activity. Hence, pension funds 
rely on the evaluative function of the stock market in order to address portfolio policies. 
This means that if pension funds do not play an active role in corporate governance, they 
may as well play an indirect role by stimulating the production and diffusion of information 
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about firms. The development of stock markets, together with increased capitalisation, 
liquidity and efficiency, implies exactly that a higher volume of information is produced. 
Firms seek long-term equity finance to boost their net revenues and they can obtain it on the 
stock market only if they meet some given information disclosure requirements. The larger 
the number of firms that are allowed to be listed the higher the volume of information needed 
to separate bad firms from good firms. 
The fundamental assumption made here is that long-term equity finance favours 
economy-wide growth and that information disclosure improves on the one hand corporate 
governance, if it offsets the possible negative impact on governance of institutional investors 
portfolio policies; on the other hand it facilitates risk diversification policies of pension 
funds and therefore, it promotes their deveiopment. Improved governance, together with the 
increased efficiency represented by the development of pension funds, can lead in turn to a 
decrease in the cost of capital with positive feedback on economy-wide growth through its 
impact on the supply and demand for long-term finance. 
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17. ApPENDIX 
17.1. Derivation of the inference function r+ h(i) = (r+ I~)e -t : 
Let 
be the value of the firm h which is perceived as being <\>s = b. TIle total differential of 
Vh = Vo is given by: 
d~ = -di + [-~S~Jdb = 0 
r+h 
Noticing that s(<\>s) = [r+<\>s]i.., the slope of firms' indifference curve in the space 
X 
(i x b) is given by: 
db = -[~S'J-l = _ r+h 
di r+h b I 
Following Bernheim (1994), a fully separating equilibrium is characterised by the 
function <\>sCi) tangent to the indifference curves and choices i must be self-fulfilling in the 
sense that <\>s = h. TIus means that: 
<\>'s (i) = r+<\>s(i) 
I 
The general solution to this first order s~parable differential equation is given by: 
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r + h(i) = Ce -+ 
where ~s = h. We only need to define the initial condition in order to find a specific 
solution to our differential equation. This can be found by denoting with h the marginal 
type investing i = O. This means that the constant of integration takes the form of: 
,.. 
which yields the signalling function characterising the fully (partially, if h < 1) 
separating equilibrium: 
,.. i 
r+h(i) = (r+h)e-T 





1t sm (g) = f[i(g,h)+~(g)-C']dh 
o 
X 
where i(g,h)=I[log(r+g)-log(r+h)]and ~(g)=---I can be solved by 
r+g 
using Leibniz's rule. Thus: 
g 
a1t sm = i(g, g) + ~(g) - C' + f [i'(g, h) + ~'(g) Jdh = 0 
ag 0 
X I X , 
=---I+g---g -C =0 
r+g r+g' (r+g)2 
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( X J r , = r+g -I r+g -c =0 




The purpose of this dissertation was to apply the concepts developed by the literature 
of asymmetric information and the principal-agent framework to three separate. issues. TIle 
first issues relates to the prolonged negative real growth, financial disintermediation, 
inflation and low real interest rates in eight former Soviet Union countries after the political 
collapse of the Soviet Union. The second issue relates to the individual behaviour of 
members in group credit contracts. TIle third and final issue relates to the mutual 
development of pension funds and stock markets. 
The first chapter is divided into two main parts. In the first part I analyse data 
relative to the macroeconomic and financial development of eight former Soviet Union 
countries (Armenia, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova and Ukraine) 
over the period 1991 - 1994; i.e. soon after the collapse of the Soviet Union. In the second 
part of the chapter I develop a model of credit rationing with ex ante asymmetric inforination 
which succeeds in explaining the phenomena that the data seem to suggest. 
After the political collapse of the Soviet Union, countries experienced a considerable 
economic instability from which only the Baltic States seem to have recovered at the end of 
the period analysed. TIle economic instability was characterised, among other things, by a 
sharp decrease in real GDP, high inflation, low real interest rates and financial 
disintermediation. Furthermore, rigidities in the labour market implied that nominal wage 
and employment remained relatively constant over the period. TIle initial instability is well 
explained by the hypothesis of monetary overhang. Nevertheless, the subsequent instability 
cannot be explained in the same way. Interest rates remained very low for several years due 
to a situation of hyperinflation and adjustment (partially achieved only in the Baltic States) 
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took place only through prices. Furthermore, the economic recovery seems to have taken 
place only in the Baltic States but again, in a period of time well beyond what the monetary 
overhang hypothesis suggests. In these countries, the level of financial deepening, measured 
as the ratio of domestic credit to the private sector over GDP, started increasing already in 
1993, suggesting a relationship between financial deepening and growth. The Baltic States 
are not the only states showing such a pattern. In 1994.financial deepening increased also in 
Belarus and Ukraine. Since then, these countries showed signs of recovery with decreasing 
negative real growth. 
The model developed in the first chapter gives a possible explanation for the 
different pattern followed in the transition between the Baltic States and the rest of the 
former Soviet Union countries. The explanation put forward relates to the presence of 
imperfect information in credit markets, coupled with a weak institutional and legal 
framework, especially as far as the system of property rights is concerned. In such a set up, 
governments have tried to increase the efficiency of the credit market by providing the 
banking sector with "cheap" money. Because of the low revenues from income, the only 
source for this extra funds has been the inflation tax. Nevertheless, by producing inflation, 
governments reduced the profitability of projects for borrowers and as a consequence, the 
real expected return to banks on each loan. As a result, banks kept nominal interest rates on 
loans low in order to offset the negative impact of inflation on borrowers' quality. Because 
of the assumption of Bertrand competitor banks, this meant that lower profits were available 
to pay depositors and nominal interest rates on deposits also remained low perpetuating the 
situation of credit rationing. A first conclusion can be drawn from the model developed. In 
a world of imperfect information and with Bertrand competitor banks, a policy aimed at 
expanding credit by providing money to the banking system and relying on the inflation tax, 
may not increase the supply of credit if households' supply of funds is sufficiently elastic to 
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the real interest rate on deposits. Furthermore, even if expansion is achieved, this may not be 
sustainable and it could risk the collapse of the whole financial system. 
, The role of inflation and collateral in this model suggests a second option available 
to governments to expand credit. By increasing the value of the collateral that banks can 
seize in the event of project failure, governments improve the quality of applicants served by 
banks. This policy is unlikely to be as inflationary as the previous one and it would result in 
higher real interest rates and increasing supply of credit from the banking sector. More 
specifically, governments should first stabilise their economies and through tIllS, reduce 
inflation and create the conditions for a positive credit demand. Once the demand for credit 
exists, it can be improved by strengthening the legal framework with particular reference to 
the bankruptcy law and private property right systems. 
This fits surprisingly well tIle data collected. Credit rationing has been relaxed in 
those countries with low inflation, with a stronger legal framework and better defined 
institutions. In countries with high inflation, the quality of borrowers has been too low °to 
create any substantial demand for credit. The situation of the financial market in countries 
such as Belarus, Ukraine, Georgia and Armenia at tIle end of 1994 was a situation of virtual 
collapse with extremely low demand for credit despite tIle negative real interest rates on 
loans. 
The analysis conducted is claimed to be original because of its marked 
microeconomic approach; furthermore, two other contributions to the existing literature can 
be identified. A first contribution to the literature which studies the macroeconomic 
stabilisation in the transition economies of Eastern Europe and former Soviet Union 
countries is made by suggesting that the failur~ of government policies in stabilising their 
economies may be related to the presence of imperfect information in financial markets. A 
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second contribution is made by explicitly modelling the effects that an improved property 
right system and legal framework would have on corporate governance and loan repayment. 
In the second chapter I analyse the determinants of individual behaviour in group 
lending contracts. Group lending programmes of the Grameen Bank's type rely on the 
formation of "social collateral" which offset the lack of physical collateral of poor borrowers 
in marginal rural areas to improve the risk sharing properties of the equilibrium contracts. 
"Social collateral" is not some physical element that lenders can seize in the bad state but it 
is a product of group interactions. It represents the discipline that monitoring has on co-
borrowers' effort and such discipline may increase the individual equilibrium level of effort 
so that poor borrowers can obtain more favourable contractual terms from formal lenders. 
Group interactions produce contrasting effects on individual optimal effort. Effort 
tends to be lowered because of free riding and profit sharing; furthermore, other things equal, 
the monitoring activity reduces the amount of effort that each individual can dedicate to the 
project, thus reducing the social norm. Positive effects are related to the social no~m that 
groups endogenously develop and to the discipline that derives from monitoring. Deviation 
from the norm are punished with social sanctions by peers when they can be observed and 
this tends to increase the equilibrium level of effort. Tins form of behaviour discipline is the 
"social collateral" that may increase banks' expected return on each loan. 
Banks' expected return on each loan will decrease or increase according to whether 
the negative effect of group lending on effort dominates or not. The negative effect is likely 
to dominate when groups are either too small or too large. When groups are too small the 
discipline imposed by monitoring cannot offset the negative impact on the social norm and 
therefore, group expected payoff would decre~e. When groups are too large the ability to 
impose sanction is too low; tins lowers the discipline and tIlerefore, the expected payoff of 
the group. In any case, the reason why borrowers tend not to form either too small or too 
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large groups cannot be explained only by the magnitude of the free riding problem as great 
part of the literature on group lending and peer monitoring seems to underline. There are 
factors of exclusively social nature that affect group formation. TIlese factors can be 
identified with the ability of co-borrowers to monitor each other; with the ability of groups to 
impose social sanctions on deviating partners and with the individual perception of social 
sanctions. 
The contribution to the existing literature consists in the attempt to formally study 
the determinants of group size in group lending contracts, highlighting the importance of 
social interactions as major determinants of individual behaviour in groups. The individual 
perception of social sanctions ("s" in the model) seems to playa crucial role. It was easy to 
show that the optimal group size is positively correlated with the individual sensitivity to 
social sanctions and this observation may provide an indirect answer to why difficulties have 
been encountered in replicating the Grameen Bank success outside Bangladesh. Very 
simply, itis necessary that a minimal strictly positive value of "s" exists ex ante for a group 
to be formed. In other words, the higher the individual sensitivity to social sanctions, the 
higher the likelihood that a group will be formed and the larger will be the optimal group 
size. If this is true, it must also be the case that group lending programmes will be more 
successful simply among individuals which simply have a high ex ante predisposition to 
form groups. 
In the third chapter I analyse the issue of pension reform and pension funds 
development with particular reference to the transition economies of Eastern Europe. Public 
P A YG pension schemes in Eastern Europe are characterised by high expenditure share in per 
cent of GDP, normally accounting for between two thirds to three quarters of total social 
security outlays. Although these countries are classitied as emerging markets, their average 
public pension expenditure is by far out of line with respect to the average expenditure of 
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Latin American and South East Asian countries, for instance. This can be explained by the 
differences in demographic structure between Eastern European countries and other 
emerging markets. Many transition economies have a demographic structure similar to the 
one of OEeD countries with high demographic and system dependency ratios; therefore, 
average expenditure levels of are also similar. Public P A YG pension schemes in Eastern 
Europe are also characterised by almost universaJ coverage, high replacement and 
contribution rates, and low retirement age. As a result, most schemes have large implicit 
debt liabilities which can only increase with the progressive ageing of population. 
Furthermore, the transition process has contributed to eroding the real value of pension 
benefits, therefore arising concerns about increasing old age poverty levels. 
The development of pension funds, which can be seen as an immediate consequence 
of a pension reform, can have a profound impact on the development of financial sectors and 
more specifically of stock markets. Pension funds represent an important source of long-
term finance deriving from employers and employees' contributions. In developed countries 
where pension systems are not based on public P A YG schemes like in the United States and 
in the United Kingdom, pension funds are the strongest institutional investors in the stock 
market. 
Pension funds can also play an important role in promoting efficient mechanisms of 
corporate governance. Factual evidence shows that pension funds do not play an active role 
in corporate governance as controlling shareholders but they rather adopt a portfolio 
approach and control is possibly exerted through take-overs activity. Hence, pension funds 
rely on the evaluative function of the stock market in order to address portfolio policies. 
This means that if pension funds do not play an active role in corporate governance, they 
may as well play an indirect role by stimulating the production and diffusion of information 
about firms. The development of stock markets, together with increased capitalisation, 
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liquidity and efficiency, implies exactly that a higher volume of information is produced. 
Firms seek long-term equity finance to boost their net revenues and they can obtain it on the 
stock market only if they meet some given information disclosure requirements. The larger 
the number of firms that are allowed to be listed the higher the volume of information needed 
to separate bad firms from good firms. 
The fundamental assumption made here is tliat long-term equity finance favours 
economy-wide growth and that information disclosure improves on the one hand corporate 
governance, if it offsets the possible negative impact on governance of institutional investors 
portfolio policies; on the other hand it facilitates risk diversification policies of pension 
funds and therefore, it promotes their development. Improved governance, together with the 
increased efficiency represented by the development of pension funds, can lead in turn to a 
decrease in the cost of capital with positive feedback on economy-wide growth through its 
impact on the supply and demand for long-term finance. 
The original contribution of the third chapter is twofold. I formally mo~el the 
positive feedback between the development of pension funds and stock market and show 
how their mutual interactions can be beneficial to the efficiency of the stock market and the 
development of effective schemes of corporate governance. I show that in a bilateral 
monopoly with efficient bargaining and where the revenues of the downstream monopolist 
are allowed to increase with its bargaining power, the Nash bargaining solution is not the 
usual contract curve, vertical at the level of quantity that maximises the "vertically 
integrated" monopoly profits, but it is now a downward sloping contract curve with quantity 
traded increasing with the bargaining power of the downstream monopolist. 
The design of effective policies for financial development is based on the crucial 
prerequisite of macroeconomic stability. Economic instability destroys existing financial 
markets and the mutual relationship between financial development and growtll. 
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Furthermore, this necessary macroeconomic condition has to be complemented by a 
throughout understanding of the behaviour of microeconomic units for financial 
development policies to be successful. In this dissertation I analysed the response of specific 
microeconomic units in financial markets when market failures determined by the presence 
of imperfect information exist. In all three chapters I show how important it is to identify 
these market failures and, within the framework presented, I underlined which aspects of 
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